Priests for Life v. United States Department of Health & Human Services
808 F.3d 1
D.C. Cir.2015Background
- Religious non-profit employers challenged the ACA contraceptive-coverage regulations and the regulatory "accommodation" that lets them avoid providing contraceptive benefits only if they submit a notice/form (to insurer or to HHS) or face substantial penalties.
- Plaintiffs (Catholic organizations, including Priests for Life and universities) sincerely contend that submitting the form or maintaining contractual relationships with insurers/TPAs would make them complicit in providing contraceptives and thus violate their religious beliefs.
- The panel held that the accommodation actually prevents objecting employers from facilitating contraception (insurers, not employers, are mandated to provide separate contraceptive coverage), so plaintiffs suffered no substantial burden under RFRA.
- The full court denied rehearing en banc; three concurrences/dissents were filed: a concurrence (Pillard, Rogers, Wilkins) defending the panel approach; dissents (Brown joined by Henderson; Kavanaugh) argued RFRA requires deference to plaintiffs’ sincere beliefs and that the government’s accommodation is not the least restrictive means.
- Central disputes: whether courts may assess plaintiffs’ legal characterization of how the regulatory scheme operates (panel: yes; dissents: no), whether the notice/form itself imposes a substantial burden, and whether less restrictive alternatives (e.g., Wheaton College–type notice or providing coverage via exchanges/direct subsidy) are available.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the accommodation’s required form/notice substantially burdens plaintiffs’ exercise of religion under RFRA | Submitting the form or remaining in contractual relationships compels plaintiffs to facilitate contraception and thus imposes a substantial burden (sincere belief) | The form merely notifies insurers or HHS so insurers, not employers, provide coverage; plaintiffs retain noninvolvement so burden is de minimis | Panel: No substantial burden; plaintiffs’ characterization of facilitation is legally incorrect and courts may decide how the law operates (rehearing denied) |
| Whether courts may evaluate the legal effect of the regulations or must accept plaintiffs’ religious characterization of causation/complicity | RFRA and Hobby Lobby forbid courts from second-guessing the religious meaning of acts; courts must accept sincere religious judgments about complicity | Courts can and must decide legal operation and causation under the regulations; Hobby Lobby addressed a different question | Panel: Courts may decide the legal operation of the regulatory scheme and need not credit legally inaccurate claims of facilitation |
| Whether the government has a compelling interest in seamless provision of contraceptive coverage to employees | Even if there is a compelling interest, it must be narrowly tailored and the government must use least restrictive means | Government asserts a compelling interest in ensuring access to contraception and that seamless provision is necessary to that interest | Panel: Government interest in seamless coverage survives; dissents question evidentiary support and underinclusiveness; en banc rehearing denied so panel’s view stands |
| Whether less restrictive alternatives (e.g., Wheaton College–style notice, exchanges, direct subsidy) are available | Less restrictive means exist (Wheaton/Little Sisters notice, exchange-based coverage or direct subsidy) that would avoid compelling plaintiffs to identify insurers or submit the regulatorily detailed form | Government argues alternatives would burden beneficiaries or be administratively impracticable and would disrupt "seamless" coverage | Panel: Current accommodation is lawful and appropriately tailored; dissents (Kavanaugh, Brown) argue Wheaton/Little Sisters notice is a viable, less restrictive alternative |
Key Cases Cited
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (RFRA protects sincere religious objections to the contraception mandate; courts must not decide correctness of religious beliefs about complicity)
- Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (courts cannot question the truth or validity of religious beliefs; sincerity is the threshold inquiry)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015) (RFRA/RLUIPA burden and framework; plaintiff bears initial burden to show substantial burden)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means framework for religious exemptions)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of benefits can constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise)
- United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (RFRA/First Amendment limits but government may compel payment where compelling interest and least-restrictive means satisfied)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (an underinclusive law undermines claimed governmental compelling interest)
- Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (RFRA’s demanding least-restrictive-means standard and the need for specific evidence of compelling interest)