Pullins v. State
323 Ga. App. 664
Ga. Ct. App.2013Background
- In the early morning of July 6, 2008, neighbor Ricky Goss observed Pullins loading the victim’s furniture and other items onto a truck from the victim’s apartment and saw a broken window with glass on the sill and in Pullins’ hair.
- Goss confronted Pullins, who claimed he had permission; Pullins placed some items back inside after Goss said he would call police.
- Management and police were notified; an Atlanta officer located Pullins in the apartment complex about 15 minutes later and returned him to the scene.
- Goss (and another neighbor) identified Pullins at a show-up outside the patrol car; Pullins was then arrested.
- Pullins was convicted by a jury of burglary and criminal trespass; he moved for a new trial and to suppress the pretrial and in‑court identifications, which the trial court denied.
- On appeal, Pullins argued insufficiency of the evidence and that the show‑up (and resulting in‑court ID) should have been suppressed. The court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for burglary | Pullins argued evidence did not prove unlawful entry with intent to steal | State pointed to eyewitness of loading stolen items, broken window, false claim of permission, and items returned when confronted to infer intent | Conviction for burglary affirmed; jury could infer intent from conduct |
| Sufficiency of evidence for criminal trespass | Pullins argued damage amount and causation not established | State relied on broken window, glass on Pullins, and jurors’ common‑sense valuation under $500 | Conviction for criminal trespass affirmed; jurors could estimate <$500 damage |
| Suppression of pretrial (show‑up) identification | Pullins argued show‑up was suggestive (he was handcuffed and presented one‑on‑one) and tainted ID | State argued show‑up occurred promptly, witnesses knew Pullins and accurately described him, minimizing suggestiveness | Denial affirmed: show‑up was reasonably and fairly conducted; even if suggestive, no substantial likelihood of misidentification under Neil v. Biggers factors |
| Suppression of in‑court identification | Pullins argued in‑court ID was tainted by any impermissible show‑up | State argued witnesses had independent basis (prior face‑to‑face contact and familiarity) for ID | Denial affirmed: in‑court ID had independent origin from witnesses’ prior interactions |
Key Cases Cited
- Foster v. State, 288 Ga. 98 (intent may be inferred from post‑crime conduct)
- Palmer v. State, 243 Ga. App. 656 (criminal intent can be inferred from words, conduct, demeanor, motive)
- Wilcox v. State, 310 Ga. App. 382 (stolen property need not be recovered to convict)
- Feagin v. State, 317 Ga. App. 543 (jurors may estimate damage to ordinary objects)
- Burrell v. State, 293 Ga. App. 540 (same re: juror estimation of damage)
- Butler v. State, 290 Ga. 412 (show‑up identification law; suggestiveness analysis)
- Wallace v. State, 295 Ga. App. 452 (timely show‑up may be non‑suggestive)
- Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (factors to evaluate likelihood of misidentification)
- Mercer v. State, 268 Ga. 856 (application of Biggers factors)
- Holbrook v. State, 209 Ga. App. 301 (in‑court ID may be admitted if independent origin)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (legal standard for sufficiency of the evidence)