STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. David John HALSTEAD, Appellant.
No. 09-0647.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Dec. 17, 2010.
APPEL, Justice.
v.
David John HALSTEAD, Appellant.
No. 09-0647.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Dec. 17, 2010.
In this сase, we confront the validity of inconsistent jury verdicts in a criminal trial in which a single defendant is convicted on a compound offense that requires, as an element, a finding of guilt on a predicate offense, but is acquitted on the underlying predicate offense. The rule in the majority of jurisdictions is to ignore the inconsistency and uphold the jury verdicts. The majority rule, however, has been subject to criticism, and a minority of courts has declined to followit.
The court of appeals applied the majority rule and upheld the verdict. We granted further review. After review of the pertinent precedents and authorities, we decline to adopt the majority rule. Pursuant to our power to supervise Iowa courts, we hold that a criminal сonviction of a compound offense cannot stand when the defendant has been acquitted of the underlying predicate offense. As a result, the defendant’s conviction for assault while participating in a felony is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for resentencing of the defendant based on his unappealed convictions.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
Lester Recinos lived in a group home in Sioux City, Iowa, when he became a crime victim. On August 1, 2008, Recinos failed to return to the group home by curfew. At 2:30 a.m., a group-home employee saw Recinos being pulled from a parked minivan. As Recinos fell to the ground, a man kicked and punched him. Passengers in the van ordered the attacker to take jewelry and money from Recinos. The grouphome employee called the police. The ensuing investigation implicated David Halstead, allegedly a passenger in the van, in the crime.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant State Appellate Defender, and Cory McAnelly, Student Legal Intern, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Patrick Jennings, County Attorney, and Drew H. Bockenstedt, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Halstead filed a motion for a new trial. In the motion, Halstead asserted that the jury’s verdict on assault while participating in a felony, a compound felony, was incon- sistent with his acquittal on the charge of theft in the first degree, the only available predicate felony under the jury instruc- tions in the case. The trial court over- ruled the motion, and this appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review.
The parties suggest that the proper standаrd of review in this case is for sub- stantial evidence. The issue in this case, however, relates primarily to a question of law regarding the consequence of a verdict that convicts the defendant of a compound felony yet acquits the defendant on the only predicate felony in the case as instructed by the court.1
See United States v. Hart, 963 F.2d 1278, 1280 (9th Cir.1992). To the extent constitutional issues are raised, review is de novo. State v. Taeger, 781 N.W.2d 560, 564 (Iowa 2010).2
This case involves a single defendant who is convicted of a compound crime and acquitted of the predicate crime in a single proceeding. Sometimes labeled in the cases as “true inconsistency” or “repug- nancy,” see, e.g., Brown v. State, 959 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla.2007); People v. Bullis, 30 A.D.2d 470, 294 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332-33 (1968), a jury verdict in a compound-con- flict case, as will be seen below, has serious flaws. For purposes of clarity, in this opinion we will refer to the inconsistency in this case as a compound inconsistency.
Before addressing the narrow issue pre- sented in this case, it is important to note that the question of inconsistent verdicts has sometimes been characterized as not involving constitutional issues. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 477, 83 L.Ed.2d 461, 469 (1984). As will be seen below, the question of the validity of аn inconsistent verdict, however, can be approached only with due regard to important constitutional concepts including double jeopardy, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to a unanimous jury verdict. At a minimum, the outcome in this case is affected by strong constitution- al currents.
III. Discussion.
A. Introduction.
The problem of in- consistent verdicts has plagued courts for some time. At common law, inconsistent verdicts were invalid and set aside. See Steven T. Wax, Inconsistent and Repug- nant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 713, 732 (1979) [herein- after Wax]. In the United States, howev- er, the approach to inconsistent verdicts has varied, depending on the nature of the alleged inconsistency and the jurisdiction involved.
In these cases, the jury verdict is inconsistent as a matter of law because it is impossible to convict a defendant of the compound crime without also convicting the defendant of the predicate offense.
