Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
411 U.S. App. D.C. 105
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Ralls purchased four Oregon windfarm project companies to develop Butter Creek wind projects.
- CFIUS reviewed the transaction under Exon-Florio, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170, because owners were foreign nationals.
- CFIUS issued interim mitigation orders restricting site access and construction; later the President issued a permanent Presidential Order prohibiting the transaction and directing divestiture.
- Ralls sued in district court challenging both the CFIUS Order and the Presidential Order, including a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment.
- The district court dismissed several claims as moot or failing to state a claim; the appeal challenges the due process ruling and seeks relief.
- The court ultimately reverses and remands for due process protections, while leaving mootness and other claims for district court consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction to review due process claim | 2170(e) bars review of Presidential actions. | Statutory bar precludes all such reviewing; no jurisdiction. | Statutory bar does not foreclose review of as-applied due process claim. |
| Whether due process required notice and access to evidence | Ralls must receive notice, access to unclassified evidence, and opportunity to rebut. | National security concerns justify limited process at CFIUS stage; no need for more. | Presidential Order violated due process by denying notice/response to unclassified evidence and opportunity to rebut. |
| Whether the CFIUS Order claims are moot or capable of repetition evading review | Capable-of-repetition mootness applies; CFIUS could revisit similar transactions. | Moot under standard mootness doctrine since Presidential Order revoked the CFIUS Order. | CFIUS Order claims are moot but capable-of-repetition yet evading-review applies; remand to address merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (clear intent required to bar constitutional claims; due process not precluded by broad bar)
- Ungar v. Smith, 667 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (no preclusion of constitutional claims without explicit legislative text)
- Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applies clear-and-convincing standard to preclusion of constitutional claims)
- Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (Supreme Court 1981) (contingency of property interests affects Takings Clause analysis; limited applicability)
- NCRI v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (due process requires notice and access to unclassified evidence in FTO designations)
- PMOI II, 613 F.3d 220 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (due process requires notice and opportunity to respond to unclassified evidence before designation)
- People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State (PMOI I), 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (review of FTO designation for public-law elements; not all findings reviewable)