Rafael Larios-Reyes v. Loretta Lynch
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21711
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- Rafael Antonio Larios-Reyes, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Maryland to "Third Degree Sex Offense" under Md. Crim. Law § 3-307 after criminal charges involving a four-year-old victim; he was sentenced to probation and required to register as a sex offender.
- DHS charged him as removable, alleging the § 3-307 conviction constituted an aggravated felony for "sexual abuse of a minor" under INA § 1101(a)(43)(A); the immigration judge and a single-member BIA decision agreed and ordered removal.
- The BIA treated § 3-307 as divisible and concluded Larios-Reyes was convicted under § 3-307(a)(3) (sexual contact with a victim under 14 where offender is ≥4 years older) and that that subsection matched the generic federal offense by comparison to a California statute analyzed in Matter of Esquivel-Quintana.
- The Fourth Circuit granted review of the legal question whether the conviction is an aggravated felony (jurisdiction preserved for questions of law) and applied the modified categorical approach because it found § 3-307 divisible and that the Shepard documents showed conviction under § 3-307(a)(3).
- The court held that the BIA erred: it neither identified a proper generic federal definition nor reasonably applied agency precedent; Maryland law allows conviction for "abuse" without an element of sexual gratification, whereas the federal generic definition requires misuse/maltreatment for sexual gratification.
- Result: the Fourth Circuit held § 3-307(a)(3) is broader than the federal "sexual abuse of a minor," granted the petition for review, vacated the removal order, and ordered Larios-Reyes's release from DHS custody.
Issues
| Issue | Larios-Reyes's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 3-307 is divisible so the modified categorical approach may be used | § 3-307 is divisible and the Shepard record identifies the subsection of conviction (§ 3-307(a)(3)). | § 3-307 is divisible and supports treating the conviction as sexual abuse of a minor. | § 3-307 is divisible and Shepard docs show conviction under § 3-307(a)(3). |
| Proper definition of the federal generic offense "sexual abuse of a minor" | Federal generic definition requires misuse/maltreatment for sexual gratification (adopt Diaz-Ibarra/Padilla-Reyes). | BIA's comparison to California statute (Esquivel-Quintana) suffices to find categorical match. | Court adopts Diaz-Ibarra definition: misuse/maltreatment of a minor for sexual gratification. |
| Whether § 3-307(a)(3) categorically matches the federal definition | § 3-307(a)(3) does not require sexual gratification and thus is broader than the federal crime. | § 3-307(a)(3) is narrower or comparable to statutes previously found to match the federal offense. | § 3-307(a)(3) is broader—Maryland allows conviction based on non‑sexual-gratification "abuse," so it does not categorically match. |
| Deference owed to the BIA's analysis | BIA's nonprecedential decision and reliance on Esquivel-Quintana are not entitled to Chevron; agency reasoning is unpersuasive. | The BIA's interpretation should be given deference and is sufficient to classify the conviction as an aggravated felony. | The court declines Chevron deference, finds BIA analysis unpersuasive under Skidmore, and reviews de novo. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach for comparing state offenses to generic federal offenses)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (clarifies categorical approach and necessity that state offense necessarily involve generic elements)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (limits use of modified categorical approach to divisible statutes and elements, not means)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (distinguishes alternative elements from alternative means for divisibility)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (identifies documents courts may consult under the modified categorical approach)
- Diaz-Ibarra v. United States, 522 F.3d 343 (4th Cir.) (adopts definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" requiring misuse/maltreatment for sexual gratification)
- Amos v. Lynch, 790 F.3d 512 (4th Cir.) (discusses limits of Chevron deference to BIA on defining "sexual abuse of a minor")
- United States v. Alfaro, 835 F.3d 470 (4th Cir.) (holds § 3-307 is divisible for other federal comparisons and discusses Maryland "sexual contact" scope)