Premo v. Moore
131 S. Ct. 733
| SCOTUS | 2011Background
- Respondent Moore and two confederates attacked and killed Kenneth Rogers in Oregon on December 7, 1995, after yangbinding him and shooting him in the temple.
- Moore confessed to two intermediaries, and his counsel advised a no-contest plea to felony murder in exchange for a 300-month sentence.
- Moore challenged in state court that his defense lawyer provided ineffective assistance by not seeking suppression of Moore’s police confession before advising on the plea.
- The Oregon postconviction court held suppression would have been futile because another full confession existed and could be testified to by two witnesses; it rejected the Strickland claim.
- Moore sought federal habeas relief; the district court denied it, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Court addresses whether AEDPA and Strickland permit relief based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law in the plea context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the state court’s Strickland ruling was unreasonable under AEDPA | Moore argues denial was unreasonable application of Strickland. | State court reasonably applied Strickland given futility and strategic judgment. | No; decision not unreasonable under §2254(d)(1). |
| Whether counsel’s decision not to seek suppression was reasonable | Suppression would have been worth challenging and could have affected outcome. | Counsel reasonably believed suppression futile and strategically sound. | Yes; reasonable under Strickland and AEDPA. |
| Whether Moore suffered prejudice from failure to suppress the confession | Suppression could have altered plea deliberations and outcome. | Plea negotiations and high stakes meant prejudice unlikely; evidence strong even without suppression. | Not established; state court’s prejudice finding was reasonable. |
| Whether Fulminante governs prejudice in the plea context | Fulminante supports finding prejudice from counsel’s failure. | Fulminante does not regulate prejudice in plea-bargain contexts; Hill controls. | Fulminante not controlling; Hill governs prejudice inquiry here. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (U.S. 2009) (high bar for prejudice; strong deference to counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (prejudice for plea: reasonable probability would have insisted on going to trial)
- Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (U.S. 2004) (AEDPA review provides more leeway to state courts applying general standards)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (U.S. 1991) (confession prejudicing trials; context not controlling in plea prejudice)
- Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1986) (precedent on effectiveness reviewed with record and information outside the record)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1999) (harmless-error standard; context not dispositive here)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (reaffirmed deferential AEDPA review in habeas cases)