PULTE HOME COMPANY, LLC v. JUANITA M. AYCOCK LIVING TRUST
A21A0640
| Ga. Ct. App. | Jun 30, 2021Background
- 1962 Holly Hills Estates plat expressly dedicated the subdivision roads, including Daffodil Drive, to public use; the plat was recorded.
- Daffodil Drive: southern portion is paved, maintained, and used as a public road; a 70-foot segment north of the Aycock(s)’ lot is unpaved, unused by the county, and partly occupied by the Aycocks’ driveway.
- The Aycocks performed landscaping/maintenance on the unpaved segment after a county employee indicated the county would not assist with drainage (the trust offered this to show reliance, not the truth of the statement).
- In 2019 Cobb County issued land-disturbance and water-line permits to Pulte to improve the unpaved segment to access adjacent lots; the Aycock Living Trust sued seeking injunctions, asserting the county had abandoned that portion of the easement such that the trust held title.
- The trial court granted a temporary injunction, finding the trust had a cognizable abandonment claim under OCGA § 44-9-6; Cobb County and Pulte appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cobb County abandoned the unpaved portion of Daffodil Drive under OCGA § 44-9-6 | Aycock Trust: county’s long nonuse plus county employee’s statements and the Trust’s maintenance show abandonment, so fee passed to abutting owner | County/Pulte: Daffodil Drive was expressly dedicated and accepted; mere nonuse is insufficient, statutory abandonment procedures (OCGA § 32-7-1 et seq.) were not followed; employee statements are hearsay for truth | No abandonment. Undisputed evidence shows County retained an easement; nonuse alone does not establish abandonment and statutory abandonment procedures were not followed |
| Whether partial use/maintenance of a dedicated street constitutes acceptance of the entire express dedication | Aycock Trust: partial use suggests the County only accepted part and effectively abandoned the unused portion | County/Pulte: where a landowner expressly defines the dedicated strip in a recorded plat, public authorities’ recognition (e.g., paving/maintenance of part) can imply acceptance of the whole | Acceptance of part of an expressly dedicated street can evidence acceptance of the entire dedication; County accepted the dedication by its acts |
| Whether a temporary injunction preventing Pulte’s permitted work was appropriate | Aycock Trust: likely to prevail on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm absent injunction | County/Pulte: they have a legal right to permit and perform work pursuant to County-issued permits; Trust lacks likelihood of success | Temporary injunction reversed — Trust lacked likelihood of success and could not show the legal injury necessary to sustain injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Jergens v. Stanley, 247 Ga. 543 (Ga. 1981) (dedication requires owner intent and public acceptance)
- Hobbs v. Ware County, 247 Ga. 385 (Ga. 1981) (partial public improvements can constitute acceptance of an express dedication)
- Harbuck v. Houston County, 284 Ga. 4 (Ga. 2008) (continuation of a dedicated street remains subject to county acceptance despite limited maintenance)
- Wiggins v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 245 Ga. 526 (Ga. 1980) (dedication may convey an easement rather than fee)
- Northpark Assoc. No. 2 v. Homart Dev. Co., 262 Ga. 138 (Ga. 1992) (roads established by dedication without express fee grant yield easements)
- Duffy Street S. R. O. v. Mobley, 266 Ga. 849 (Ga. 1996) (no presumption of abandonment from nonuse under 20 years)
- Tietjen v. Meldrim, 169 Ga. 678 (Ga. 1930) (abandonment requires clear, unequivocal, decisive acts showing intent)
- SRB Investment Svcs. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 289 Ga. 1 (Ga. 2011) (factors governing interlocutory injunctions)
- Oconee Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Brown, 349 Ga. App. 54 (Ga. App. 2019) (reversal where enjoined party had a legal right to act)
- Sorrow v. 380 Properties, 354 Ga. App. 118 (Ga. App. 2020) (addressing limits on partial abandonment of express easements; treated as contrasting authority)
