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67 F. Supp. 3d 125
D.D.C.
2014
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Background

  • Prevor developed Diphoterine™ Skin Wash (DSW), an aerosol canister whose liquid both mechanically washes chemicals off skin and chemically neutralizes/draws chemicals out of skin; Prevor estimated ~90% mechanical, ~10% chemical effect.
  • FDA’s Office of Combination Products initially designated DSW a combination product, classifying the liquid as a drug because it "achieves its primary intended purposes, at least in part, through chemical action."
  • This Court (PREVOR I) remanded, criticizing FDA’s expansive reading that a de minimis chemical effect suffices and directing FDA to clarify what constitutes a "primary intended purpose."
  • On remand FDA changed tack: it treated DSW’s single primary purpose as "to help prevent and minimize accidental chemical burn injuries" and adopted a new standard that chemical action need only "meaningfully contribute" (not fully "achieve") that purpose to trigger drug regulation.
  • The Court found FDA’s single-purpose framing reasonable given Prevor’s own statements, but held FDA’s substitution of "meaningfully contributes" for the statutory term "achieve" was legally erroneous and arbitrary; vacated FDA’s designation and remanded for further proceedings.

Issues

Issue Prevor's Argument FDA's Argument Held
Proper statutory standard under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h): whether a chemical action must "achieve" a product's primary intended purpose to exclude device classification "Achieve" requires the chemical action to accomplish the primary purpose; de minimis or merely contributory chemical effects insufficient Statute ambiguous about degree; agency may treat a product as a drug if chemical action "meaningfully contributes" to the primary purpose Court held statute unambiguous: "achieve" is not synonymous with "meaningfully contributes"; FDA's substitution was unlawful and arbitrary
Identification of primary intended purpose (single vs multiple purposes) DSW’s stated purpose is to prevent/minimize chemical burns; mechanical vs chemical modes are modes of action, not separate primary purposes FDA initially identified two primary purposes, then on remand adopted Prevor’s broader single-purpose framing to avoid primacy analysis Court found FDA’s adoption of Prevor’s single primary purpose reasonable on the record
Sufficiency of FDA’s scientific assessment that chemical action is primary Prevor: studies show predominant mechanical effect; chemical action is secondary FDA: literature and studies (including Prevor’s materials) show chemical properties materially (and in FDA’s view substantially) contribute to efficacy Court deferred to agency expertise on scientific evidence but could not uphold classification because legal standard applied was erroneous; factual findings may be reconsidered on remand
Appropriate remedy (judicial classification vs remand) Prevor sought a declaration that DSW is a device and judgment for Prevor FDA urged deference and remand Court vacated FDA’s designation as arbitrary and capricious but declined to classify DSW itself; remanded to FDA for reconsideration under correct legal standard

Key Cases Cited

  • Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference framework)
  • Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (arbitrary and capricious standard)
  • Goldstein v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 451 F.3d 873 (agency interpretation must conform to statutory meaning)
  • Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313 (deference to reasonable agency interpretation)
  • A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484 (remand appropriate where agency action arbitrary or inadequately explained)
  • Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860 (deference to agency scientific determinations)
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Case Details

Case Name: Prevor v. United States Food & Drug Administration
Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia
Date Published: Sep 9, 2014
Citations: 67 F. Supp. 3d 125; 2014 WL 4459174; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128280; Civil Action No. 13-1177 (RMC)
Docket Number: Civil Action No. 13-1177 (RMC)
Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.
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