Some allegedly inconsistent verdicts in- volve a defendant in a single proceeding having multiple counts, such as a case involving compound and predicate felonies or multiple deaths due to a single act or occurrence. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict with Verdict on Another Indictment or Information Tried at Same Time, 16 A.L.R.3d 866, 868 (1967). In other cases, jury verdicts may be said to be inconsistent if multiple defendants are tried either together or separately. For instance, it may be claimed that the conviction of one defendant of conspiracy while all of the possible confederates are acquitted produces an inconsistent verdict because it takes more than one person to conspire. See Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Prosecution or Conviction of One Conspirator as Affected by Disposition of Case Against Coconspirators, 19 A.L.R.4th 192, 198-204 (1983); C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdicts as Between Two or More Defendants Tried Together, 22 A.L.R.3d 717, 720-21 (1968).
Before addressing the narrow issue presented in this case, it is important to note that the question of inconsistent verdicts has sometimes been characterized as not involving constitutional issues. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 477, 83 L.Ed.2d 461, 469 (1984). As will be seen below, the question of the validity of an inconsistent verdict, however, can be approached only with due regаrd to important constitutional concepts including double jeopardy, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to a unanimous jury verdict. At a minimum, the outcome in this case is affected by strong constitutional currents.
B. Approach of the United States Supreme Court to Compound Inconsistency in Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases.
In Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932),the United States Supreme Court considered the question of proper disposition of a case when the jury convicted a defendant of a compound offense but acquitted the defendant on all predicate offenses. Dunn, 284 U.S. at 391-92, 52 S.Ct. at 190, 76 L.Ed. at 358. In Dunn, the government charged Dunn with “maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor,” “unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor,” and “unlawful sale of such liquor.” Id. at 391, 52 S.Ct. at 190, 76 L.Ed. at 359. The jury acquitted the defendant of the possession and sale counts, but convicted him of maintaining a nuisance. Id. at 391-92, 52 S.Ct. at 190-91, 76 L.Ed. at 359. As is apparent, the case involved a claim of compound inconsistency. See id. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court in Dunn upheld the con- viction on the compound felony. Id. at 394, 52 S.Ct. at 191, 76 L.Ed. at 359. The Supreme Court offered two rationales in support of its decision.
Next, the Dunn Court justified the re- sult on another ground. According to the Court, the acquittal on the possession charge should be interpreted merely as the assumption of a power that the jury had no right to exercise, but was disposed to do so through lenity. Id. While recognizing that an inconsistent verdict could be based upon motivation other than lenity— in- stance, as a result of compromise or of a mistake on the part of the jury—the Court reasoned that it could not speculate re- garding these matters. Id. at 393-94, 52 S.Ct. at 190-91, 76 L.Ed. at 359. As a result, the Dunn Court adopted what amounted to an irrebuttable presumption that the jury was engaged in an act of lenity when it acquitted the defendant of the possession chаrge, even though the Court recognized that the jury verdict could have been based on other factors. See id.
Justice Butler dissented in Dunn. Ac- cording to Justice Butler, the jury’s deter- mination of not guilty on the possession charge amounted to a final determination of the possession element in all charges. Id. at 406-07, 52 S.Ct. at 195-96, 76 L.Ed. at 365-66 (Butler, J., dissenting). Justice Butler thought the inference that the jury made a mistake was preferred over the notion that the jury assumed a power that it could not lawfully assert, namely, lenity. Id.
The prospect of a modification of the Dunn approach was put to rest in Powell. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69, 105 S.Ct. at 479, 83 L.Ed.2d at 471. In Powell, the defendant was charged with fifteen violations of fed- eral law, including “conspiring ... ‘to knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute cocaine,’ ” “possession of a specific quantity of cocaine with intent to distribute,” and “using the telephone in ‘committing and in causing and facilitating’ certain ‘conspiracy to possess felonies— with intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.’ ” Id. at 59-60, 105 S.Ct. at 474, 83 L.Ed.2d at 465. The jury ac- quitted Powell on the first two counts of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute, but convicted her of using the telephone in connection with these felonies. Id. at 60, 105 S.Ct. at 474, 83 L.Ed.2d at 465.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the ap- proach in Dunn and upheld the verdict. Id. at 65, 105 S.Ct. at 479, 83 L.Ed.2d at 471. The Powell Court recognized that the res judicata rationale of Dunn was no longer applicable. Id. at 64, 105 S.Ct. at 476, 83 L.Ed.2d at 468. Nonetheless, the Powell Court concluded that the approach in Dunn remained good law. Id.
