*1
EASTERBROOK, Cirсuit Judge.
In 1995 Indiana enacted a statute mak
ing the woman’s informed consent a condi
tion to an abortion.
§
Ind.Code
16-34-2-
1.1. Even though the text of this law is
materially identical to
held
constitu
tional in Planned Parenthood
South
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 881-87, 112
120 L.Ed.2d
(1992),
a federal district court issued a
preliminary injunction preventing the stat
ute from taking effect. A Woman’s
Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. New
man, 904 F.Supp.
(S.D.Ind.1995).
years later,
Two
the district court modified
injunction
to permit the state to en
law,
force most of the
but
blocked en
forcement of the requirement
infor
mation
provided
“in
presence
pregnant woman, [by] the physician who is
perform
abortion,
referring
phy
sician or
physician
(§
assistant”
16-34-
2-1.1(1)).
(1997).
See
judge wrote fetus; (ii) of a dimensions Mississip- analysis of a new study, and result. data, a different require pi on the (iii) information relevant experience thought judge also fe- unborn of an survival potential abor- the demand showing that tus; information when decline did not development. stage of telephone or over paper provided (E) risks associated The medical number in the reduction that the implies to term. fetus carrying the (a cost higher attributable abortions (18) statutory hours reason) (2) before eighteen than to least rather At bad reason). woman (a abortion, pregnant valid information following: orally informed follows: reads as Indiana’s bene- (A) assistance That medical ex- performed not be shall An abortion prenatal available may be fits informed voluntary and cept with care childbirth, neonatal care, upon woman pregnant consent county office family (1) subdivisions has been children. provided. (B) When the litigation That the began, father plaintiffs of the unborn chal lenged not only fetus the requirement is legally required ad assist in *3 vice be delivered in person the support of but the also child. In medical-emergency exception, case of which rape, they the information re- deemed insufficient because it quired lacks details under this clause may be found in the Pennsylvania statute. The omitted. district court certified the medical-emer (C) That adoption alternatives are gency issue to the Supreme Court of available and that adoptive parents Indiana, interpretation, whose see A Wom may legally pay the costs of prenat- an’s Choice-East Side Women’sClinic v. care, al childbirth, and neonatal Newman, 671 (Ind. N.E.2d 104 1996), sat care. isfied thе district judge. See 980 F. Supp. (3) The pregnant woman certifies in at 966. Plaintiffs then dropped objec this writing, before the abortion is per- tion, leaving only the advice requirement formed, that the information required ground contention† as a † comparison, For reproduce we the substantive natives to abortion and that she has a portions of the statute at Casey, issue in 18 Pa. right to review printed materials and § Cons.Stat. 3205: that a copy provided will be to her free of (a)No abortion performed shall charge be or in- she chooses to review it. except duced with the (ii) voluntary and in- Medical assistance may benefits be formed consent upon woman prenatal care, available whom childbirth and performed abortion is to be care, or induced. neonatal and that more detailed in- Except in the case of a medical emergency, formation on the availability of such as- consent to an abortion is voluntary and sistance is contained the printed mate- informed only if and if: published by rials department. (1) At least 24 prior hours (iii) to the abor- The father of the unborn child is tion, physician perform who is to liable to assist support in the child, of her abortion or referring physician has even in instances he where has offered to orally informed the woman of: pay for the abortion. In the rape, case of (i) The nature of proposed proce- may information be omitted. dure or treatment and of those risks (3) A copy of printed materials has alternatives procedure to the or treatment provided been to the pregnant woman if a patient reasonable would consider she chooses to view these materials. material to the decision of whether or (4) pregnant woman certifies in writ- to undergo the abortion. ing, prior abortion, that the infor- (ii) probable gestational age of the mation required provided to be under unborn child at the time the abortion is to (1), paragraphs (2) pro- has been performed. be vided. (iii) The medical risks associated (b) Where a medical emergency compels carrying her child to term. performance abortion, of an physi- (2) At least 24 prior hours to the abor- cian shall woman, inform the prior to the tion, the physician who perform is tо abortion if possible, of the medical indica- abortion or the referring physician, or a tions supporting judgment his that an abor- qualified physician assistant, health care tion is necessaiy to avert her death or to practitioner, technician or social worker avert substantial and irreversible impair- to whom tire responsibility has been dele- ment major bodily function. gated by physician, either has (c) informed ... physician No guilty shall be of vio- pregnant woman that: lating this section for failure to furnish the (i)The department publishes printed required information (a) subsection if he materials which describe the unborn or she demonstrate, can by a preponder- child and agencies list which offer alter- evidence, ance of the that he or she rea-
687 also, e.g., Scheib- See the books. on sions the fact much makes Inc., Laboratories, F.3d 293 Dolby er v. operate allowed never been v. Cir.2002) Brulotte (following (7th v. 1014 States United It relies written. 176, 13 29, 85 S.Ct. 2095, Co., 379 Thys 745, 739, 107 S.Ct. Salerno, 481 U.S. incom- (1964), though even 99 L.Ed.2d (1987), proposition L.Ed.2d more recent cases, rationale of with the patible amendment that, first except Granville, 530 U.S. decisions). v. only Troxel unconstitutional held may law L.Ed.2d under n. exists of circumstances set “no when calling way out (2000), Yet offers us valid.” the Act which “suggestion,” Carhart, in Salerno language 530 U.S. Stenberg *4 judg- (2000), to Salerno’s without not 743 essential approach 2597, L.Ed.2d 147 S.Ct. Salerno, between the incompatibility the ment. Given a mention as much so hold- Stenberg’s language and invalid, pre-enforcement in a Salerno’s held Court must might that that of Salerno language statute the ing, an challenge, courts by the state way. give construed have been applications. proper some least
