Quintez Talley v. John E. Wetzel
15 F.4th 275
3rd Cir.2021Background
- Plaintiff Quintez Talley, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, sued defendants alleging a fraudulent settlement of two prior federal suits and asserted RICO, constitutional, and multiple state-law claims.
- District Court dismissed Talley’s federal claims for failure to state a claim (finding the settlement was not publicly filed and an appearance had been entered) denied leave to amend, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims (dismissed without prejudice).
- Talley appealed and moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP); defendants argued Talley had accrued three § 1915(g) “strikes” based on prior “mixed dismissals” that dismissed federal claims on § 1915(g) grounds while declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- The principal legal question on the IFP motion was whether a “mixed dismissal” (some claims dismissed on § 1915(g) grounds and remaining state claims dismissed for lack of supplemental jurisdiction) counts as a § 1915(g) strike.
- The Third Circuit held that mixed dismissals are not strikes under § 1915(g), granted Talley IFP for the appeal, but on the merits affirmed the District Court’s dismissal and denial of leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mixed dismissals count as a § 1915(g) strike | Talley: § 1915(g) requires dismissal of the entire "action or appeal" on one of the enumerated grounds; mixed dismissals do not satisfy that text | Appellees: dismissing federal claims effectively dismisses the entire action (no jurisdiction over pendent state claims), so mixed dismissals should count as strikes to prevent "strike-proofing" | Held: Mixed dismissals are not strikes; § 1915(g) requires the entire action/appeal be dismissed on the enumerated grounds. |
| Whether Talley may proceed IFP on appeal | Talley: he has fewer than three strikes because prior mixed dismissals are not strikes | Appellees: Talley has three strikes from prior mixed dismissals and summary affirmance | Held: Talley may proceed IFP; prior mixed dismissals (and a summary affirmance) do not count as strikes. |
| Whether District Court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend | Talley: proposed amendment would correct factual defects (jurisdiction/waiver and filing of settlement) and cure pleading deficiencies | Appellees: amendments would be futile; original defects are incurable | Held: No abuse; amendment would be futile because defendants had waived personal-jurisdiction defenses by filing answers and the settlement was not publicly filed, so the proposed facts did not cure deficiencies. |
| Whether District Court erred in declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims | Talley: district court should have retained jurisdiction to permit relief (e.g., to void settlement and reopen prior cases) | Appellees: declining jurisdiction was proper where federal claims were dismissed | Held: No abuse of discretion; dismissal of state claims without prejudice was appropriate and Talley did not request reopening of prior cases in his pleadings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721 (2020) (Supreme Court construes § 1915(g) textually; dismissals for failure to state a claim count as strikes unless leave to amend was granted)
- Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) (a strike accrues only if the entire action or appeal is dismissed explicitly on § 1915(g) grounds)
- Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2013) (reaffirming that § 1915(g) refers to dismissal of an entire action, not individual claims)
- Fourstar v. Garden City Group, Inc., 875 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (mixed dismissals do not count as strikes)
- Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2019) (same conclusion: declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims does not create a strike)
- Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2010) (strike requires dismissal of the entire case on § 1915(g) grounds)
- Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2011) (interpreting "action" to mean the entire case for § 1915(g) purposes)
- Brown v. Megg, 857 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2017) (mixed-dismissal analysis; strike requires whole-action dismissal)
- Escalera v. Samaritan Vill., 938 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding mixed dismissals are not strikes)
- NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929 (2017) (use of expressio unius canon in statutory interpretation)