229 F. Supp. 3d 894
E.D. Mo.2017Background
- Four plaintiffs were arrested in Ferguson in August 2014 on municipal "failure-to-comply" charges arising from post-Michael Brown protests; all were tried in 2016 and acquitted.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Missouri tort law against the City of Ferguson, arresting officers (John Does 1–3), officers Tim Harris and Sean Gibbons, and municipal attorneys Stephanie Karr and J. Patrick Chassaing (hired via Curtis Heinz law firm).
- Plaintiffs allege retaliatory arrests for protected speech/assembly, false arrest, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, municipal liability, abuse of process, and seek compensatory and punitive damages.
- DOJ issued a report finding systemic misuse of the failure-to-comply ordinance and disparate racial enforcement; Ferguson later entered a consent decree with DOJ.
- Karr and Chassaing moved to dismiss in part asserting absolute prosecutorial immunity; City and other defendants moved to dismiss other claims and punitive damages against the municipality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether individual-capacity vs. official-capacity is pleaded | Complaint shows individual misconduct so claims are individual | Complaint is silent on capacity so should be treated as official-capacity only | Court: pleadings are silent; deemed official-capacity; plaintiffs given leave to amend to plead individual capacity |
| Prosecutorial absolute immunity for Karr & Chassaing | They are private-contracted attorneys analogous to Richardson's private prison guards, so immunity should not apply | Filarsky and Imbler support absolute immunity for private attorneys performing prosecutorial functions | Court: Karr & Chassaing entitled to absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts; claims based on those acts dismissed |
| First Amendment retaliatory arrest (Count I) | Plaintiffs were peacefully assembling/speaking and were arrested in retaliation | Defendants: plaintiffs fail to allege specific protected conduct and lack of probable cause | Court: complaint insufficiently specific on protected activity; plaintiffs may amend to add specificity |
| Malicious prosecution / prosecution without probable cause (Count II) | Officers instigated prosecutions without probable cause and in retaliation | Defendants argue § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims require "more" and (for prosecutors) immunity | Court: substantive-due-process framing dismissed; Fourth Amendment/prosecution-without-probable-cause claim survives against non-immunized defendants; immunity issues as to prosecutors granted |
| Conspiracy (§ 1983) | Defendants conspired to deprive rights, overt acts occurred | Defendants invoke intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine to bar claim | Court: denied dismissal on intra-corporate doctrine at this stage; conspiracy claim survives |
| Abuse of process (state law) | Process was used to deter protestors (collateral purpose) | No allegations that police officers acted with improper purpose; only prosecutors alleged to have improper purpose | Court: dismissal for failure to state abuse-of-process claim (no improper-purpose allegations against officers) |
| Punitive damages against municipality | Plaintiffs seek punitive damages against City | Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983 | Court: punitive damages request stricken as to City |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must be plausible)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standards applied across civil actions)
- Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (private attorneys performing government functions may receive immunity)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutorial absolute immunity for functions intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (distinguishing prosecutor functions from complaining-witness testimony)