444 F. App'x 660
4th Cir.2011Background
- Plaintiffs sued the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging an MTA regulation restricting voter registration at transit stations.
- During settlement negotiations, MTA suspended enforcement and agreed to work toward new regulations; the case was placed on the inactive docket.
- Plaintiffs later moved to reopen; after briefing, the district court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, deeming the regulations unconstitutional and awarding nominal damages of one dollar.
- The district court denied an injunction or declaratory relief based on a binding judicial undertaking that the regulations would not be enforced.
- Plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees under § 1988; the district court denied them, concluding that nominal damages meant no fee was appropriate.
- This Fourth Circuit reversal holds that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties and that factors under Farrar v. Hobby and Mercer v. Duke Univ. support an award of attorney’s fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are Plaintiffs prevailing parties under §1988? | Pezold/Leto were prevailing due to settlement and relief obtained. | Buckhannon catalyst theory forecloses fee unless merits obtained; nominal damages alone do not prevail. | Yes; Plaintiffs prevailed and are entitled to fees. |
| Do the Farrar-Mercer factors support a fee award here? | First Amendment significance and public purpose justify fees; settlement achievement counts as relief. | Only nominal damages and lack of injunctive relief weigh against fees. | Yes; factors weigh in favor of awarding fees. |
| Was Buckhannon correctly applied to deny fees? | Buckhannon concerns catalyst theory, not the prevailing-party analysis here; settlement-based relief counts. | Buckhannon forecloses fee where there is no merits judgment or consent decree. | No; district court erred in relying on Buckhannon and should focus on settlement-based relief and merits. |
| Did the binding judicial undertaking constitute recoverable equitable relief? | The undertaking and settlement gave enforceable relief; thus prevailing party status is satisfied. | Relief was voluntary and lacked court-ordered status beyond the agreement. | Yes; the undertaking supported recovery of fees. |
| Is the issue of First Amendment/public-interest sufficient to support fees? | Open public forums and voting rights constitute a significant public interest warranting fees. | Not a basis for fees absent substantial monetary relief or novel issues. | Yes; the public-interest aspect supports a fees award. |
Key Cases Cited
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1992) (prevailing-party status with nominal damages; factor-based fee analysis)
- Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (three Farrar-Mercer factors for fee awards)
- Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) (catalyst theory rejected for fee eligibility)
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983) (lodestar/multipliers and degree of success in fee awards)
- Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1983) (context for public-interest and fee considerations)
- Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993) (First Amendment rights in public forums)
- Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (fee awards rewarding civil-rights plaintiffs)
- Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (U.S. 1980) (interim fee awards for settlements in civil rights actions)
- Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998) (private attorney general rationale for §1988)
- S–1 and S–2 By and Through P–1 and P–2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina, 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994) (settlement-based relief can support fee awards)