Lead Opinion
Nоrthpark Associates No. 2, Ltd. seeks to enforce its private easement rights in abandoned roads in a former residential subdivision that Homart Development Company has redeveloped as commercial property. We reverse the trial court’s finding that Northpark never acquired any easement rights and remand for consideration of the remaining issues.
In 1962, owner and developer John Dromey recorded the Crestline Valley subdivision plat in the superior court clerk’s office in Fulton County. The plat divided the property into lots and delineated the location of the two subdivision roads. In 1984 Homart bought all but two lots of the subdivision and all the lots in two adjoining subdivisions to develop an office project. Northpark, a competing devel
As a result of an October 1988 agreement with Homart, the Fulton County Commission resolved to аbandon portions of Crestline Road and Crestline Valley Circle (“Crestline Roads”) and, if necessary, to condemn Northpark’s private easement rights in the subdivision roads.
In 1990, the county accepted the dedication of the Crestline Parkway, abandoned portions of the Crestline Roads, and delivered a quitclaim deed to Homаrt conveying the county’s interest in the abandoned roads. A month later Homart closed the abandoned roads. Northpark then sought an injunction to prevent Homart from interfering with its easement rights. Northpark appeals the trial court’s denial of the injunction.
1. A developеr’s sale of lots in a subdivision according to a recorded plat creates private easement rights in favor of purchasers in any area set apart for their use. Walker v. Duncan,
Where the owners of a tract of lаnd subdivide it into lots, record a map or plat showing such lots, with designated streets and a public park, and sell lots with reference to such map or plat, the owners are presumed to have irrevocably dedicated such streets and park for the use of all of the lot owners in the subdivision. . . . The owners of lots in the subdivision have an easement in these public areas whether or not there has ever been an acceptance of the dedication by public authorities or the public generally.
The Crestline Valley Subdivisión owner and developer recorded the subdivision plat showing the subdivision roads, then sold lots to Northpark’s predecessors-in-title by deeds referring to the recorded plat. The plat had no notation that the developer had conveyed the subdivision roads in fee simple to the county nor had the developer conveyed the roads to the county by deed prior to the sale of the subdivision lots. Therefore, Northpark acquired easement rights in the subdivision roads when it bought the two lots by deeds in chains of title that made reference to the recorded plat. The closing of the abandoned portions of the subdivision roads and their relocation to the Crestline Parkway did not eliminate Northpark’s easement rights in the subdivision roads delinеated on the Crestline Valley subdivision plat. Northpark’s easement rights acquired in this manner are limited to the subdivision roads shown on the plat that Dromey recorded and do not extend to the parts of Crestline Road abutting Homart’s property in the other two subdivisions that Homart bought for its development.
2. Homart argues that Northpark did not acquire private easement rights because the subdivision developer did not have any rights to convey. Homart contends that Dromey had already dedicated fee-simple title in the subdivision roads to Fulton County by recording the subdivision plat. Citing this court’s opinion in Clark v. McBride,
As we have previously acknowledged, “the recording of a subdivision plat not only acts as the grant of an easement to the purchasers of the property, but also raises a presumption of intent to dedicate to the public.” Walker,
Our decision in Clark, which concerned a 20-foot strip of land used for sewage and drainage, failed to consider the presumption that the dedication convеyed an easement and not a fee-simple title. Furthermore, the Clark decision went outside the recorded plat, the instrument of dedication, to determine the parties’ intentions. By considering the developer’s and county’s intentions, the decision violated the rule of cоnstruction that parol evidence is inadmissible when a written instrument is not ambiguous. See OCGA § 13-2-2; 23 AmJur2d 29, Dedication, § 32 (2d ed. 1983). Because of these problems, we overrule Clark to the extent it permits the developer’s subjective intent in recording a plat to prevail. We reaffirm that a develоper who intends to convey fee-simple title in subdivision roads must make an express grant to the county or other governmental authority.
3. Due to the present status of the record, we are unable to determine if the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying thе injunction. The trial court denied the injunction based on its finding that Northpark’s predecessors-in-title never conveyed any private easement rights because the roads were dedicated to Fulton County before the sale of any subdivision lots, it was in the public interest to relоcate the roads, and Homart had not impeded Northpark’s access to its lots. Because the trial court never reached Homart’s equitable defenses, particularly its laches defense, we remand this case for consideration of these and any other remaining issues.
Judgment reversed and case remanded.
Notes
By Crestline Roads, we mean Crestline Valley Circle and Crestline Road in the three subdivisions that Homart bought as part of its office project. The term “subdivision roads” refers to Crestline Vаlley Circle and the part of Crestline Road delineated on the subdivision plat that Dromey recorded.
Our holding in this case does not alter the law dealing with the abandonment of easements as articulated in Tietjen v. Meldrim,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Because I am firmly convinced that under the applicablе law and the facts of this case Northpark never acquired an easement to the Crestline Roads, I must dissent to the reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
1. In Clark v. McBride,
The authority relied upon by the majority does not establish the proposition for which it is cited. Walker v. Duncan,
The majority’s opinion establishes a new and hyper-technical standard for judging the effect of dedication of streets in a subdivision by means of a recorded plat. That approach too severely limits the ability of trial courts to apply the “crucial test in determining whether a conveyance grants an easement in or conveys fee simple title to land [, which] is the intention of the parties.” Clark v. McBride, supra at 309.
2. Even if the majority were correct in its application of the law regarding interests in land, and I am convinced it is not, this case should not be reversed. It is patent from the record of this case that Northpark’s sole intent in purсhasing the property and in opposing the abandonment of the Crestline Roads was to act as a “dog in the manger,” a spoiler. The record shows that Northpark did not engage in any of the zoning proceedings and did not care about the accelerating disrepair of the roads to which it now lays claim. It was not until Homart had expended considerable sums to build an alternative roadway serving both of Northpark’s lots that Northpark first made complaint about the loss of its asserted easement. When Northpark’s objections were rejected, it did not pursue any appeal. Under those circumstances, it would be an injustice to uphold Northpark’s lately asserted interest. Having slept on its asserted rights, rights which it sought to acquire only to prevent competition by another developer, Northpark should nоt be permitted to enlist the aid of equity for the purpose of oppression.
Being certain that Northpark has no rights in the Crestline Roads which should be enforced, I must dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
The majority overrules this case insofar as it permits the developer’s subjective intent to control the effect of a recorded plat, but that overruling does not affect the holding for which that case is cited herein.