have at justiciable claim Still, say that a di- irreconcilable us with leaves This the ignore must that we mean not does The Supreme Court. from rectives commenced. has that enforcement fact in lower courts that insisted Justices what is about rely predictions Plaintiffs un- precedents apply hierarchy en- were law if Indiana’s happen likely to incompa- overruled, they seem even less has Indiana Because written. as forced See, e.g., recent decisions. more with tible law implementing from disabled been 20, 3, 118 Khan, 522 U.S. v.Co. Oil State ef- actual about information gathering (1997); Rodri- L.Ed.2d 199 275, 139 S.Ct. the inferences about uncertainty fects, any Ex- v. Quijas Shearson/American de guez how experience states’ on other based 484, S.Ct. 477, 109 Inc., 490 U.S. press, carry over experience that (1989). When 526 L.Ed.2d 104 fa- Indiana’s in resolved must Indiana than rather disregard themselves Justices about This, doubts coupled vor. did a decision—as overrule analy- constitutional predictions role Casey— did plurality Stenberg, and reasons important, sis, to be out turns We pickle. in a appeals courts they put presently. explained departing without Salerno follow cannot reiterated, stated, Karlin Casey Stenberg in both taken approach from may have statute an informed-consent Saler- disregard we cannot Casey; yet terms, written from differ effects principle departing without no principle could effects those an and relieves overruling express only innocuous-appearing demonstrate deci- follow duty to court inferior medical range of allows Indiana while furnishing infor- sonably believed (c) of subsection defense personnel. severely ain resulted would have mation parallel no direct Pennsylvania statute or mental physical effect on adverse law, Supreme but Indiana’s patient. health emergency” "medical has read essentially the requires Pennsylvania thus the same to achieve law proviso in Indiana’s "orally” by Indiana, provided advise same Choice—East Woman’s See A basic effect. the abortion. before 24 hours physician, Newman, N.E.2d 671 Clinic Women’s Side law in Indiana’s than restrictive is more It 1996). side contends (Ind. Neither 24-hour requires a Pennsylvania ways: two statutes between remaining difference Indiana, any and it in18 waiting period versus material. the informa- to deliver physician requires the law actually imposes an undue burden on Parenthood Wisconsin v. Doyle, 44 abortion. But neither decision explained F.Supp.2d 975 (W.D.Wis.1999), affirmed how such arguments factual are to be eval- under the name Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 uated: implementation before after?, (7th Cir.1999) (en F.3d 857 banc), remand- using what standards? Normally a court ed, 530 (2000), U.S. 1271 decision on re- say asked to that a have for- mand, (2001) (en banc). F.3d 603 bidden only effects asks whether proper Supreme Court vacated our decision with- outcome is possible; it does not hold a regard out to the district findings; court’s and, if a judge district nonetheless trial — (as it was of thе view we likewise had takes evidence and makes findings, the concluded, 872-73) 195 F.3d at that consti- appellate court will reexamine matters tutionality must be assessed at the level of with a heavy presumption favoring the legislative fact, rather adjudicative law’s constitutional application. See, e.g., fact determined by more than 650 district Vance v. Bradley, 99 judges. Only treating the matter as (1979); L.Ed.2d National legislative produces fact the nationally uni- Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. Chicago, 45 form approach that Stenberg demands. *5 (7th Cir.1995). F.3d 1124 say One may in against This worked the partial-birth-abor- response that these cases deal with ration- tion laws in Stenberg but has worked in review, al-basis while abortion implicates favor of other laws: the Court has it held fundamental rights. But laws regu- constitutional to prevent non-physicians late, itself, not abortion but ancillary issues from performing abortions, see Mazurek v. (such as consent), informed do not affect Armstrong, 968, 520 U.S. 117 1865, fundamental rights unless the ancillary 138 L.Ed.2d (1997), 162 without factual rule creates an undue burden on the un- inquiries into whether other pro- medical derlying right. How does the court handle fessionals could job do the as safely, and factual disputes that bear on whether an how much prices may be elevated aby undue burden has been created? It can- physician-only rule. not simply assume that a fundamental right burdened; has been that begs the Findings based on new evidence could question. produce a new understanding, and thus a different legal outcome;
Stenberg the plurality shows that im- the undue-burden plied this in Casey, standard must be did we in applied at the level Karlin. But if logic, the issue is and to one of whole, legislative the nation as rather rather adjudicative than fact, one state at a time. Nebraska unsound to for- say that, bade use of “intact very dilation records and nature, similar extraction” (D X),& (as method Wisconsin’s law of late-term could be abortion. valid we held Stenberg Karlin) believed that this ban and Indiana’s invalid, law just unacceptable consequences because different because district judges reached would induce physicians to steer different clear of conclusions about the inferences other procedures similar D & X. drawn from the same body of statis- Nebraska’s law therefore was tical held uncon- work. Because the Supreme Court stitutional, as an undue burden has on abor- not made point explicit, however, tion, without the need for a trial. Mean- and because the undue-burden approach while a trial had been Wisconsin, held in does prescribe not a choice between the where the district judge found as a legislative-fact fact adjudicative-fact and ap- that the untoward consequences anticipat- proaches, we think it appropriate to review ed in Stenberg would not occur. Planned the evidence in this record and the infer-
689
warrant);
v.
Corp.
Bose
of a
absence
at the
drawn
may be
properly
enees
Inc.,
States,
United
Union
Consumers
stage.
pre-enforcement
1949,
80
104 S.Ct.
466 U.S.
the two-
found
court
district
The
(factual
(1984)
disputes
L.Ed.2d
Mississippi
Utah
requirement
visit
first
constitutionality under
determine
per
abortions
number
reduced
novo). Cf.
de
are reviewed
amendment
10% com
by about
in those states
formed
-
Inc.,
Books,
Alameda
Angeles v.
