Proceeding before the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia v. Johnson
790 F.3d 457
| 3rd Cir. | 2015Background
- Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and various counties sought to disqualify the Federal Community Defender’s Capital Habeas Unit from representing clients in seven PCRA proceedings, alleging misuse of federal grant funds.
- The Federal Community Defender removed the actions under 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), (d)(1); Commonwealth moved to remand under §1447(c); FCDO moved to dismiss §12(b)(6) arguing no private right of action and preemption.
- District Courts split: Eastern District denied remand and granted dismissal; Middle District remanded and denied the FCDO’s motion as moot.
- The issue presented is whether removal jurisdiction was proper and whether the Commonwealth’s disqualification attempts are preempted by federal law; the court held removal proper and preemption in the FCDO’s favor.
- The decision rests on CJA framework, the AO’s oversight of grants, and the relationship between the FCDO and federal authorities; ultimately the disqualification motions are preempted and must be dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1442(a)(1) removal applies to the PCRA disqualification motions | Commonwealth contends removal lacks jurisdiction | FCDO asserts proper removal under federal officer removal statute | Removal jurisdiction exists |
| Whether the Commonwealth’s disqualification motions are preempted by federal law | State-law mechanisms govern the disqualification | Federal statutes and grant scheme preempt enforcement through state action | Disqualification proceedings are preempted |
| Whether the Commonwealth lacks a private right of action to enforce federal grant terms | Commonwealth enforces grant terms under state law | No private right to enforce federal statutes; preemption governs | Private right of action is not available; preemption controls |
| Whether the acts by FCDO in PCRA proceedings relate to acts under color of federal office | Relationship with AO is insufficient to establish 'acting under' | FCDO’s activities relate to grant oversight and federal duties | Causation/relating-to element satisfied |
| Whether the FCDO is a "person" for purposes of §1442(a)(1) | Nonprofit defense entity is outside the statute’s scope | FCDO qualifies as a 'person' under 1 U.S.C. §1 and case law | FCDO is a ‘person’ under §1442(a)(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142 (U.S. 2007) (broadly construed; private contractor can invoke removal when acting under federal authority)
- Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (U.S. 1969) (origin of modern §1442 removal purpose)
- Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (U.S. 1999) (federal question and nexus analysis for removal; intergovernmental tax immunity context)
- Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (U.S. 1989) (colorable federal defense sufficiency for removal; arises under federal officer removal doctrine)
- Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (U.S. 2001) (conflicts preemption principles in federal regulatory schemes)
- Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (U.S. 2009) (AEDPA context; authorized representation for federal habeas and related state proceedings)
- Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (U.S. 1992) (definition of 'relating to' in broader statutory context)
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 551 U.S. 142 (U.S. 2007) (reiterated breadth of 'acting under' standard)