R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company v. County of Los Angeles, 29 F.4th 542

Congress enacted the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) in 2009 to authorize FDA regulation of tobacco and to set a tripartite preemption scheme: a preservation clause, a preemption clause, and a savings clause.
The TCA gives FDA exclusive authority over "tobacco product standards" while expressly preserving state, local, and tribal authority to enact laws "in addition to or more stringent than" the TCA, including laws "relating to or prohibiting the sale" of tobacco products.
Los Angeles County adopted an ordinance (2019) banning the retail sale of all flavored tobacco products.
Tobacco manufacturers (R.J. Reynolds and others) sued, alleging the County ban is both expressly and impliedly preempted by the TCA; the district court dismissed their complaint and denied preliminary relief.
The Ninth Circuit (majority) affirmed: it held the TCA does not expressly preempt the County’s sales ban (and the savings clause independently excepts sales regulation), and the ban is not impliedly (obstacle) preempted. Judge Nelson dissented, arguing the ban is preempted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the TCA expressly preempts Los Angeles County’s flavored-tobacco sales ban	The preemption clause bars any requirement "relating to tobacco product standards," which includes sales bans that functionally set product standards; the County ban therefore conflicts with and is preempted by the TCA	The TCA’s preservation and savings clauses preserve state/local authority over sales and explicitly except "requirements relating to the sale ... of tobacco products [to] individuals of any age," so the County ban is outside express preemption	Majority: Not expressly preempted (preemption clause read narrowly; sales regulation preserved and in any event saved by the savings clause). Dissent: Preempted.
Whether the County ban is impliedly (obstacle) preempted	The sales ban undermines the FDA’s regulatory scheme and decisions (e.g., treatment of menthol) and thus stands as an obstacle to federal objectives	The TCA does not require flavors remain available; Congress preserved local authority to adopt more stringent sale restrictions, so the ban does not frustrate federal purposes	Held: Not impliedly preempted (no obstacle to TCA objectives).

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (pre- TCA decision that FDA lacked general authority to regulate tobacco under existing statutes)
Gen. Motors Corp. v. New Castle Cty., 498 U.S. 110 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (noted as background on preemption principles)
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (sales or purchase restrictions can operate as preempted "standards" even if they target downstream actors)
Nat'l Meat Ass'n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (state sales ban at point of sale can be preempted as an obstacle to a federal statutory scheme)
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 708 F.3d 428 (2d Cir. 2013) (interpreting TCA to reserve manufacturing/product-standard regulation to FDA while allowing local regulation of retail sales)
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (when a statute contains an express preemption clause, courts focus on its plain wording)