Los
that do
states
neighboring
pared
152 L.Ed.2d
U.S.-,
also
judge
visits.
multiple
require
the standard
(without discussing
per
of abortions
the number
found
freely substitute
review,
Justices'
all nine
be
not declined
has
Indiana
formed
district
of the
for that
judgment
under
to women
given
advice
cause
anof
significance
on the
judges
appellate
16-34-2-1.1,
not neces
though
§
Ind.Code
suit).
in a constitutional
study
empirical
(because
aspect
person
sarily
Monaghan, Constitu
P.
Henry
also
asks See
enjoined).
been
Rev.
Review,
L.
Colum.
Fact
review tional
findings, but
aside these
set
us to
(1985).
52(a)
deferen
highly
Fed.R.Civ.P.
under
City,
Bessemer
tial,
Anderson
see
work
empirical
that the
concluding
By
84 L.Ed.2d
564, 105 S.Ct.
dis-
competently,
out
carried
been
had
the district
say that
(1985),
we cannot
(for
of this
purposes
established
judge
trict
erroneous.
clearly
findings
court’s
Mis-
dropped
abortions
litigation)
hotly debat
were
conclusions
studies’
Car-
those in South
compared
sissippi,
grounds,
statistical
medical
both
ed on
Mississippi
year after
olina,
during
*6
responsibly
dealt
judge
the district
but
two visits.
requiring
a statute
enacted
con,
his
and
and
pro
arguments
with these
(and
replica-
study
of
The authors
hap
But what
upset.
be
findings cannot
Mississippi
Utah)
ask how
did not
Utah,
question
a
and
Mississippi
pened
does
study
Indiana.
with
compares
review
appellate
fact on which
historical
of
sorts
on the
based
regression
not include
necessarily ordаin
deferential,
not
does
is
income,
urbanization,
variables,
such
whether
in Indiana —or
happen
will
what
clinic, av-
abortion
to an
average distance
in Indiana
happen
likely
is
what
on, that
abortion, and so
erage price
ad
That
burden.”
an “undue
amounts
Mis-
from
drawn
conclusions
might enable
law,
called
sometimes
fact and
mixture
confidence
extrapolated
to be
sissippi
fact,”
re
is
issue
“constitutional
why
reason
is one
That
states.
other
pre
in order
without deference
viewed
Mississippi
in Karlin
held
we
judge
single
aof
idiosyncrasies
vent
what
predicting
basis
poor
study was
effects.
far-reaching legal
having
from
jury
Wisconsin,
we
which
happen
would
fact
of historical
findings
Only the
Pennsylvania
more similar
thought
52(a).
consid
Thus our
by Rule
sheltered
at 485-86.
F.3d
188
Mississippi.
not
is
significance
the studies’
eration
fixed
been
have
shortcoming could
That
Industries,
Inc.
Cooper
See
deferential.
First,
the authors
ways.
in one of two
Inc.,
U.S.
532
Group,
Tool
Leatherman
comprehen-
a more
conducted
have
(2001) could
674
L.Ed.2d
424, 121 S.Ct.
and
variables
additional
study, with
sive
damages
(constitutionality
punitive
reveal
would
coefficients
regression
v. United
novo); Ornelas
de
reviewed
Second,
done.
That
effects.
States,
scholars)
(or
could
other
the authors
cause for
(1996) (probable
L.Ed.2d
to test
states
other
data
gathered
de novo
is reviewed
or seizure
search
(and,
so, how)
whether
state-specific
reveals is successful persuasion, we ob-
characteristics affect
the results. That
served in Karlin.
In this case the plain-
was not done either. What has happened
tiffs tried to separate the effect of informa-
in Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and the other
tion from the effect of making two visits.
states whose informed-consent
re-
laws
Since 1997 Indiana has been able to en-
quire two visits? Did Mississippi prove to force
portion
of its informed-consent
be a
predictor
better
of Wisconsin than
statute requiring the provision of certain
Karlin anticipated, or was the
outcome
information to women who inquire about
Wisconsin dissimilar? This record is silent
abortions. Yet the number of abortions
on these matters. Mississippi
Utah,
has not
shows,
declined. This
the district
two states with a history of hostility to judge wrote, that the law
persuasive
lacks
abortion
very
few
providers
abortion
effect; and if a decline in abortions cannot
(implying long
times),
travel
may be poor
persuasion,
attributed to
then the cause
models for other states.
Indianapolis has must lie in some other and impermissible
multiple
clinics;
another in Fort
feature of the law.
Wayne serves the
portion
northeastern
Yet this assumes what is to
proven:
state;
women in the northwest and
that Indiana is like Mississippi
Utah,
southeast can use not only
providers
local
so that
the number of abortions would
but
just
also those
across the state
lines
decline 10% or more if the law were en-
Chicago and Louisville.
just
So
as in Kar-
forced as written. Maybe what Indiana’s
lin
application
of the Mississippi data
experience since 1997
shows
(and
data)
now Utah’s
to a different state
from Mississippi and Utah
differs
abe
leap of faith. Here is where
not experience a substantial de-
pre-enforcement
nature of this suit
cline, with or without multiple visits. Or
matters.
maybe what it shows is that presenting the
Plaintiffs did try to deal with another
information in person is critical to its per-
problem identified in Karlin:
suasive effect. Our education system rests
original Mississippi study did not try to
on the premise that information delivered
*7
separate the raw
of a
costs
two-visit re-
orally, with an opportunity
give-and-
for
quirement from the effects of the informa-
take, “takes” better than information deliv-
provided
that was
during the first
ered exclusively in writing. Otherwise a
visit.
