236 F. Supp. 3d 1126
N.D. Cal.2017Background
- Plaintiffs Steve Rabin and John Chapman filed a putative class action alleging PwC’s hiring policies disproportionately favor younger applicants and deter older applicants, asserting a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.
- PwC moved for judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), arguing the ADEA does not permit disparate impact claims by job applicants (only employees).
- The question for the court was whether 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) — which prohibits classifying “any individual” in ways that deprive employment opportunities — encompasses applicants as well as employees.
- The court evaluated statutory text, Supreme Court precedent (notably Smith and Griggs), EEOC regulations and interpretations, and the ADEA’s legislative history.
- The court concluded that the ADEA’s language, precedent, agency interpretation, and legislative history support allowing job applicants to bring disparate impact claims and denied PwC’s motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the ADEA permits disparate-impact claims by job applicants (not just employees) | § 623(a)(2) protects “any individual,” so applicants may sue for disparate impact | § 623(a)(2) should be read to protect only persons with a “status as an employee”; omission of “applicant” shows Congress did not include applicants | Court held applicants may bring disparate-impact claims under § 623(a)(2) |
| Whether Supreme Court precedent (Griggs/Smith) supports applicants’ disparate-impact claims under ADEA | Griggs and Smith, interpreted broadly, support disparate-impact relief for applicants and employees alike | Griggs involved employees; Title VII amendments and textual distinctions counsel against extending to applicants under ADEA | Court relied on Griggs and Smith to support applicants’ claims under the ADEA |
| Whether agency interpretation (EEOC/DOL) supports applicants’ claims | EEOC regulations and DOL guidance treat neutral pre-employment practices as potentially discriminatory and apply to applicants | Defendant offered no persuasive basis to reject longstanding agency view | Court deferred to and credited agency interpretation permitting applicant disparate-impact claims |
| Whether legislative history supports applicant protection | ADEA’s purpose and sponsors’ statements emphasize protecting older workers from barriers to obtaining employment | Defendant argued legislative amendments elsewhere (Title VII) show distinctions, but no evidence Congress intended to exclude applicants under ADEA | Court found legislative history supports protecting applicants and curing hiring barriers |
Key Cases Cited
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (Sup. Ct.) (recognized disparate-impact liability under Title VII and addressed neutral hiring requirements)
- Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (Sup. Ct.) (held ADEA authorizes disparate-impact claims)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (Sup. Ct.) (interpreting “employee” to include prospective employees in certain contexts)
- Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (Sup. Ct.) (discussing limits on disparate-impact liability and characterizing Griggs)
- Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (Sup. Ct.) (applied Griggs principles to applicants and employees)
- Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (Sup. Ct.) (discussed disparate-impact doctrine in employment context)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct.) (framework for deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958 (11th Cir.) (en banc decision holding ADEA § 4(a)(2) does not reach applicants; cited and distinguished by the court)