129 Conn. App. 275
Conn. App. Ct.2011Background
- The Ridgefield Zoning Board granted a variance for 975 Ethan Allen Highway allowing wholesale and retail sales of oriental rugs, fine furniture, and art in a B-2 zone where retail is generally not permitted.
- Amatulli variance language restricted sales to certain products, including fine furniture, with no clear definition of that term.
- In 1990 the variance was granted; in 1993-1995 plaintiffs sought site plan approval for selling high-end furniture; planning decisions hinged on whether items fell within “fine furniture.”
- The board later defined “fine furniture” as one-of-a-kind, hand-crafted, not mass produced, capable of appreciating in value, which the trial court found arbitrary and illegal.
- The trial court ultimately adopted a definition of “good quality furniture” but on appeal that definition was rejected as well, and the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the board’s definition of fine furniture was arbitrary and illegal | R& R argues board definition deviated from record and variance terms | Board asserts its understanding should control or be given deference | Board definition was arbitrary and illegal |
| Whether the trial court properly rejected the board’s definition and adopted its own | Court’s construction aligned with the record and variance intent | Court should defer to board’s interpretation of variance terms | Court’s definition also improper; deference not warranted on undefined term |
| What is the correct meaning of ‘fine furniture’ under the Amatulli variance | ‘Fine furniture’ means high quality furniture | ‘Fine furniture’ has a narrower, stricter meaning | Term means high quality furniture, not necessarily one-of-a-kind or valuable per se |
| Can the board redefine variance terms on remand and/or modify conditions | Remand should not permit redefining core variance terms | Board may interpret terms to align with record | Board cannot arbitrarily redefine terms; remand requires proper legal process |
Key Cases Cited
- Reid v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 235 Conn. 850 (1996) (variance conditions are integral parts of the variance and interpreted like regulations)
- Burlington v. Jencik, 168 Conn. 506 (1975) (variance and attached conditions linked; interpretation guided by same principles as regulations)
- 200 Associates, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 83 Conn.App. 167 (2004) (undefined terms in regulations interpreted with regulatory principles; deference limited when clear)
- Kraiza v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 121 Conn.App. 478 (2010) (when unclear words are ambiguous, ascertain board’s intent on variance)
- Anatra v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 127 Conn.App. 125 (2011) (variance runs with the land; conditions must be clear and recorded)
- Jeffery v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 155 Conn. 451 (1967) (word meaning as a matter of law if defined or not defined; not necessarily common usage)
- R & R Pool & Patio, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 257 Conn. 456 (2001) (definition of fine furniture; record and prior decisions inform meaning)