R. Lucas v. WCAB (City of Sharon)
2606 C.D. 2015
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Dec 20, 2016Background
- Robert Lucas, a firefighter employed by City of Sharon from 1976 to March 2000, claimed prostate cancer from occupational exposure to IARC Group 1 carcinogens; he last fought a fire in February 2000.
- Lucas was first diagnosed with prostate cancer in October 2009 and filed a medical-only claim petition on May 18, 2012 seeking medical benefits under Section 108(r) (firefighter cancer) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
- WCJ credited claimant’s expert linking occupational exposure to his prostate cancer and granted the claim petition for medical benefits.
- The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board reversed, holding the petition was untimely because it was filed 633 weeks after the last exposure and Section 301(f) requires filing within 600 weeks of last exposure; the Board treated the 600-week period as a statute of repose not subject to the discovery rule.
- On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed, applying its recent precedents construing Section 301(f) to (1) allow the rebuttable presumption only if the claim is filed within 300 weeks of last exposure, (2) allow a claim to be filed within 600 weeks of last exposure, and (3) treat the 600-week deadline as a statute of repose not tolled by the discovery rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 301(f) requires filing a Section 108(r) claim within 600 weeks of last workplace exposure | Lucas: 301(f) merely extends the 300‑week manifestation period to 600 weeks; claim should be allowed if disease manifested within 600 weeks regardless of filing date; discovery rule applies | Board/Employer: 301(f) creates an independent 600‑week filing deadline measured from last exposure; untimely if filed after 600 weeks; no discovery‑rule tolling | Held for Board: 301(f) requires filing within 600 weeks of last exposure; Lucas’s petition (633 weeks) was untimely; 600‑week period functions as a statute of repose not subject to discovery rule |
| Whether the discovery rule (Price) can toll Section 301(f)’s 600‑week period | Lucas: discovery rule delays accrual until competent medical diagnosis linking disease to work, so filing within 600 weeks after discovery should be allowed | Board/Employer: 600‑week period is triggered by last exposure (not discovery) and acts as a statute of repose, so discovery rule does not extend it | Held for Board: discovery rule inapplicable to Section 301(f)’s 600‑week repose period; diagnosis timing irrelevant once 600 weeks elapsed |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Philadelphia Fire Dept. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Sladek), 144 A.3d 1011 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (interpreting Section 108(r) to require claimant show specific Group 1 carcinogen causation)
- Hutz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 147 A.3d 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (applied statutory two‑tier filing rule in Section 301(f))
- Westinghouse Elec. Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Korach), 883 A.2d 579 (Pa. 2005) (distinguishing statutes of repose from statutes of limitations)
- City of McKeesport v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Miletti), 746 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2000) (discussing manifestation vs. filing timing under Section 301(c)(2))
- Price v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Metallurgical Resources), 626 A.2d 114 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (articulating discovery rule application to statute of limitations under Section 315)
- Sharon Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Myers), 670 A.2d 1194 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (discussing limitations vs. repose concepts)