R.P.B. VS. D.R.(FV-21-0354-16, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED), A-2604-15T1

Background

Plaintiff (former client) and defendant (former brief dating partner) had a short relationship; plaintiff cancelled construction work and returned a deposit by certified check on Nov. 30, 2015 and told defendant not to contact him.
Between Nov. 30 and Dec. 18, 2015 defendant called plaintiff repeatedly (~30 calls); plaintiff told her to stop and threatened a restraining order if she continued.
From Jan. 2–6, 2016 defendant sent ~45 emails to plaintiff alleging hacking, trespass, and demanding money and files; plaintiff ignored them and sought a final restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA).
At the Jan. 14, 2016 FRO hearing both parties testified pro se; defendant declined to cross-examine plaintiff and sought to introduce expert/computer evidence but did not present those witnesses or devices.
The trial judge found defendant’s email barrage constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, that defendant acted with purpose to harass, and that a restraining order was necessary to prevent further abuse; defendant appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendant committed predicate act of harassment under PDVA	Plaintiff argued the volume, timing, content, and prior warnings showed purpose to harass	Defendant argued emails were motivated by a good-faith belief plaintiff hacked her devices (no intent to harass)	Court held sufficient credible evidence supported harassment finding and purpose to harass
Whether FRO was necessary to prevent further abuse (Silver second prong)	Plaintiff argued ongoing emails/calls would continue and FRO was needed to stop intrusion	Defendant argued belief in hacking explained conduct and FRO was unnecessary	Court held FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff and prevent further harassment
Whether defendant was denied due process by not being granted adjournment	Plaintiff maintained timely hearing within statutory period and no adjournment requested	Defendant argued she lacked time to marshal expert evidence and should have been allowed adjournment sua sponte	Court held no due process violation: notice was adequate, PDVA requires prompt hearing, and defendant did not request continuance
Whether exclusion of defendant’s out-of-court statements about expert findings was improper hearsay exclusion	Plaintiff treated the Norton/expert statements as hearsay and inadmissible	Defendant argued the statements were offered to show her state of mind, not the truth of hacking allegations	Court held the statements were offered to prove the hacking (truth), so exclusion was proper and not reversible error

Key Cases Cited

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394 (1998) (standard for appellate review of family court findings and consideration of past abuse)
Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (2006) (two-prong test for FROs under PDVA)
J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458 (2011) (intent to harass may be masked by seemingly innocent acts)
State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564 (1997) (use of common sense to infer intent and totality-of-circumstances analysis)
A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 2016) (Silver second-prong guidance on necessity of restraining orders)
H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309 (2003) (due process requirements in domestic-violence proceedings: notice and opportunity to prepare)
McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546 (1993) (due process includes notice defining issues and adequate opportunity to respond)
Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super. 116 (App. Div. 2005) (right to cross-examine and call witnesses in domestic violence hearings)
Dinter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 252 N.J. Super. 84 (App. Div. 1991) (trial court's evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474 (1974) (standard for disturbing trial court findings)
In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108 (1997) (deference to trial court credibility findings)
Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295 (App. Div. 2008) (reversal only if court ignored applicable standards)