ty assumed that “for those women who nia’s statute. See Planned Parenthood of
have the
resources,
fewest financial
those Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 510
travel long distances,
must
1309,
U.S.
those
909,
114 S.Ct.
693 requiring abortionists on demand that nationwide laws informed-consent al the reasonable about to advise reevaluated. must abortion, as the state just to ternatives pre- been has Indiana years For seven pa notify to physicians require may materially a statute enforcing from vented to alternatives and risks about tients Su- by the valid held law to a identical procedures. medical invasive other many in court by this Casey, in preme Turnock, F.2d Ragsdale v. See Barms. in circuit fifth Karlin, by the and J., Cir.1988) (Coffey, dissent (7th 1396-97 (other country in the anywhere court No decade, a than more Accordingly, for ing). Indiana) held has in judge district view authority for been has there since years in law invalid any similar abortion require may legislature a state fore- not does Salerno Although Casey. “with mothers expectant provide to clinics to challenges pre-enforcement all close per to procedure of description a discretion of laws, an abuse abortion possi and risks formed, explanation pre-enforce- a to issue judge a district of alter a and discussion complications, ble law effects while injunction ment make can the woman so natives effects) open are for those (and reasons prior enlightened choice” responsible and Mississippi happened What debate. child. pre-born her life of terminating the effects imply does Utah at 1397. Id. unconstitutional, to be bound are Indiana and Wiscon- (like Pennsylvania this majority so opinion, today’s In and into effect its law put sin) dissenting opinions is entitled embraces panel conse- own by its judged law abortion rejects Ragsdale, Zbaraz and and allows challenge, quences. facial clinics’ informed enforce its of Indiana state REVERSED crit- the dissent Although statute. consent dis- concurring. reversing the Judge, COFFEY, Circuit icizes with “findpng] flaws court trict I. fac- based the court which evidence Judge Wood which findings” findings tual me to requires again — once case This regardless stand” “should believes informed constitutionality of review rec- at the looking court “[w]hether of the context in the legislation consent discretion an abuse novo, under de I ord ago, year’s industry. Seventeen error,” post for clear merely standard, or еnact waiting period a 24-hour stated col- my issue take 715—I was a Assembly Illinois General by the ed burden “undue criticism, for the league’s ensuring means lawful reasonable may be this case applicable standard” a brief time “at least a woman courts appellate only applied uniformly moral, numerous and consider” discuss trial whether inquire independently psychological, economical, practical, social, fact constitutional findings of judge’s reaching “involved factors medical and based the record firmly supported whether decision mature, well-informed See, law. application upon proper v. Zbaraz pregnancy.” not to abort v. Inc. Parenthood Memphis Planned (7th e.g., Cir. F.2d Hartigan, Cir.1999); (6th F.3d Sundquist, 175 I Similarly, dissenting). J., 1985) (Coffey, Casey, Parenthood Planned also see case in another later years three concluded 2791, 120 6, 112 S.Ct. n. 833, 991 empowered the state Illinois dissenting). (Scalia, J., L.Ed.2d abor- discourage childbirth promote *10 Judge Easterbrook succinctly and force- policy is no guarantee of reliability. As fully explains that the trial judge’s conclu- one commentator noted, has JAMA may sion this case involves “leap of faith” send a manuscript out to as many as ten that events which may or may not be reviewers “but it may actually be reviewed occurring in Mississippi and Utah will be by only three, two, or even one. Further- replicated in Indiana. Ante at 690. I more, an article may appear print even add that the judge’s trial factual findings a majority JAMA’s reviewers recom- of in this case are based on a faulty study by mends against publication, provided that biased researchers who operated in a vacu- the editor decides in its D. Mur- favor.” um of speculation. As even the dissent al., ray et It Ain’t Necessarily So 151 recognizes, the “key” piece of evidence (2001) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, the relied upon by the district court was a test for admissibility is not whether an study published in the August 27, 1997 article has been reviewed, or even well Journal the American Medical Associa- of accepted, by one’s peers. According to the tion (“JAMA”), post and was co- Supreme (which Court: “Publication is authored a statistician employed by the but one peer element review) is not of Planned Parenthood-affiliated Alan Gutt- qua sine non admissibility; it of does not machеr Institute. It is most obvious that necessarily reliability, correlate with study fails to shed any light on the in some well-grounded instances but inno- question before us today: Will Indiana’s vative theories will publish- not have been abortion statute cause a decline in abor- ed. propositions, Some moreover, are too tion rates in Indiana? The answer is particular, new, too too limited inter- of ” “no, study is for riddled with flatos published.... est to be publica- The fact of biases, being the most serious (or lack thereof) peer in a reviewed to account failure effects journal thus will relevant, abe but not will result the substantive differences dispositive, assessing consideration in scope between the the “medical emer- validity particular scientific tech- gency” exception in the Mississip- state of nique or methodology in opinion which an pi’s statute as contrasted with the state of premised.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Indiana’s Thus, statute. logically Inc., Pharm. 