Next, the Powell Court reasoned that individualized challenges to jury verdicts designed to ferret out the basis of the inconsistency would be “imprudent” and “unworkable.” Id. at 66, 105 S.Ct. at 477, 83 L.Ed.2d at 469. The Powell Court reasoned that any attempt to divine the reason for the inconsistent verdict would “be based either on pure speculation, or would require inquiries into the jury’s de- liberations that courts generally will not undertake.” Id.
Finally, the Powell Court conclud- ed that the remedial scheme afforded to defendants following a guilty verdict was sufficient protection to guard against ju- ries that would convict out of passion or prejudice. Id. at 67, 105 S.Ct. at 478, 83 L.Ed.2d at 470. The Powell Court rea- soned that by requiring the government to convince jurors at trial and judges on ap- peal of the defendant’s guilt and the suffi- ciency of the evidence to support the ver- dict, a convicted defendant was sufficiently protected against juror abuse. Id.
Powell and Dunn, of course, involve criminal proceedings. It is interesting to note, however, that the approach of the United States Supreme Court to inconsis- tent verdicts in criminal cases differs from its approach in civil cases. While the law is not entirely clear in the civil context, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 804-06, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1576-77, 89 L.Ed.2d 806, 814-15 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), it appears that the United States Supreme Court is more likely to intervene to prevent jury inconsistency in civil cases than in the criminаl context. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, Comment, Judge and Jury—Inconsistent Verdicts in the Federal Courts, 63 Harv. L.Rev. 649, 654 (1950) (stating there is no civil equivalent to Dunn to prevent upset- ting inconsistent civil verdicts) [hereinafter Bickel]; Shaun P. Martin, Rationalizing the Irrational: The Treatment of Untena- ble Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 28 Creigh- ton L.Rev. 683, 694-98 (1995) (discussing various measures federal courts take to cure inconsistencies).
C. Approach of State Courts to Compound Inconsistency in Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases.
1. Majority state court view regarding compound inconsistency. The substantial majority of state courts that have consid- ered the question of inconsistent jury ver- dicts in criminal cases involving compound inconsistencies have followed the approach of the United States Suрreme Court in Powell and Dunn. See, e.g., People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 569-70 (Colo.1995); People v. Jones, 207 Ill.2d 122, 278 Ill.Dec. 45, 797 N.E.2d 640, 644-47 (2003); Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind.2010); State v. Brown, 132 N.H. 321, 565 A.2d 1035, 1039-40 (1989). These state courts generally break no new ground but restate the rule and reasoning in Dunn and Powell. The fact that a marked majority of state court cases adopt Dunn and Powell, of course, is not determinative on the Iowa law question presented in this case as the persuasiveness of authority is not deter- mined by the pound, but by the quality of the analysis.
More than a decade prior to Powell, the Alaska Supreme Court decided DeSacia. DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 381. Unlike this case, DeSacia involved a factual inconsis- tency in which a defendant charged with two counts of manslaughter—one count for each of two victims killed in a car acci- dent—was convicted on one count but ac- quitted on another. See id. at 370. The DeSacia court recognized that the res ju- dicata rationale of Dunn was no longer good law. Id. at 375. With respect to the presumption of lenity, the DeSacia court emphasized:
[T]he truth is simply that we do not know, nor do we have any way of telling, how many inconsistent verdicts are at- tributable to feelings of leniency, to com- promise, or, for that matter, to outright confusion on the part of the jury.
Id. at 377. Rejecting the presumption of lenity in Dunn, the DeSacia court held that an inconsistent verdict was infected with legal error and could not be affirmed. Id. at 378.
With respect to remedy, however, the DeSacia court did not provide the defen- dant with an unqualified victory. The De- Sacia court recognized that under double- jeopardy principles, the defendant could not be retried on the charge for which he was acquitted. Id. at 379. The DeSacia court, however, held that the defendant could be retried on the charge that result- ed in a conviction. Id. at 381. The DeSa- cia court reasoned thаt double jeopardy did not apply and that principles of collat- eral estoppel did not bar retrial on the ground that such a result would be unfair to the state. Id. at 379-81.
A decade after DeSacia, the New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d 617 (1981). In Tucker, the court considered a case in which a jury convict- ed the defendant on two counts of robbery and one count of possession of a loaded gun, but acquitted him on two other counts of robbery. Tucker, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 617. The Tucker court affirmed the convictions on the ground that the verdicts were not legally inconsis- tent. Id., 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 620-21. That court observed that re- versal on grounds of inconsistent verdicts is appropriate only if “acquittal on one crime as chargеd to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the other crime, as charged, for which the guilty verdict was rendered.” Id., 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 619. The Tucker court emphasized that the inquiry necessary to determine whether verdicts were legally inconsistent, and therefore flawed, did not require inquiry into the jury process but only an objective analysis of the jury charge to ascertain if there was an irrec- oncilable conflict. Id.
