RALPH L. CLARK, JR. v. UNITED STATES, 136 A.3d 334

Background

Ralph L. Clark pleaded guilty to an armed robbery; the plea agreement capped the government s allocution at a 10-year sentence, but the government s sentencing memorandum erroneously recommended 20 years.
At sentencing the prosecutor acknowledged the error, agreed the 20-year recommendation was "off the table," filed a corrected memorandum the next day, and argued during allocution that 10 years was "very generous." The judge sentenced Clark to 10 years.
On direct appeal (Clark I) the D.C. Court of Appeals found the government s initial breach "grave and inexcusable" but, because defense counsel did not object or move for reassignment, reviewed only for plain error and affirmed the sentence.
Clark filed a § 23-110 motion asserting plea counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) consult with him about the breach before sentencing, and (2) advise him of available options including seeking reassignment for resentencing or withdrawing the plea.
The trial judge denied the § 23-110 motion without a hearing, treating counsel s conduct as a tactical decision and concluding Clark suffered no Strickland prejudice in light of Clark I; Clark appealed (Clark II).
The court held counsel s failure to advise was constitutionally deficient (counsel must consult client on fundamental choices), but Clark failed to show a reasonable probability he would have sought to withdraw his plea, so no Strickland prejudice; judgment affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Clark)	Defendant's Argument (United States)	Held
Whether plea counsel was constitutionally deficient for not consulting Clark before proceeding with sentencing after the government s breach	Counsel failed to inform Clark of the breach and available remedies (reassignment or plea withdrawal), usurping Clark s decision	Counsel made a permissible tactical choice to proceed given the judge s reaction and risk of worse outcome before another judge	Court: Counsel s failure to consult was constitutionally deficient; client must decide fundamental choices
Whether Clark was prejudiced by counsel s deficiency (Strickland prejudice)	If told, Clark would likely have sought to withdraw his plea, so a reasonable probability of different outcome exists	Even if informed, it was not reasonably probable Clark would withdraw because trial risked a 10-year mandatory minimum versus his plea term	Court: No reasonable probability Clark would have sought withdrawal; no Strickland prejudice; relief denied
Whether the trial court abused discretion by denying a § 23-110 hearing	Clark argued statutory presumption favors a hearing because allegations concerned facts outside the record	Government argued allegations were vague or palpably incredible and Clark I foreclosed prejudice	Court: Denial of hearing was not required because, on this record, prejudice cannot be shown; any hearing would be moot
Effect of Clark I/plain error ruling on collateral Strickland claim	Clark distinguished direct-appeal plain error (reassignment) from counsel s failure to advise about plea withdrawal	Government argued Clark I precludes showing prejudice here	Court: Clark I does not preclude collateral review of counsel s failure to advise on plea withdrawal, but Clark still failed to prove prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Clark v. United States, 51 A.3d 1266 (D.C. 2012) (direct-appeal decision addressing government s breach and plain error review)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (remedies for government breach of plea agreement include plea withdrawal or resentencing before an unaware judge)
Dominguez Benitez v. United States, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (prejudice standard for withdrawing plea parallels Strickland; must show reasonable probability defendant would not have pleaded)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain error review criteria)
Long v. United States, 910 A.2d 298 (D.C. 2006) (§ 23-110 hearings: presumption in favor of hearing unless motion and record conclusively show no relief)
Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92 (D.C. 2002) (review standards for ineffective assistance claims under Strickland)