Rafael Tiscareno-Garcia v. Eric Holder, Jr., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3280

Background

Rafael Tiscareno-Garcia, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without inspection and after years in the U.S. was arrested in 2010, pled guilty to illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a), and served 181 days in jail.
DHS served a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging removability for unlawful entry and subsequently initiated removal proceedings; Tiscareno-Garcia conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
Cancellation of removal requires, among other things, showing 10 years continuous presence and good moral character during that period. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) bars a finding of good moral character if, during the relevant period, the person was confined for an aggregate of 180 days or more as a result of conviction.
The government moved to pretermit the cancellation application, arguing the 181-day incarceration permanently bars a finding of good moral character under § 1101(f)(7).
The IJ and the BIA agreed with the government, applying § 1101(f)(7) literally to bar Tiscareno-Garcia from establishing good moral character and thus from eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Tiscareno-Garcia appealed, arguing (1) the statute’s literal application is absurd because illegal entry convictions are inherent to many removable aliens and (2) alternatively the 10-year good-character period ended at service of the NTA so his confinement occurred after the relevant period; he also asserted a due process challenge.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1101(f)(7) bars a finding of good moral character based on 181 days served for a § 1325(a) illegal-entry conviction	The literal application is absurd: Congress intended to allow relief to aliens who entered illegally, so a § 1325(a) conviction should not bar cancellation	The statute is clear: § 1101(f)(7) precludes good moral character if an alien was confined ≥180 days during the period, regardless of offense type	Court upheld plain-text reading; not absurd; § 1101(f)(7) applies and bars relief when confinement ≥180 days
Whether the 10-year period for good moral character ends at service of the NTA, excluding post-NTA confinement from § 1101(f)(7) analysis	Confinement here occurred after the NTA was served, so the 181 days are outside the 10-year period and should not disqualify him	Government relied on BIA precedent that the relevant period ends with final administrative decision; IJ/BIA considered confinement within the relevant period	Court dismissed this claim for lack of jurisdiction because petitioner failed to raise it to the BIA and thus did not exhaust administrative remedies
Whether applying §§ 1229b(b)(1), 1101(f)(7), and 1325(a) violates due process	The combined effect deprived him of meaningful opportunity to obtain relief because the criminal sentence foreclosed immigration eligibility	Government argued no procedural defect in removal proceeding; criminal conviction does not divest immigration courts of authority	Court rejected due process claim—no procedural defect in immigration proceedings and no prejudicial fundamental unfairness
Whether the agency misapplied statutory scheme or exceeded Chevron deference bounds	Implied: statute must be read to avoid absurdity and preserve congressional intent to permit relief for many illegal entrants	Agency and government relied on plain statutory language and plausible congressional purpose to exclude those serving long incarcerations	Court applied plain-meaning rule; found plausible congressional purpose and no basis to override text

Key Cases Cited

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (framework for statutory interpretation and agency deference)
Sigmon Coal Co. v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2000) (rare-absurdity doctrine for overriding plain statutory text)
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (affirming Sigmon Coal standard)
Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (courts may override literal terms only in exceptional absurdity)
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (courts must give effect to plain statutory terms)
Romero-Ochoa v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding use of incarceration length as proxy for offense seriousness)
In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004) (court will reject absurdity argument if plausible congressional intent supports plain meaning)
Huaman-Cornelio v. BIA, 979 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1992) (exhaustion requirement for judicial review of removal orders)
Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2014) (failure to raise claim to BIA deprives court of jurisdiction)
Massis v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2008) (same principle on administrative exhaustion)
Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2008) (standards for due process claims in removal proceedings)