Most recently, the Supreme Court of Maryland has considered the problems posed by inconsistent verdicts. In Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 949 A.2d 619 (2008), a jury found the defendant not guilty on all drug-trafficking charges, but found him guilty of possessing a firearm “during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime.” Price, 949 A.2d at 622. The Maryland Supreme Court, finding the verdicts incon- sistent, concluded that the guilty verdict was infected with legal error and сould not be sustained. Id. at 630.
In reaching its conclusion, the court in Price noted that in civil cases, Maryland law did not tolerate inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 628-29. If inconsistent verdicts were not tolerated in the civil context, the Price court observed, the case was even stronger in the context of criminal law in which the law affords greater procedural protections for a defendant than is given to either side of a civil trial. Id. at 630.
In sum, the majority of state cases sim- ply adopt the approach of Dunn and Pow- ell, but a significant minority distinguishes between factual and legal inconsistency and regard inconsistencies resulting from conviction of a compound felony and ac- quittal on the underlying predicate felony as fatally flawed.
D. Iowa Case Law Related to the Issue of Compound Inconsistency in Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases.
The Iowa Court of Appeals has, on at least two occasions, considered the question of the remedy for inconsistent jury verdicts in a criminal case. In State v. Pearson, 547 N.W.2d 236, 241 (Iowa Ct.App.1996), the court said that an inconsistency does not re- quire reversal if the inconsistency resulted from the jury’s exercise of lenity. In State v. Hernandez, 538 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Iowa Ct.App.1995), the court adopted the approach of Dunn and Powell.
E. Academic Commentary on Com- pound Inconsistent Jury Verdicts in Crimi- nal Cases.
There is a body of aca- demic commentary on the question of proper treatment of inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases generally. There have been a number of somewhat dated pieces that tend to support the Supreme Court’s approach. See, e.g., Bickel, 63 Harv. L.Rev. at 651-52 (1950); Chad W. Coulter, Comment, The Unnecessary Rule Con- sistency in Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. Pa. L.Rev. 223, 225-26 (1986) [hereinafter Coulter]. These commentators tend to emphasize the sanctity of juries in our system of criminal justice and the undesir- ability of seeking to determine the under- lying cause of inconsistency in jury ver- dicts. Bickel, 63 Harv. L.Rev. at 651 (characterizing the review of a jury verdict as a radical encroachment on the province of the jury); Coulter, 135 U. Pa. L.Rev. at 236-37 (“The Dunn case represents a practical and just compromise between the ‘jury‘s role in seeing that the individual gets justice with mercy’ and ‘the important federal interest in the еnforcement of the criminal law.‘”) (quoting Bickel, 63 Harv. L.Rev. at 655 (first quote); Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2008, 64 L.Ed.2d 689, 700 (1980) (second quote)).
More recent commentary, however, has been more critical. The leading commen- tator has characterized the Supreme Court‘s approach to inconsistent verdicts as “distressing.” See Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 Harv. L.Rev. 771, 834 (1998) [hereinafter Muller]. According to this authority, while we cannot do the equivalent of throwing open the hood and looking at the engine of jury deliberations, we should nonetheless not tolerate obvious jury error. Id. The commentator proposes a number of possible solutions to the general problem of incon- sistent jury verdicts, including harmless error analysis, refusаl to accept an incon- sistent verdict, and retrial at the option of the defendant. Id. at 821-34.
Another prominent academic has ob- served that the message in Dunn is, it is of “[b]etter that ten innocent defendants be convicted than that ten guilty defendants be denied the boon of unlawful jury nullifi- cation.” Albert W. Alschuler, The Su- preme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. 153, 213 (1989) [hereinafter Alschuler]. The commentary questions a rationale in Powell— namely, that the government would have no recourse under double-jeopardy princi- ples if the inconsistent guilty verdict were vacated—as imposing an improper penalty for application of double-jeopardy princi- ples. Id. at 213. Further, it is suggested that it makes no sense to impose extensive and cumbersome front-end controls on the trial process and then have no controls on the back end when the jury produces an inconsistent verdict. Id. at 154-55, 229.
