Puente Arizona v. Joseph Arpaio
821 F.3d 1098
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Arizona amended its identity-theft statutes (A.R.S. §§ 13-2008, 13-2009) to criminalize using another person’s identity "with the intent to obtain employment," as part of H.B. 2779 (2007) and H.B. 2745 (2008).
- Puente Arizona (an immigrant advocacy org.), unauthorized immigrants, and Maricopa County taxpayers sued state and county officials, alleging the statutes are facially preempted by federal immigration law (IRCA) and violate equal protection.
- The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the employment-related portions of the statutes on field- and conflict-preemption grounds.
- Arizona appealed the injunction; Maricopa County separately appealed the district court’s denial of its Monell-based dismissal motion.
- The Ninth Circuit limited review to the facial preemption claim (the only ground for the preliminary injunction), and deferred consideration of Puente’s as-applied preemption and other claims to the district court on remand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona’s employment-related identity theft statutes are facially preempted by federal immigration law (IRCA) | The statutes intrude on the federal scheme for regulating employment of unauthorized aliens, conflict with IRCA’s remedies and prosecutorial allocation, and run afoul of IRCA’s document-use limitations; therefore they are facially preempted. | The statutes are textually neutral (apply to any person), address traditional state police powers (combatting identity theft), and can be validly applied in many non-immigration contexts, so they are not preempted on their face. | The statutes are not facially preempted; the preliminary injunction is vacated and the district court’s finding that the facial challenge likely would succeed is reversed. The as-applied claims remain for the district court. |
| Whether the district court properly considered state legislative motive to infer congressional preemption | Puente: state intent to target unauthorized aliens supports finding preemption. | Arizona: legislative motive alone cannot establish that Congress intended to preempt; effects matter more than stated motive. | Court: State legislative motive is not dispositive; preemption depends on Congress’s intent as applied to the statute’s practical effects. |
| Whether certain applications (e.g., prosecutions relying on I-9 documents) are preempted by IRCA’s document-use limitations | Puente: IRCA’s limitations on use of Form I-9 and related rules mean some state prosecutions are preempted. | Arizona: those problems arise only in some applications; facial invalidation is improper. | Court: Such arguments may support as-applied relief but do not show a clear-and-manifest intent by Congress to preempt the statutes entirely. |
| Whether the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear Maricopa County’s Monell interlocutory appeal | County: denial of Monell dismissal is appealable along with injunction. | Puente: Monell ruling is not "inextricably intertwined" with the injunction appeal and is not appealable now. | Court: Dismissed County’s interlocutory Monell appeal for lack of jurisdiction; pendent jurisdiction is inappropriate here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local governments can be liable under § 1983 for policies or customs causing constitutional violations)
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (federal immigration law can preempt state immigration-related measures where Congress clearly intended a comprehensive federal scheme)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial challenge standard: to invalidate a statute on its face, challenger must show no set of circumstances in which the law would be valid)
- Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (standard for issuing a preliminary injunction requires likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest)
- Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (state statutes aimed only at unauthorized aliens can be preempted where they interfere with federal immigration enforcement priorities)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (presumption against preemption for laws regulating in areas of traditional state police power)
- Dillingham Construction, N.A. v. California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, 519 U.S. 316 (1997) (courts should not lightly find preemption in areas of traditional state regulation)