593-94, 113 impossible upon study draw Mis- 2786, 125 (1993) L.Ed.2d 469 (empha sissippi’s legislation when predicting the added). sis See Noah, also L. Sanctifying legislation. future Indiana’s effects Review, Peer 59 U. Pitt. Scientific L.Rev. (“At best ... peer editorial A. review manages to filter out obviously I initially reject the notion that we must work.”). sloppy defer to the JAMA study because, accord- ing to the dissenting judge, the study Caution regarding the “peer value of ” “meets any conceivable standard review peer- judicial as a gatekeeper is particu- ” review and published larly “one important in the case abortion- most highly respected journals study in the published related med- George in JAMA. ical Post 713. A party proffer- Lundberg, D. field.” the editor at the time of ing expert testimony must always publication establish of the 1997 study upon relied that it is reliable and relevant to an under- plaintiffs case, publicly standing of the issue before court, stated that religious abortion is “a issue” Clark v. Takata Corp., 192 F.3d 759 n. which should be solely by decided (7th Cir.1999), and peer JAMA’s review ivoman consultation “after loith the father *11 B. per- family, (if possible), her members of adviser, the woman’s religious and haps can- article Moreover, a faulty JAMA JAMA, Lundberg, reliable, physician.” a trust- G.D. as to utilized serve Responsibility, predict- for basis independent Editorial worthy, and and AboHion 1998). 26, legislation the Indiana (Aug. of 740, ing the effects 280 JAMA neither that abor- reаson the additional Lundberg that the for to assert went on this record else in anything police, nor article the business is “not tion decision of greater num- a for the fact Department accounted courts, lawyers, the U.S. of prob- with medical women of Indiana ber Congress Services, the Human Health and situated (as similarly compared lems legisla- States, state various the United the bur- will avoid Mississippi) in women except the anybody individu- tures, else notice-and-waiting provi- of Indiana’s dens vice The executive Id. above.” als named “medical for state’s by qualifying sions Medical Associ- of the American president judge trial exception. emergency” time at one which ation, organization an of Indiana number concluded vast be the voice was considered unable will find themselves who women prac- surgeons and physicians majority of of the notice- a result abortions as obtain Lundberg nation, stated ticing in equivalent will be and-waiting provisions and “inappropriately for terminated who Mississippi of women the number a ma- into JAMA interjecting inexcusably having from foreclosed are supposedly do nothing that has debate jor political percent approximately abortion — ” choosing to by or medicine with science F.Supp.2d See population. relevant college students how study on a publish a However, from even is evident 1175. as ” Presi- in midst of “having sex defined statute, excep- reading of cursory proceedings. impeachment Clinton’s dent notice-and-waiting require- tions to AMA Ballingrud, D. See Defends and scope Chief broad far more ments are (Fla.) Petersburg Firing, St. Editor’s they are than Indiana inclusive more on 1999, Relying 23, at 3B. Times, Feb. at- result, even after As a Mississippi. apparent this JAMA facts, it is notion judge’s trial these accept tempting jaundiced analy- study regression be viewed performed must properly differences a statistician all other eye, for was written have accounted ses for in Indiana out- population editor who female published between 1163-71, de- id. supporters Mississippi, spoken “abortion ”1 obvi- exception Indiana reasonably be mand, cannot breadth thus greater number ously result preju- without impartial classified being excused or bias. dice flaws, for study had obvious parental notice Moreover, noting that morе worth to interview inexplicably failed the author hostility to- exhibited article one JAMA teenage popula- sample representative gener- legislation in consent informed wards responses upon only relied instead tion and August Indeed, study published a JAMA al. visiting Par- teenagers Planned were 14, “requiring parental from enthood concluded According to Wisconsin. clinics obtaining prescribed contra- notification "the only that critic, study showed girls’ use impede adolescent ceptives don't tell around who fool kids types of willingness to and their contraceptive services Ka- surprising.” That’s not it. parents about sexually screening and treatment seek Griffin, Sex Shun Would Girls L. wanza Surveyed on Sex- Girls diseases.” transmitted Sentinel, Aug. Care, J. J., Milw. Services, Aug. Health Wall St. ual-Health at 1A. Many declared critics at D2. *12 696 requirements, statute’s and thus a lesser As we have pointed above, out because number Indiana women be bur- of will the statutory exception is much more ex- by requirements
dened
Indiana’s
than the pansive in Indiana than Mississippi, a
requirements Mississippi
greater number of Indiana women will be
exempt from
Supreme
Court of
limitation of their
Indiana
statute
its
than
broadly
similarly
decision
defines
situated
women in
term “medi-
Mississip-
any
pi,
cal
physical
emergency” as
and thus I cannot agree
or men-
that evidence
tal
of a
condition that
10 percent
more severe
reduction
Mississippi’s
prolonged
regular
those
than
“lesser
predicts
abortion rate
that a similar reduc-
normally
conditions
tion is on
associated
the horizon in
with
Indiana.
pregnancy,” A Woman’s Choice v. New-
I cannot understand the dissent’s at-
man,
104,
671 N.E.2d
109 (Ind.1996),
tempt
enlarge
scope
Indiana’s
of
while the Mississippi legislature has nar-
emergency exception
medical
”
by claiming
rowly defined “medical emergency
“the
acknowledges [that]
which,
“that condition
on the basis
of
Indiana’s law has been construed to have
physician’s best clinical
judgment,
so
emergency by-pass provision
an
that cov-
complicates a pregnancy as to necessitate
any
physical
ers
kind
psychological
or
of
an immediate abortion to avert the death
risk to the
any
provi-
woman
from
of
the mother or
which a twenty-four-
of
sions, including presumably
‘presence’
delay
hour
grave
create
peril
im-
оf
requirement.”
708,
Post at
n.2.
doing
In
mediate and irreversible loss
major
of
this, the dissent has mischaracterized the
bodily
Miss.Code
§
Ann.
41-
function.”
majority opinion as well as the Indiana
31(b).
