Przekurat v. Torres, 2016 COA 177

Background

At a large Boulder house party in 2006 hosts Torres, Samuel and Peter Stimson, and Davis provided kegs; party attendance ranged roughly 20–120 people.
Attendee Hank Sieck (age 20) drank at the party, later drove Plaintiff Jared Przekurat’s car at high speed, and caused a catastrophic crash that left Przekurat severely injured and incompetent.
Przekurat sued the four hosts under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-47-801(4)(a)(I) (2005 amendments) claiming hosts “knowingly provided [an] underage person a place to consume an alcoholic beverage.”
Hosts moved for summary judgment, presenting affidavits and deposition testimony that none knew Sieck, knew his age, or knew he was drinking; Przekurat relied on circumstantial evidence of an open party and widespread underage drinking.
The district court granted summary judgment for the hosts for lack of evidence that any host actually knew Sieck was under 21 and drinking; it later (erroneously) denied Przekurat’s Rule 59 motion as untimely but that denial was harmless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the statutory term “knowingly” apply to both (a) providing a place to consume and (b) the drinker’s age under § 12-47-801(4)(a)(I)?	Przekurat: statute was meant to impose liability where hosts provided an uncontrolled venue likely to facilitate underage drinking regardless of the host’s knowledge of a specific drinker’s age.	Hosts: “knowingly” requires actual knowledge of both that a place was provided and that the person consuming was under 21.	Court: “knowingly” applies to all elements; plaintiff must show actual knowledge of the drinker’s underage status.
Can constructive knowledge or failure-to-act suffice to meet the “knowingly” mental state under § 12-47-801(4)(a)(I)?	Przekurat: hosts should be liable based on constructive knowledge (should have known) given the open, unrestricted party and available alcohol.	Hosts: constructive knowledge is insufficient; statute requires actual knowledge.	Court: Constructive knowledge is insufficient; statutory “knowingly” requires actual knowledge (direct or circumstantial evidence of knowledge).
Did Przekurat present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that any host actually knew Sieck was under 21 and drinking?	Przekurat: circumstantial evidence (large open party, free alcohol, lack of age checks, underage guests present) supports inference of host knowledge.	Hosts: testimony and affidavits state they did not know Sieck or his age and did not observe him drinking.	Court: Evidence insufficient—no direct or circumstantial proof any host knew Sieck or his age; summary judgment affirmed.
Was the district court’s denial of the Rule 59 motion for reconsideration for lack of jurisdiction correct?	Przekurat: the 14-day Rule 59 clock ran only when final judgment entered (after dismissal of remaining defendant), so his motion was timely.	Hosts: motion untimely; trial court lacked jurisdiction.	Court: Trial court erred in finding lack of jurisdiction because the Rule 59 period began when judgment became final; but error was harmless because reconsideration would not change result.

Key Cases Cited

Build It & They Will Drink, Inc. v. Strauch, 253 P.3d 302 (Colo. 2011) ("willfully and knowingly" requires actual knowledge; constructive knowledge insufficient)
Dickman v. Jackalope, Inc., 870 P.2d 1261 (Colo. App. 1994) (mental state applies to knowledge of age as well as service; licensee not liable absent knowledge the patron is under 21)
Huddleston v. Board of Equalization, 31 P.3d 155 (Colo. 2001) (statutory words/phrases should be given consistent meaning throughout a statute)
Full Moon Saloon, Inc. v. City of Loveland, 111 P.3d 568 (Colo. App. 2005) (constructive knowledge can satisfy certain statutes imposing an affirmative duty on licensees; distinguished here)
Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1988) (Rule 59(e) timing runs from entry of final judgment; cited analogously for C.R.C.P. 59)