478 P.3d 1026
Utah2020Background
- Keith Terry and his ex-wife fought while he sat in his Jeep picking up their children; the ex-wife later alleged Terry punched her, Terry denied striking her.
- Terry was charged with domestic violence assault (predicate) and domestic violence in the presence of a child (compound, predicated on the assault); jury also convicted him of unrelated traffic counts (not appealed).
- After deliberations the jury acquitted Terry of domestic violence assault but convicted him of domestic violence in the presence of a child—an outcome the trial judge found baffling.
- Trial court denied Terry's motion to arrest judgment/strike the allegedly inconsistent verdict and sentenced him; Terry appealed and the Utah Court of Appeals certified the question to the Utah Supreme Court.
- The Utah Supreme Court framed the primary legal question as whether a conviction of a compound offense can stand where the jury acquitted the defendant of the predicate offense, and whether such a verdict is a legal error subject to review and vacatur.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (City) | Defendant's Argument (Terry) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conviction for a compound offense can stand when the jury acquitted the predicate offense | Verdicts should be reviewed per count; sufficient evidence supports the compound conviction so it may stand | An acquittal of the predicate offense negates an essential element of the compound offense and makes the compound conviction legally impossible | Court held such verdicts are legally impossible and must be vacated when a compound conviction depends on an acquitted predicate offense |
| Proper standard of review for a legally impossible verdict | Treat as an inconsistent verdict and review for sufficiency of the evidence (per State v. Stewart) | It's a question of law—legal impossibility—and should be reviewed for correctness | Court held the issue is a pure question of law and reviewed for correctness |
| Appropriate remedy/procedure to correct a legally impossible verdict | Existing avenues (e.g., reviewing counts independently or Rule 23 arrest-of-judgment practice) suffice | Vacatur is required; appellate/supervisory authority may be used to enforce this rule | Court used its supervisory authority to require vacatur of legally impossible verdicts and directed the advisory committee to propose a rule reflecting the decision |
| Double jeopardy and retrial implications of vacating the compound conviction | Concern that vacatur might preclude retrial due to double jeopardy or be speculative to overturn a jury verdict | Vacatur is preferable even if retrial might be constrained; better to avoid enforcing an impossible conviction | Court acknowledged double jeopardy concerns but prioritized invalidating legally impossible convictions and left retrial/double-jeopardy specifics for future cases |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610 (Utah 1986) (discussing factually inconsistent verdicts and review for sufficiency)
- United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1984) (majority federal rule allowing inconsistent verdicts to stand under supervisory-power reasoning)
- Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1932) (held each count is to be treated independently; consistency not required)
- State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 805 (Iowa 2010) (adopting rule that certain legally impossible verdicts are invalid)
- McNeal v. State, 44 A.3d 982 (Md. 2012) (distinguishing factually inconsistent from legally impossible verdicts and invalidating the latter)
- Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 218 (Fla. 2007) (refusing to uphold legally impossible verdicts where acquittal negates an element of conviction)
- People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1981) (describing legally impossible or "repugnant" verdicts as contrary to justice)