Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.
2014 IL App (5th) 130017
Ill. App. Ct.2014Background
- Plaintiffs Price and Fruth alleged Philip Morris violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act by advertising cigarettes as ‘light’ or ‘low tar.’
- The trial court entered judgment for plaintiffs, which was reversed on appeal due to 10b(1) exemption, and remanded to dismiss; mandate issued December 2006.
- FTC’s stance later suggested it never authorized use of ‘light’/‘low tar,’ leading plaintiffs to seek relief from judgment under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401.
- FTC amicus brief in Altria Group and 2008 rescission of guidance cast doubt on the prior Supreme Court reading of FTC authorization.
- On remand, the trial court found plaintiffs were diligent, had a meritorious claim, and that the FTC position could have altered the outcome, but denied relief, ruling it was equally likely the Supreme Court would have decided otherwise on damages.
- The appellate court reversed, holding the trial court exceeded the scope of 2-1401 by predicting how the Supreme Court would decide the damages issue and directing dismissal would not follow from that reasoning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court exceed 2-1401 scope? | Price argued the court mispredicted the Supreme Court on damages. | Philip Morris argued 2-1401 review allowed predicting outcomes on merits already decided. | Yes; court exceeded 2-1401 scope. |
| Did plaintiffs demonstrate due diligence for 2-1401 relief? | Price exercised diligent efforts to obtain FTC position evidence. | Philip Morris contends plaintiffs failed to act diligently earlier. | Yes; plaintiffs acted with due diligence. |
| Did plaintiffs show a meritorious claim supporting relief? | FTC position would have altered the 10b(1) defense, making relief warranted. | Merits could not be assessed given earlier record. | Yes; plaintiffs had a meritorious claim. |
| How should relief from judgment be disposed given the 2-1401 reversal on damages? | Vacating dismissal reinstates the verdict with the proceedings to proceed. | Reinstating verdict is improper; only Supreme Court can reinstate. | |
| Vacate dismissal to reinstate proceedings with verdict intact. |
Key Cases Cited
- Juszczyk v. Flores, 334 Ill. App. 3d 122 (Ill. App. 2002) (standard for due diligence in 2-1401 petitions; de novo review)
- Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437 (Ill. 2000) (relates to evidence arising after judgment; distinguishable)
- Duree, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1032 (Ill. App. 2001) (sanctions evidence and unresolved issues; distinguishable)
- Paul, 223 Ill. 2d 85 (Ill. 2006) (limits 2-1401 to relief from judgment; damages/preemption issues resolved differently)
- Cipriani, 202 Ill. App. 3d 986 (Ill. App. 1990) (new evidence can affect 2-1401 outcomes when relevant to condition/value)
- Klose v. Mende, 378 Ill. App. 3d 942 (Ill. App. 2008) (due diligence standard in 2-1401; merit and diligence considerations)