Preston v. Leake, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22520

Preston, a North Carolina registered lobbyist, sues the Board to challenge NC's Campaign Contributions Prohibition as facially and as applied to her.
Statute NC Gen. Stat. § 163-278.13C(a) bars lobbyists from contributing to candidates for the General Assembly or Council of State; it defines 'contribution' broadly to include almost any value unless volunteered services are provided.
Board enforces the ban via investigations, civil penalties, referrals for criminal prosecution, and advisory opinions; exceptions allow many non-contribution political activities by lobbyists.
District court held closest‑drawn scrutiny applies and upheld the ban as facially and as applied, citing substantial government interest in preventing corruption and appearance of corruption.
On appeal, court agrees the proper standard is 'closely drawn' scrutiny and affirms the district court’s judgment upholding the prohibition as closely drawn to a sufficiently important government interest.
Key factual backdrop includes North Carolina’s history of corruption scandals and legislative judgments to impose a broad ban on lobbyist contributions to address corruption concerns.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
What scrutiny applies to the prohibition on lobbyist contributions?	Preston argues strict scrutiny is required for an absolute ban.	Board argues closely drawn scrutiny applies to contribution bans.	Closely drawn scrutiny applies.
Is the Campaign Contributions Prohibition closely drawn to serve North Carolina's interest in preventing corruption and its appearance?	Preston contends the ban is not closely drawn and overbroad, depriving symbolic speech.	Board contends the ban is narrowly tailored to lobbyists and addresses corruption risks with alternatives remaining.	Yes, it is closely drawn to an important government interest.
Is the Campaign Contributions Prohibition constitutional as applied to Preston?	Preston seeks to contribute modest amounts and volunteer, arguing the ban chills First Amendment activity.	Board asserts Preston faces credible threat of enforcement; ban targets public corruption risk and appearance.	Yes, it is constitutional as applied to Preston.
Is the Campaign Contributions Prohibition facially overbroad?	Preston claims lack of de minimis exceptions and potential chilling effect on broader class.	Board argues statute is narrowly tailored and contains exemptions/advisory opinions; overbreadth is limited.	No, the statute is not facially overbroad.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1976) (basis for 'closely drawn' scrutiny of contribution limits)
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (U.S. 2000) (distinguishes limits on contributions from expenditures; associates' speech)
Beaumont v. FEC, 539 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2003) (upholds closely drawn scrutiny for certain contribution bans)
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (U.S. 2006) (warns against broad, non-de minimis prohibitions on volunteers' expenditures)
NCRL I, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999) (pre-enforcement standing in lobbyist-related challenges)
NCRL II, 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (reaffirms closely drawn scrutiny for anti-corruption measures)
Garfield v. Connecticut, 616 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 2010) (upholds or critiques ban scope in contractor/lobbyist contexts)
Ariz. Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (U.S. 2011) (recognizes dual levels of scrutiny in campaign finance)
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (U.S. 2010) (recognizes the First Amendment scope of corporate/super PAC spending; contextual to scrutiny levels)
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. v. FEC, 479 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1986) (concepts on campaign finance restrictions and speech)