Rabel, Joshua v. New Glarus School District
3:20-cv-00821
| W.D. Wis. | Feb 3, 2022Background
- N.R., a sixth‑grade student with Down syndrome and profound cognitive disabilities, had a history of running from school and aggressive, dangerous behavior during the 2018–19 school year.
- An October 22, 2018 IEP (with parents participating) added a Behavioral Intervention Plan (BIP) authorizing preventive supports and permitting physical restraint or seclusion when "student and/or staff is in danger" (e.g., running, hitting, throwing objects); staff were trained in non‑violent crisis intervention.
- District staff documented events in daily notes and incident reports; plaintiffs identify 47 incidents where they allege unreasonable seizures/excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; plaintiffs sued the New Glarus School District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but did not sue individual staff members.
- Defendant moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits describing each incident and contending any restraint was objectively reasonable and done for safety; defendant also argued no municipal action caused constitutional violations.
- The court found plaintiffs’ summary‑judgment responses procedurally deficient (many responses lacked proper record citations, raised improper new facts, and relied on state law rather than federal constitutional analysis) and concluded plaintiffs failed to identify a municipal policy or show Monell causation.
- Court granted summary judgment for the district: plaintiffs did not show violations of the Fourth Amendment by district employees in a manner that would impose Monell liability on the school district.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether staff uses of restraint/seclusion in the 47 incidents violated N.R.'s Fourth Amendment rights | Many incidents involved unreasonable or premature restraints that escalated N.R.'s behavior and were unlawful | Staff actions were objectively reasonable responses to dangerous, unregulated behavior; documented exigent safety risks and limited, trained interventions were used | Plaintiffs failed to present admissible, material factual disputes or federal constitutional analysis to defeat summary judgment on individual seizure/excessive‑force claims |
| Whether the IEP/BIP itself constituted an official district policy authorizing unconstitutional force | The IEP/BIP authorized restraint/seclusion and arm‑in‑arm escorts in ways that could permit arbitrary or excessive force | The IEP/BIP authorized restraint only when student or staff were in danger; arm‑in‑arm transports were listed as preventive supports, not restraints; parents participated in and consented to the IEP | The IEP/BIP did not facially authorize unconstitutional force; plaintiffs waived any developed Monell argument and the documents reasonably read as safety‑limited measures |
| Whether Monell municipal liability attaches (policy/custom/final policymaker; deliberate conduct; causation) | District is liable because its employees followed the IEP/BIP and the IEP functioned as district policy; alleged failure to supervise/train | Municipal liability requires an official policy/custom or decision by a final policymaker plus deliberate conduct and a direct causal link; plaintiffs offered no facts showing such a policy, widespread custom, final policymaker act, or municipal causation | No Monell liability: plaintiffs did not identify a constitutional municipal policy, widespread custom, or evidence of deliberate municipal action that was the moving force behind any constitutional injury |
| Adequacy of plaintiffs’ summary judgment submissions and legal argument | Plaintiffs asserted factual disputes via interpretations of district notes and cited state restraint law to show unreasonableness | Defendant showed detailed affidavits and contemporaneous records; argued plaintiffs’ responses failed to comply with summary judgment procedures and lacked federal constitutional analysis | Court disregarded many of plaintiffs’ disputed facts for procedural noncompliance and found plaintiffs’ legal arguments perfunctory and undeveloped, justifying summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires that the municipality itself caused the constitutional deprivation)
- Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995) (Fourth Amendment seizure in school context analyzed for reasonableness under school environment)
- New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (school setting changes Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis)
- Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (municipal liability requires deliberate conduct and causation beyond respondeat superior)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal failure to train theory requires a direct causal link and deliberate indifference)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (municipal liability may attach when a policymaker makes a deliberate choice)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard and genuine dispute analysis)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant may meet burden on summary judgment by pointing to absence of evidence for nonmoving party)
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (§ 1983 claims require identification of the specific constitutional right infringed)