937 F.3d 973
7th Cir.2019Background
- Indiana law generally requires parental consent for abortions by unemancipated minors but provides a judicial bypass allowing abortion without consent if the minor is mature or the abortion is in her best interests.
- 2017 legislation (SEA 404) added a parental notice requirement: even after a bypass permits an abortion, the minor’s attorney must notify parents before the procedure unless the court finds notice is not in the minor’s best interests; bypass of notice is available only on best-interests grounds (not maturity).
- Planned Parenthood sued pre-enforcement and obtained a preliminary injunction against the notice provisions; the district court relied on uncontradicted affidavits showing some minors fear parental notification would lead to abuse, coercion, obstruction, or deterrence from seeking bypass.
- The State presented no evidentiary rebuttal at the preliminary-injunction stage and argued the injunction was premature because effects can only be measured after enforcement.
- The Seventh Circuit (majority) affirmed the preliminary injunction, applying the Casey undue-burden framework to find the notice requirement likely imposes a practical veto and undue burden on a substantial fraction of minors who would use the bypass; a dissent argued the record is speculative and the statute’s best-interests bypass is sufficient.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a pre-enforcement facial challenge may support a preliminary injunction against an abortion regulation | Planned Parenthood: pre-enforcement evidence showing likely effects suffices under Casey/Whole Woman’s Health; injunction appropriate to prevent irreparable harm | State: facial challenge requires post-enforcement evidence; injunction is premature without data from actual operation | Court: pre-enforcement injunction permissible; Casey/Whole Woman’s Health allow assessment of likely effects and injunction affirmed |
| Whether the parental-notice requirement likely imposes an undue burden on minors seeking bypass | Planned Parenthood: uncontradicted affidavits show notice will cause abuse, obstruction, self-harm, or deter attempts — creating practical veto for many mature minors | State: notice is less intrusive than consent; interests in parental involvement and health justify notice; effects speculative without evidence | Court: likely undue burden for a substantial fraction of affected minors because State offered no rebuttal evidence; injunction affirmed |
| Whether Bellotti maturity-based bypass must apply to notice statutes (i.e., must notice be waivable for maturity) | Planned Parenthood argued notice statute is unconstitutional because it lacks a maturity-based bypass | State: statute constitutional with best-interests bypass only; parental notification distinct from consent | Court: declined to decide Bellotti’s full applicability to notice statutes at this stage; affirmed injunction based on undue-burden evidence without resolving that legal question |
| Scope/timing and mechanics of notice (when notice is triggered and how served) | Planned Parenthood: notice requirement (certified mail or personal service) will delay/complicate abortions and risk harm | State: notice triggered by bypass hearing; argued reasonable state interest in parental awareness | Court: notice is triggered only when judge authorizes abortion; court noted certified mail/personal service create practical timing and safety problems contributing to undue burden |
Key Cases Cited
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (establishes judicial-bypass requirements for parental-consent statutes)
- Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (sets undue-burden standard and large-fraction denominator approach)
- Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (applies Casey undue-burden analysis to pre-enforcement challenge; courts weigh evidence of burdens and benefits)
- Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009) (Seventh Circuit precedent on parental-notice/consent jurisprudence and statutory interpretation)
- A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002) (discusses limits of pre-enforcement injunctions and evidentiary needs)
- H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding parental-notice statute where record did not raise maturity/best-interests claims)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (facial-challenge standard outside First Amendment; discussed in contrast to abortion cases)