Indiana,
In
an abortion
41—
clinic
Supreme .Court’s construction
the stat-
may disregard
of
the notice-and-waiting re-
ute
us. We in the
quirements
majority,
before
when
attending physician,
if “the
stating that Indiana’s emergency bypass
in the
judgment
her
exercise
clinical
has been
encompass
“held
any
light
kind
all
relevant
ato
wom-
factors
threat
to the
safety,”
woman’s
health,
an’s
health or
or
good
concludes in
life
691,
ante at
complications
referring
that medical
faith
in her
Supreme
patient’s pregnancy
Court’s statement that
necessity
indicate the
the “med-
emergency exception
ical
by therapeutic
treatment
excuses a wom-
abortion”
requirement
without
Newman,
delay.
supra
consent
informed
significant
when
hand,
On the
there
other
is a
in Mississippi threat
to her
health,
time
physical
1997 JAMA study, an
abor-
life
mental” but
clinic
“severe-but-temporary
was allowed to
waive
no-
conditions in
tice-and-waiting
which
requirement
only
medically
abortion is not the
emergencies
necessary
“medical
to avoid the death
treatment are not covered
prevent peril
exception.”
the woman or
Newman,
immedi-
This entered will assist women in un- the abortion practice because he was de- derstanding an invasive nied hospital staff privileges by procedure a medical may very well painful peer review committee after questionable psychological, physical, and moral conse- procedures medical quences. inferior surgical The woman undergoing the technique.” Id. at 1552. Such abortion may information very well experience serious is essential to making a responsible psychological deci- disorders and mental health sion. problems in the form of depressive psycho- sis (including suicide) the risk of both be- The woman also will receive information fore, during, and many years following regarding issues, economic such as the fa- her perhaps even for a lifetime. ther’s obligation decision— to contribute to the sup- Added to this mental strain and anguish port child, the availability of medical are the almost endless number of physical benefits and care, child and the right and involved,
risks
including trauma, perma-
possibility of giving up
baby
to a loving-
nent damage
reproductive
and other
adoptive family. After receiving such in-
vital organs, dysfunction of the-cardiovas-
formation, it also
probable
that the best
cular or respiratory system, internal bleed-
interests of the client would be better
ing or hemorrhaging, embolism, and aller-
served were she to
granted
a reason-
gic reactions. Other medical factors to be
able period of time to reflect upon the
considered in making a mature, informed
information recently made known to her
decision include the type of abortion to be
dealing with the possible social
psy-
performed, the
past
woman’s
medical and chological problems arising from the deci-
psychological history, her physical reaction
sion. Hopefully, the medical professionals
to previous
procedures,
medical
her toler- who meet with the woman will be well-
ance for certain medications, the likelihood
trained
order that they might prepare
of contracting a
infection,
uterine
the patient
to confront and resolve the
chance that
placenta
and fetus will not
possible feelings of anger, fear, dеpression,
be completely removed,
potential
and confusion she may encounter towards
future difficulties in bearing children, and herself
father,
and/or
guilt
onset of
even the possibility of sexual sterility. See
*18
and overall withdrawal
society,
from
and
Zbaraz,
The Indiana statute requires that the name of the abortionist be made known to It also is reasonable for a legisla- state the patient, thus giving her an opportunity ture to have believed that the most effi- to review credentials, the qualifications, cient way to safeguard health, the safety, and experience of the physician, inquiring and well-being of the pregnant woman into whether he is a board-certified gyne- would be to allow her to receive the above- cologist, is accurate his pregnancy term stated information during a face-to-face diagnosis, and is familiar with both the meeting with professionals. medical It procedure and myriad the complications was most unfortunate and inappropriate that may very well arise during the proce- for the court to accept the proposition that dure. See id. at 1550. In making this voluntary consent for an abortion may be information receive this women to tant for 800-phone dialing an patient a insured or the presence her abortionist either in digits number, touching certain physician’s in infor- taking and —trained well-schooled passively then and keypad, nurse, See or mid- telephone. assistant, practice through the licensed mation very well F.Supp. patient might because the wife who person to the personally to talk “want meeting will direct, face-to-face aOnly and procedure may performing” to and doctor patient allow the serve face-to-face personal, benefit understanding of complete a full and have meeting profes- instead of consultation might arise possible problems operating the first time “on the sional procedure. invasive during or after “this is the it is unclear whether table” and meeting is type only This—and this — supposed to be you’re person or the doctor the client whether to determine way Newman, F.Supp. talking to.” conveying isor consent an informed giving Per- 1464-65. procedure. postpone wish any question vital contact is sonal Indeed, in-the-presence the need for an consent, medical it allows the informed by testimo- was underscored requirement to observe opportunity best expert injunction hearing, preliminary at the ny pa- behavior of and nonverbal verbal just recently who had a woman where and her reactions focusing on tient an Indiana procedure at undergone the expres- her facial questions, responses her never saw clinic testified she abortion contact, voice, attitude, eye sions, tone of never began procedure, until he doctor movements, confused or body and posture (for with a -it was face covered saw his oth- patterns countless speech nervous mask), his never learned surgical by tele- that are indiscernible factors er her. spoke he never name because be- incongruities reveal phone may but “[A as follows: The woman testified fe- what she says and patient tween what said, your ‘This is assisting nurse] male United feels or believes. actually Cf. ’ said, have a doctor, my doctor I ‘Does (7th French, 945, 951 F.3d v. States smiled, she giggled And he name?’ Mancillas, 183 Cir.2002); States United And he did he was. I but don’t know Cir.1999). (7th n. 22 F.3d to me. talked He never procedure. result, consultation a face-to-face aAs about some- They talked He talked her. time before a reasonable occurring remember, and it was I can’t even thing, telephone what “may disclose 416-17). (Tr. he over. And left.” a woman whether will mask: interview uncertain, equivocal or the General materials that apprehensive, Some abortion; wheth- pro- whether to about the abortionist Assembly directed additional some woman, might needs wishes she she er in order that vide wishes, information; but she or whether one of making before properly informed difficult, additional to ask some may find it of her entire decisions important most *19 alterna- some other explore question possible minimize as best as to life and tive.” psychologi- physical or for future potential easily accurately or injuries, cal cannot Representa- House In the Indiana media, the dis- other conveyed through this bill stated tives, sponsor the chief The Gen- requires. injunction judge’s trict impor- debates that extensive diming (internal 7-8 Conference at Indiana Catholic States of thе United Curiae Brief Amicus omitted). ellipsis citations Bishops and the Catholic Conference of Assembly eral opinion that it is of even one citation to record, invades essential for the woman to be well-in- legitimate province of the legislative formed among other things, of “proba- and executive branches and places a strait- gestational ble age of the fetus” and also jacket upon power to regulate and given the option of seeing a picture or control practice. result, As a lit- drawing of the fetus and its dimensions. erally thousands Indiana women have 16-34-2-1.1.(1). § Ind.Code It is nigh undergone abortions since 1995 without unto impossible to provide a picture or having had the benefit of receiving the drawing pre-born of a child over the tele- necessary information to ensure that their phone unless both the patient and the momentous choice is premised upon the abortion clinic are equipped with expen- wealth of information available to amake sive, highly advanced videoconferencing well-informed and educated life-or-death equipment. Furthermore, any attempt decision. I remain convinced that the trial provide an illustration through the mail judge abused his discretion when depriv- without having first met with the patient ing the sovereign State of Indiana of its for a physical examination may potentially right lawful enforce statute before be misleading and inaccurate. The district us. I can only hope that the number of judge’s refusal to enforce Indiana’s re- may have been quirement of face-to-face meetings be- harmed by the judge’s decision is but few tween the health care provider and the in number.
pregnant woman emasculates the statute
and undermines the very intent of the
III.
legislature.
In Indiana,
according
preamble
In my opinion, it
anwas
abuse of discre-
its abortion
“[cjhild
statute,
control
birth
tion for the district
judge to disregard
is preferred, encouraged, and accepted
controlling legal authority, cast aside the
over abortion.”
§
Ind.Code
16-34-1-1.
opinions
qualified
medical experts and Furthermore, “in America, we respect the
the judgment of the people of Indiana as
sanctity of human life.”
Mellas,
Walsh v.
represented by the elected members of the
(7th
F.2d
Cir.1988).
Pro-life
Indiana General Assembly, and declare
legislation that fails to pose a substantial
that the “in
presence”
requirement
is obstacle for 87 to 90 percent of a state’s
not “reasonably likely
provide
any genu- women,
may
have the incidental effect
ine benefit” to Indiana women. Newnian,
reducing
demand for
abortions
path of a woman’s choice cannot be con- I sidered a permissible means serving its legitimate ends. Turning now to the way in which we should 877,112 resolve this Id. at appeal, it is useful to S.Ct. 2791. begin with some reminders about what Applying standard, this the Court struck (For Casey held. ease exposition, I down the Pennsylvania spousal statute’s refer to Casey alone rather than to “the consent requirement and the record-keep- Casey standard as endorsed Stenberg,” ing requirement relating spousal notice; since formulation, the latter while more upheld it the statute’s parental consent accurate, is needlessly cumbersome.) (which requirement contained the neces- First, Casey dictates how draw the line sary one-parent judicial bypass provi-
between permissible state regulation and sions), the medical emergency provisions, unconstitutional regulation: the rest of the record-keeping require- ' Numerous forms of ments, state regulation and the “informed consent” re-
might have the
quirement.
incidental effect of in-
Knowing both what failed the
creasing the cost or decreasing the avail- new test and
passed
what
gives
it
litigants
ability
care,
of medical
whether
for abor-
roadmap of the kind of claims that are
tion or any othеr
procedure.
medical
likely
succeed,
and the kind of evidence
The fact
law which serves a
they
present.
must
valid
It
gives
also
us con-
purpose, one not designed to strike
guidance
crete
on the
questions
critical
the right itself, has the
(1)
incidental
now
effect
before us:
under the Casey test,
of making it more difficult or more ex- must the statute create an “undue burden”
pensive to procure an abortion
for every
cannot
single woman,
or is it enough
enough to invalidate it. Only
where
create an undue burden for some
state regulation imposes
(2)
women;
an undue bur-
to what extent are we dealing
den
aon woman’s ability to make
with empirical,
fact-specific issues, and to
decision does the power of the
what
State
extent with “legislative” issues; and
reach into
the heart of the liberty pro-
how must the statute allow for flexible
tected
the Due Process Clause.
compliance with the state’s
goals?
