Rackley v. Rackley (In re Rackley), 502 B.R. 615

Plaintiffs seek dischargeability of debts awarded in a Georgia state court Final Fee Order (2011) against Mrs. Rackley in a child custody dispute.
Final Fee Order sanctions include $130,561.14 in attorneys’ fees and costs against Mrs. Rackley and her attorney, Laura E. Austin, for frivolous claims and expanded proceedings.
The state court also awarded Mr. Rackley $2,474.15 for custody-related fees and expenses and guardian ad litem Sally Cannon $11,865.00 for GAL services, each weighed by financial capacities.
The adversary proceeding was filed in 2012; the court denied some summary judgment motions for procedural reasons but held a hearing on August 28, 2013.
The court analyzed whether these state-court sanctions and guardianship awards are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5), §523(a)(15), or §523(a)(6), and granted/denied relief accordingly.
Conclusion: partial grant and partial denial of Plaintiffs’ summary judgment request; several debts found nondischargeable under §523(a)(5) or §523(a)(15), while §523(a)(6) claim denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether sanctions and related fees are dischargeable as domestic support	Rackley argues they are non-dischargeable under §523(a)(5) as support	Rackley contends guardianship and related sanctions fall outside §101(14A) and are not ‘support’	Partially resolved: some sanctions/fees nondischargeable under §523(a)(5) as support.
Whether guardian ad litem fees constitute domestic support	Cannon’s GAL fees are in the nature of support for the child	GAL fees are not inherently supportable under §101(14A)	GAL fees awarded as guardian ad litem are nondischargeable under §523(a)(5).
Whether sanctions under O.C.G.A. §9-15-14(b) are nondischargeable under §523(a)(15) or other provisions	Sanctions were incurred in a domestic-relations dispute and qualify under §523(a)(15)	Pre-BAPCPA and state-law sanctions may be dischargeable absent §523(a)(5) applicability	Debts totaling $69,226.32, $53,335.09 and $8,000 are nondischargeable under §523(a)(15) (per order); the Rackleys’ §523(a)(5) claim denied as to these amounts.
Whether §523(a)(6) claim is warranted given willful/malicious injury standard	Rackley seeks §523(a)(6) nondischargeability for willful injury	No clear evidence of intent to injure; conduct was frivolous but not shown to intend injury	Denied; §523(a)(6) claim rejected.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burden and burden-shifting standard)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (material facts must be judged in light most favorable to non-movant)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (S. Ct. 2005) (limits on reviewing final state-court judgments)
In re St. Laurent, II, 991 F.2d 672 (11th Cir. 1993) (collateral estoppel elements under Georgia law apply in dischargeability)
In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1985) (definition of ‘in the nature of support’ under §523(a)(5))
In re Strickland, 90 F.3d 444 (11th Cir. 1996) (federal law governs whether an obligation is ‘in the nature of support’)
Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505 (2010) (statutory interpretation caution; legislative intent governs)