Ploof v. State
75 A.3d 840
| Del. | 2013Background
- In 2001 Gary Ploof murdered his wife, Heidi, shooting her in a Walmart parking lot to obtain a newly effective $100,000 Air Force spousal life‑insurance benefit; he was convicted of first‑degree murder and later sentenced to death after a penalty hearing.
- At sentencing the State proved the statutory aggravator that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; defense mitigation focused on Ploof’s lengthy, decorated Air Force service, family relationships, and adjustment to prison.
- Postconviction counsel uncovered testimony from six former foster children who lived in the Ploof household alleging parental physical abuse of Gary and sexual abuse of the foster girls by Gary’s father (Gerald), plus records suggesting the foster home was closed after indicated reports.
- Trial counsel had interviewed Ploof and his parents and relied primarily on military‑service mitigation; she did not pursue the foster‑home records or interview former foster children despite “red flags” (a cryptic remark by Gerald, counsel’s own suspicions, and an incomplete home‑study).
- The Supreme Court of Delaware held trial counsel’s investigation was objectively unreasonable (failure to follow up on the red flags), but concluded, after reweighing aggravating and mitigating evidence, that Ploof failed to show Strickland prejudice — i.e., no reasonable probability the sentence would have differed. The court therefore affirmed denial of postconviction relief.
- A dissent argued the omitted child‑abuse evidence, together with military service, could reasonably have led a sentencing judge to impose life rather than death, and so prejudice under Strickland existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ploof) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel’s penalty‑phase investigation was constitutionally deficient | Counsel failed to investigate obvious "red flags" (a cryptic parental statement, suspicion about the foster‑home records) and thus omitted significant mitigation (former foster‑children testimony, closure reports) | Counsel reasonably relied on interviews with Ploof and parents and focused mitigation on strong military record; additional investigation was not obviously necessary | Held deficient: counsel’s failure to obtain/read the complete home‑study and to follow up on parental remark and suspicions fell below objective professional norms under Strickland/Wiggins guidance |
| Whether the deficient performance prejudiced Ploof under Strickland | The newly uncovered child‑abuse evidence (physical abuse of Ploof; sexual abuse of foster girls by father; mother’s cruelty/indifference) would have meaningfully undermined confidence in the death sentence; reasonable probability of a different result | The statutory aggravator (murder for pecuniary gain) and other aggravating facts were powerful; the new evidence was attenuated by time, often involved others (foster girls) rather than Ploof personally, and was largely cumulative or less severe than facts in Williams/Wiggins/Rompilla | Held no prejudice: after reweighing aggravation and total mitigation the court concluded there is not a reasonable probability the sentence would have been different; affirmed denial of relief |
| Whether additional military‑service detail (discovered postconviction) would have changed outcome | More detailed military testimony would strengthen mitigation and might tip balance | Additional details were cumulative of trial evidence and add little weight | Held cumulative; even if deficient for not presenting all details, no prejudice shown |
| Whether other penalty‑phase claims (renewal of objection to unadjudicated‑crime evidence; mental‑health expert competency) warrant relief | (Raised in appendix; argued these defects undermined penalty phase) | State: claims waived for insufficient briefing and forfeited | Held waived: appellate rule violations; issues not addressed on merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance + prejudice)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (failure to investigate severe childhood abuse and cognitive deficits can establish Strickland prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s inadequate mitigation investigation prejudiced defendant where severe abuse and deprivation were uncovered)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (counsel’s failure to review court file on prior conviction can be deficient and prejudicial where it would have revealed powerful mitigation)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (courts must properly weigh post‑trial mitigation evidence including military service)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (Strickland analysis must avoid hindsight and indulge strong presumption of reasonable representation)