Rachel Spivack v. City of Philadelphia, 109 F.4th 158

Rachel Spivack, an at-will Assistant District Attorney in Philadelphia, was terminated after her request for a religious exemption from the DAO’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate was denied.
The original DAO policy (August 2021) allowed for case-by-case religious and medical exemptions but later, reportedly (January 2022), religious exemptions were categorically denied.
Spivack, an Orthodox Jew, submitted documentation supporting her religious opposition to vaccination, noting her previous vaccine exemptions and support from her rabbi.
The DAO stated that unionized employees were governed by City/union rules, and only at-will staff were subject to the DA's policies.
Spivack sued the City and DA Krasner, alleging violations of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause; the district court ruled for the defendants on summary judgment.
On appeal, the Third Circuit found disputes of material fact regarding neutrality and general applicability, vacated the summary judgment, and remanded for trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Vaccine Mandate Neutrality & Applicability	Policy targeted religious objectors, lacked neutrality and general applicability; allowed discretion in exemptions.	Policy was neutral and generally applicable to all at-will employees; categorical policy applied equally.	Disputed—material fact issues require jury trial.
Religious Exemption Denial	Refusal to grant Spivack’s exemption was based on anti-religious animus; individualized discretion was exercised.	No religious animus; policy was based on public health and legal advice; categorical denial was neutral.	Disputed—jury must decide if denial was neutral.
Medical vs. Religious Exemptions	Allowing medical but not religious exemptions was discriminatory.	Medical exemption is objectively defined and relates directly to public health; not comparable to religious exemption.	Court found medical exemptions did not defeat general applicability.
Unionized Employees Not Covered by Policy	Exempting unionized employees was a secular carveout undermining general applicability.	DA lacked authority over union employees due to collective bargaining agreements.	Court held carveout was not fatal to applicability.

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (neutral, generally applicable laws are subject to rational basis review)
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (targeting religious conduct triggers strict scrutiny)
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522 (individualized exemptions and hostile treatment of religious exercise trigger strict scrutiny)
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (COVID-19 restrictions and compelling government interest)
Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (disparate exemptions affecting general applicability)
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (secular exemptions impacting general applicability)
Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (general applicability and arbitrary exemption policies)
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617 (neutrality inquiry considers policymakers’ statements)