A third academic critic characterizes as “surprising” the notion in Dunn that a government-sanctioned decision maker is entitled to “indulge” in “carelessness” and other Vagaries. Andrew D. Leipold, Re- thinking Jury Nullification, 82 Va. L.Rev. 253, 280 (1996) (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279, 64 S.Ct. 134, 135 (1943)). The critic also observes that the approach in Dunn deprives the defendant of valuable evidence “that the jury failed to find proof of each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” thereby increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction, and that the potential fоr a compromise verdict under Dunn is “particularly troublesome.” Id. at 279 n. 99, 280.
These more recent critics find a founda- tion in an older article written by a prose- cutor, Steven Wax. Wax, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. at 738. In article, Wax asserts that a strong argument can be made that inconsistent verdicts are incompatible with the notion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Like the minority of state courts, Wax notes that “[t]he assumption by the proponents of the Dunn position that most inconsistent verdicts are benign acts on the jury‘s part is just that—an assumption.” Id. at 739. What also may be at work, according to Wax, includes confusion, compromise, enforcement of public safety, misunderstanding of a charge, or what Wax calls “the gestalt perspective.” Id. Wax thus suggests that, when an acquittal of one charge is conclusive as to an element which is neces- sary to conviction on another charge, the conviction should be reversed. Id. at 740.
In sum, while the academic literature on inconsistent verdicts is not extensive and is mixed in its conclusions, a number of ob- servers regard Dunn and Powell as flawed, particularly in the context of legal inconsistency caused by conviction of a compound felony and acquittal of the po- tential underlying predicate felony.
F. Determination of Proper Ap- proach to Compound Inconsistent Jury Verdicts Under Iowa Law.
1. Validity of jury verdict involv- ing compound inconsistency. After re- view of the applicable precedents and au- thorities, we decline tо follow the approach of Dunn and Powell and conclude that, in a case involving conviction of a compound felony when the defendant is acquitted of the underlying predicate crime, the convic- tion cannot stand. We reach our conclu- sion for several reasons.
If all inconsistent verdicts were the re- sult of lenity with respect to the acquit- tals, and rationality with respect to the convictions, the approach in Dunn and Powell would make sense. But, we think it obvious that this is not the case. At the outset, it is equally possible that an inconsistent verdict is the product of ani- mus toward the defendant rather than lenity. See Muller, 111 Harv. L.Rev. at 798, 834. The presumption of lenity seems particularly doubtful if the jury convicts a defendant of the mоre serious component offense but acquits the defen- dant on predicate felonies. Further, aside from the animus-lenity coin, the inconsis- tent verdict may be a result of mistake, confusion, or compromise. See DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 377. Reasoned criminal trial verdicts, 22 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 313, 318-19 (2009). It is also difficult to justify that we would afford less protection in a criminal matter than in a civil matter involving money damages. See Price, 949 A.2d at 626-30.
In departing from Dunn and Powell in this case, we do not open a Pandora’s box by probing into the sanctity of jury delib- erations. Our analysis focuses solely on the legal impossibility of convicting a de- fendant of a compound crime while at the same time acquitting the defendant of predicate crimes. Making such a legаl determination does not require the court to engage in highly speculative inquiry into the nature of the jury deliberations. See Tucker, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d at 619-21 (refusing to speculate about jury motivation, but looking to objective facts to assess whether the jury verdict is self- contradictory). We focus solely on the elements of the crime, the jury verdicts, and the instructions in the case.
We also accept the notion that any potential remedy should be available only when the jury verdicts are truly inconsistent or irreconcilable. A reviewing court must carefully examine the pleadings and the instructions to ensure that the jury verdicts are so inconsistent that they must be set aside. See, e.g., Cochran v. State, 136 Ga.App. 125, 220 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1975) (emphasizing the need to carefully examine сrimes to determine whether they contain different elements, thereby show- ing whether the verdicts are truly inconsis- tent or repugnant); Commonwealth v. Austin, 906 A.2d 1213, 1219-21 (Pa.Super.Ct.2006) (discussing how apparently in- consistent verdicts may not be legally in- consistent).
Applying these principles to the case at hand, we find that the jury verdicts in this case are truly inconsistent. A jury simply could not convict Halstead of the compound crime of assault while participating in a felony without finding him also guilty of the predicate felony offense of theft in the first degree.3
There is simply no exit from this air-tight conundrum. As a result, Halstead’s conviction of the compound felony in this case must be re- versed. We reach our conclusion for several reasons.
