39 F.4th 591
9th Cir.2022Background
- Late-night Mesa patrol: Officer Jonathan de Vries observed Preston Seidner riding a bicycle without a front light and activated his patrol vehicle’s overhead lights to effect a stop.
- Seidner pedaled past de Vries and began to flee on the bicycle; de Vries pursued in his patrol SUV at a relatively short distance.
- De Vries accelerated, maneuvered his SUV across the street and stopped semi‑perpendicular to Seidner’s path; Seidner’s bicycle then collided with the patrol vehicle, causing wrist and head/chest injuries.
- Seidner sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive‑force claim; the district court denied de Vries’s qualified immunity motion.
- Ninth Circuit majority: whether de Vries used excessive force is a jury question (reasonableness not resolvable as a matter of law), but de Vries is entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established.
- Concurring opinion: would treat the maneuver as deadly force and hold it constitutionally excessive under the Graham factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Seidner) | Defendant's Argument (de Vries) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was there a Fourth Amendment seizure? | Vehicle blockade intentionally terminated freedom of movement | De Vries originally argued no seizure (abandoned on appeal) | Held: yes — using the patrol car to stop Seidner constituted a seizure (Brower rule) |
| Was the use of force excessive? | Roadblock to stop a bicyclist for a minor violation was excessive force | Force reasonable to stop a fleeing suspect on a bicycle | Held: Not resolvable on summary judgment — jury question whether force was reasonable |
| What level of force was used (deadly vs intermediate)? | Seidner (and concurrence) — maneuver was deadly force because it risked serious bodily injury | De Vries — did not strike Seidner with a moving car; risk was lower given bicycle speed and visibility | Held: Majority — intermediate force (capable of serious injury); Concurrence — would characterize as deadly force |
| Is de Vries entitled to qualified immunity? | Law clearly established that an unreasonable roadblock likely causing an unavoidable crash violates the Fourth Amendment | No clearly established precedent applying to a bicycle roadblock in these circumstances | Held: Yes — qualified immunity applies because existing precedent did not place this conduct “beyond debate” |
Key Cases Cited
- Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (establishes that a roadblock that terminates freedom of movement is a seizure)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (use‑of‑force claims judged by objective reasonableness and multi‑factor analysis)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (deadly‑force standard: cannot use deadly force if suspect poses no immediate threat)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (seizure requires intentional governmental termination of freedom of movement)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (records/videos that blatantly contradict a party’s account can defeat that version of facts on summary judgment)
- Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (definition and treatment of deadly force in Fourth Amendment context)
- Williamson v. City of Nat’l City, 23 F.4th 1146 (Ninth Circuit framework for analyzing type/amount of force and Graham factors)
- Rice v. Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112 (summary judgment standards when an unchallenged video contradicts a party’s version of events)