Pursuing America's Greatness v. Federal Election Commission
132 F. Supp. 3d 23
D.D.C.2015Background
- Plaintiff Pursuing America’s Greatness (PAG) is an independent-expenditure political committee advocating for Mike Huckabee; it operated the website www.ilikemikehuckabee.com and a Facebook page and planned a Twitter handle including the candidate’s name but did not solicit donations on those properties.
- PAG challenges the FEC’s advisory opinion (Advisory Opinion 2015‑04, the CAP opinion) applying 52 U.S.C. § 30102(e)(4) and 11 C.F.R. § 102.14 to forbid unauthorized committees from using federal candidates’ names in project titles, URLs, Facebook page titles, or Twitter handles unless the title clearly and unambiguously expresses opposition to the candidate (the Name Identification Requirement and the Opposition Exception).
- The FEC adopted the Special Projects Name Regulation in 1992 to treat any project title or other designation as a committee’s “name,” and added the Opposition Exception in 1994 to permit titles that clearly show opposition to a candidate.
- CAP asked whether websites and social media accounts could include a candidate’s name; the FEC unanimously answered no because the titles did not clearly express opposition (CAP Advisory Opinion 2015‑04). PAG then ceased activity and filed this pre‑enforcement suit seeking a preliminary injunction asserting APA and First Amendment claims.
- The district court reviewed the FEC’s rulemaking record, evidentiary examples of public confusion (including Facebook comments on PAG’s page), and held that the Name Identification Requirement is a lawful, disclosure‑focused regulation that survives intermediate (exacting) scrutiny; PAG’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| APA challenge to FEC’s interpretation/application of § 30102(e)(4) and 11 C.F.R. § 102.14 | FEC unlawfully applied rules beyond fundraising context to internet properties (URLs, social media) and rules are arbitrary/capricious | FEC points to rulemaking record showing concerns beyond fundraising, rational basis for treating project titles/URLs as names; agency interpretation entitled to deference | Held: FEC action not arbitrary or contrary to law; PAG unlikely to succeed on APA claim; agency interpretation reasonable and supported by rulemaking record |
| First Amendment — prior restraint/content‑based challenge | Requirement acts as a prior restraint and is content‑based (permits oppositional titles but bans supportive/neutral uses), so strict scrutiny applies | FEC: rule is part of FECA disclosure regime and is reviewed under exacting/intermediate scrutiny; it is a disclosure/location restriction, not a total ban; serves important government interests in avoiding confusion, fraud, abuse | Held: Requirement is disclosure‑oriented, narrowly tailored to important/compelling interests; subject to intermediate/exacting scrutiny and upheld; PAG unlikely to succeed on First Amendment claims |
| Whether a website URL/social media handle is a "name"/"title" covered by the rule | PAG argues URLs/handles are not necessarily a project’s title/name | FEC’s CAP opinion treated URLs/handles as the site/account name; that interpretation was reasonable | Held: Court finds it reasonable and not plainly erroneous to treat a website’s URL or social media handle as the project’s name/title |
| Irreparable harm / preliminary injunction factors | PAG contends its First Amendment rights are threatened daily and thus irreparable harm exists | FEC argues PAG can still speak in the body of communications and disclaimers, and public interest favors enforcement of statute/regulation | Held: Because PAG not likely to succeed on merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest do not support preliminary injunction; motion denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Common Cause v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 842 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (interpreting § 30102(e)(4) and discussing scope and anti‑confusion purpose of the statute)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference framework for agency statutory interpretation)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard under APA)
- Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (disclosure regime and scrutiny for campaign finance regulations)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (compelling interest in preventing voter confusion; upholding narrowly tailored election‑related restrictions)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (disclosure interests in campaign finance law)
- McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (discussing disclosure as less restrictive alternative and modern internet relevance)
- SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (disclosure interests: public’s interest in knowing who is speaking and funding political speech)