Because we do not accept the pre- sumption of lenity in cases involving incon- sistent verdicts, we place greater weight than Powell and Dunn on the lack of reliability of jury verdicts when compound inconsistency is present. The purpose of our criminal justice system is to find the truth. When a jury convicts a defendant of a compound offense, but acquits the defendant on a predicate offense, our con- fidence in the outcome of the trial is un- dermined.
In constitutional terms, a jury ver- dict involving compound inconsistency in- sults the basic due process requirement that guilt must be proved beyond a reason- able doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). When a jury returns a compound inconsistency, a legal error has occurred. There is a substantial possibili- ty that the jury has simply made an error, engaged in compromise, or engaged in some other process that is inconsistent with the notion of guilt beyond a reason- able doubt.
Finally, we are concerned about the perceptions of the criminal justice system when inconsistent verdicts are allowed to stand. We are concerned that allowing a potentially long prison term arising from a compound felony to stand when a defendant has been found not guilty of predicate offenses will have a corrosive effect on confidence in the criminal justice system. When liberty is at stake, we do not think a shrug of the judicial shoulders is a suffi- cient response to an irrational conclusion. We are not playing legal horseshoes where close enough is sufficient. It is difficult to understand why we have a detailed trial procedure, where the forum is elaborate and carefully regulated, and then simply give up when the jury confounds us. See Alschuler, 56 U. Chi. L.Rev. at 154, 229-34; cf. Richard L. Lippke, The Case for Reasoned Criminal Trial Verdicts, 22 Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 313, 318-19 (2009). It is also difficult to justify that we would afford less protection in a criminal matter than in a civil matter involving money damages. See Price, 949 A.2d at 626-30.
In departing from Dunn and Powell in this case, we do not open a Pandora’s box of inquiry into the jury‘s exercise of lenity. In State v. Hernandez, 538 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Iowa Ct. App.1995), the court adopted the approach of Dunn and Powell.
Because we do not accept the presumption of lenity in cases involving inconsistent verdicts, we place greater weight than Powell and Dunn on the lack of reliability of jury verdicts when compound inconsistency is present. The purpose of our criminal justice system is to find the truth. When a jury convicts a defendant of a compound offense, but acquits the defendant on a predicate offense, our confidence in the outcome of the trial is un- dermined.
It is clear under double-jeopardy prin- ciples that the defendant may not be tried on the offenses for which he was acquitted. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969). The question arises, however, whether Hal- stead may nonetheless be subject to retrial on the charge for which he was found guilty, namely, the compound felony of assault while participating in a felony. Compare DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 379-81 (allowing retrial on offense when conviction was obtained in a prior trial), with Smith v. State, 412 Md. 150, 985 A.2d 1204, 1215 n. 10 (2009) (citing Ferrell v. State, 318 Md. 235, 567 A.2d 937, 940 (1990)) (refus- ing to allow retrial on double-jeopardy grounds).
We conclude that the defen- dant may not be retried on the underlying felony. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the doctrine of collateral estop- pel applies against the government as part of double jeopardy. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 442-46, 90 S.Ct. at 1193-95, 25 L.Ed.2d at 474-76. Double-jeopardy doctrine prohibits postacquittal appeal by the government that, if successful, would result in a second trial or would necessitate further proceed- ings “ ‘devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged’ ” before a second trier of fact. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145-46, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 116, 122 (1986) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 570, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 650 (1977)). As is apparent from Ashe and Smalis, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is part of double-jeopardy doctrine. Under collateral estoppel, a conclusive deter- mination of a jury cannot be retried in a separate successive proceeding. Here, it is clear that the jury has acquitted the defendant of the underlying predicate of- fenses. We find that collateral estoppel bars any subsequent retrial on the com- pound felony charge because the factual issues of guilt on the predicate felonies have been authoritatively determined.
IV. Conclusion.
For the above reasons, Halstead’s con- viction of assault while participating in a felony is reversed, and his sentence is vacated. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on the compound felony and for resentencing as a result of Halstead’s un- challenged convictions on theft in the fifth degree and robbery in the second degree.
DECISION OF THE COURT OF AP- PEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART, SENTENCE VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
APPEL
Justice