Project Vote v. Kelly
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82214
W.D. Pa.2011Background
- ACORN and Project Vote challenged 25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1713(a), which prohibits paying for voter registrations based on the number obtained.
- ACORN and Deckard were plaintiffs; District Attorney prosecuted seven individuals under § 1713(a) in 2008; ACORN settled with DA via consent agreement (DA dismissed, commitment to hourly pay).
- ACORN and later Project Vote structured canvassing in Allegheny County in 2008 with hourly pay and production aspirations; most canvassers failed to meet goal, no terminations tied to a single shortfall.
- After ACORN’s bankruptcy, ACORN was dismissed; Governor Corbett and then Acting AG Ryan/Attorney General Kelly became defendants in official capacities.
- Plaintiffs asserted facial and as-applied challenges to § 1713(a), arguing it burdens First Amendment rights and is void for vagueness in its enforcement.
- Court considered whether § 1713(a) can be narrowly construed to avoid constitutional issues and whether prospective relief is available.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 1713(a) unconstitutionally broad on its face? | ACORN/Project Vote contend it bans core political speech by payroll practice. | AG argues statute is narrowly construed to prohibit only piece-rate/commission pay, not hourly pay or discharge. | Statute not facially invalid when narrowly construed. |
| Should strict scrutiny apply to § 1713(a)? | Per Meyer, the burden may be severe due to speech impact. | Burden is not severe if read narrowly; less exacting scrutiny suffices. | Less exacting scrutiny applies; not a severe burden. |
| What is the proper construction of § 1713(a) in this case? | Argues language is broad to prohibit production-based compensation. | Language prohibits only compensation based on number of registrations, not mere termination for underperformance. | Court adopts narrow construction prohibiting only piece-rate/commission payments; discharges permitted. |
| Does Pennsylvania have sufficient interests to justify § 1713(a) under Burdick/Anderson balancing? | Fraud prevention and orderly process are not enough if speech burden is improper. | Voter-registration fraud and process integrity justify regulation; Pennsylvania has SURE, HAVA requirements, and fraud costs. | Interests are sufficiently weighty to justify the modest burden. |
| Is prospective relief available given the current party posture? | Want injunctive/declaratory relief against District Attorney's application of § 1713(a). | No live adversarial party remains for as-applied challenge; no likelihood of enforcement by AG given narrow construction. | No prospective relief; declaratory relief unavailable due to lack of live dispute. |
Key Cases Cited
- Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (paid circulators implicated in core political speech; strict scrutiny when applicable)
- Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (per-signature and identity requirements invalidated; burdens on speech analyzed)
- Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (facial challenges and legislative facts; broader constitutional questions)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (no absolute constitutional limit on state election regulation; balancing test applies)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (balancing test for election regulations; strict scrutiny only for severe burdens)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (flexible framework for weighing state interests against First Amendment rights)
- Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (misjoinder/joinder, but referenced for jurisdictional mechanisms)
- Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (clarified overbreadth and remedies; context of First Amendment challenges)
- Meyer v. Grant (repeated citation for context), 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (see Meyer for core political speech framework)