Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Secretary, United States Department of Labor
776 F.3d 157
| 3rd Cir. | 2015Background
- PATH suspended Intervenor Bala for absenteeism after Bala had off-duty back injury and protective sick leave; warnings preceded suspension based on total absences.
- Bala filed with the Secretary of Labor alleging retaliation for following a physician’s orders to not work after off-duty injury, under FRSA §20109(c)(2).
- ARB upheld an ALJ’s finding that PATH violated §20109(c)(2) by disciplining Bala for following physician orders.
- RSIA added §20109(c)(1) and (c)(2); plaintiffs argued §20109(c)(2) reaches off-duty injuries; PATH argued it covers only on-duty injuries.
- Court reviews ARB decision de novo on legal questions; statute interpretation is core, with no deference if statute unaddressed directly by Congress.
- Primary issue is whether §20109(c)(2) is limited to on-duty injuries, affecting Bala’s retaliation claim and the ARB’s interpretation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §20109(c)(2) apply to physician orders after off-duty injuries? | Bala argues c2 covers treating-physician orders regardless of injury timing. | PATH argues c2 is limited to on-duty injuries to advance c1’s goals. | Yes; c2 applies only to on-duty injuries, so Bala’s claim fails. |
| If c2 applies off-duty, was there sufficient evidence of retaliation? | Bala contends disciplined for protected sick leave following injury. | PATH contends record shows discipline tied to overall absenteeism, not protected leave. | Not reached; court did not decide due to c2 limitation finding. |
| Is the ARB entitled to Chevron deference on statutory interpretation here? | ARB's interpretation should receive deference as an agency construction. | Traditional tools of statutory construction control; deference not warranted if Congress spoke directly. | No Chevron deference; court resolves statutory question de novo and held c2 limited to on-duty injuries. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (context for anti-retaliation provisions and statutory structure)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (U.S. 1983) (Russello canon on interpreting disparate statutory provisions)
- Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 1999) ( Russello-related discussion on context and structure)
- Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (S. Ct. 2011) (interpretation of anti-retaliation provisions via whole-text analysis)
- City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (U.S. 2002) (statutory interpretation and context in text)
- Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (U.S. 1989) (text, purpose, and context guiding statutory interpretation)