broader
707 2,000,- consulting Ante father: majority putative addresses. that the lenges connection, dis- despite year women a who are the victims of In this at 687. claimers, strong im- is left with the by partners. assaults their male severe ei- majority applying that the pression regu those women—“the victims of As for Salerno, 481 U.S. States ther United physical psychological lar abuse at the (1987), 739, 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d husbands,” 893, id. at hands their essence, it. In very close to something or were different. The S.Ct. matters like the one that a state statute it holds found, based on limited re “[t]he Court now would be unconstitutional before us search that has been conducted with re circumstances” only if was “no set of there spect notifying one’s husband about an it it was which under which valid— abortion, although involving samples too in single mean that not a woman seems to representative,” small to be id. find the law’s burdens toler- Indiana would spousal notification S.Ct. impermissible an back-door able. This is requirement “likely prevent sig yet, it as- of Salerno. Worse application obtaining nificant number of women from question before the answer to the sumes Id. at 2791. abortion.” S.Ct. wants to system whether the Indiana us: Later, point, to underscore the it reiterаt Indiana unduly in will burden put place analysis ed that does not end with “[t]he pertinent part of the women. Since percent upon the one of women whom the force, ma- gone never into statute has Id. at operates; begins statute it there.” that the presumption in the jority indulges 894, 112 2791. S.Ct. But burden at all. this imposes law no juris- in our presumption is found nowhere critical That takes us second implicating laws fun- at least for prudence, in question: whether the reduction abor- Further- rights. damental constitutional is the result of the law’s performed tions more, methodology is inconsistent consequence or the of the persuasive force Casey. with in impermissible placement obstacles to choose. right of a woman’s path Casey spous- addressed the Part V-C of assume, argu- the sake of may One Pennsyl- requirement al notification of the ment, will that fewer women law, also under circumstances vania than did women Mis- forego yet begun. which enforcement had to the studies in the sissippi, according found, The district court had Su- that a may further assume record. One ma- accepted, that vast preme “[t]he in Indiana larger percentage of women their jority of women consult husbands forego an abortion will do so because preg- prior deciding to terminate by the informa- they persuaded were law’s 888,112 2791. nancy. ...” 505 U.S. at contrary to their sis- requirements, tional assume, therefore, can that the spousal We No matter: under Mississippi. ters was not an undue requirement notification those women Casey, our focus must be on burden, burden, for that any kind of who, spousal like those affected women; they are al- majority” “vast Pennsylvania, requirement notification specified. ready doing what because of forego the abortion to consider the But the Court went on burden, persuasion.1 not because of already of women who were not plight fact, along Supreme Court to have reasoned parallel spousal notifi- In panel, Casey requirement deeper than the same lines as cation runs of women finding Were would have concluded mere of an undue burden. 1% imagine I cannot a more resounding re- herself that the patient’s consent is in- pudiation of the approach Salerno than the formed. Our concern is with specific *23 Casey opinion gаve. majority opinion way in which the state wants the informa- in Stenberg makes it clear that this was no tion to be transmitted.2 oversight. accident or We must therefore The majority suggests that Casey has the effect the “in presence” look already answered this question, insofar as requirements on the Indiana upon women it addressed a regulatory regime with a operates: whom the statute the approxi- similar “two visit” rule. But a look at the (as mately 10% the record suggests and as Casey opinion shows that the Court was found) the district court who will no longer writing not so broadly; to the contrary, be able to obtain abortions under the new the great Court took pains not to rule on (Note that regime. the 10% number could informed rules either in consent/two-visit be off by an order of magnitude and we general as a matter of fact or as a matter required enjoin still be part this Instead, of law. it explicitly limited its the law it “only” 1%, affected holding to the record before it. It stated number presumptively affected that there was “no evidence on record spousal notification rule in Pennsylvania.) that requiring a give doctor to the infor- But, majority responds, the Su- provided mation as by the statute would preme Court in Casey upheld something amount practical terms to a substantial almost like exactly the Indiana “in the obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” presence” requirement when it added). found that (emphasis Id. There is no reason Pennsylvania’s informed consent rules to treat the phrases “on this record” and passed muster. Informed consent at the practical “in terms” as casual insertions. level, general course, most was not the The Court thought that the waiting period issue either in our case or in Casey; under question one, was a close particularly be- injunction entered, the district court it cause would often translate into a two- every Indiana woman is furnished with the requirement. visit Pennsylvania dis- information the state helpful, deems and trict court had not made the necessary when she up shows for the abortion proce- findings of fact to show that a two-visit dure the doctor can again once assure requirement would to an amount undue forego abortions because of the notifica- any provisions, of its including presum- requirement merely have in chаnged fact ably "presence" requirement. But that "persuaded” their minds—been distinguish —after does not it from Pennsylvania's consultation with their husbands that would statute, which also physician relieved not have occurred but for the notification compliance with the informed consent rules requirement. The Court focused on those demonstrate, "if he or she can by a prepon- persuaded, who were not but who evidence, derance of the that he or she rea- carry instead were forced to pregnancy sonably furnishing believed that the informa- term because risk violence or tion would have severely resulted ain adverse abuse from partner. their male Similarly, physical effect on the or mental health of the this court should focus on those who are not patient.” 3205(c) (1990). § Pa. Cons.Stat. persuaded "presence” require- because The existence of such a statute was not ment, but for requirement whom this is close enough to convince the spousal Court that the equivalent of a flat prohibition on abor- requirement consent permissible. was By the tion. token, same the existence of a safety similar 2. As acknowledges, Indiana’s valve in the enough law has been construed to emergency have an save the "presence” otherwise burdensome provision by-pass any that covers kind of requirement, for the explain I reasons below. physical psychological risk to the woman II that court had because (largely burden test from Roe old trimester applied the Initially, necessary briefly to consid- Wade, 410 U.S. er we mean the term “fact” and what (1973), and had invalidated L.Ed.2d 147 may a fact established. The ma- how sensitive, other, factually less rule for jority explain why tried to how and reasons). any doubt If there could be court, reversing the district even while it whether question on the remaining critical of fact accepts findings such the rec- restricting ruling dropped Mississippi abortions after en- *24 it, from following passage rule, the compared before actment of a two-visit as ord Carolina, in which did not it to rest: those South Casey should set (2) rule; a two-visit the number have conclude Court did not And the District in Indiana has not performed of abortions an obsta- waiting period is such that the given declined because of advice are most fоr the women who cle even pursuant to the statute. Even Hence, on the. record by it. burdened support facts the district though these us, this in the context of before majority finding, argues court’s convinced we are not challenge, facial finding the ultimate of an “undue burden” consti- waiting period 24-hour that the sustained, largely cannot because an undue burden. tutes did not find such a burden Supreme Court rule, Casey in a did this for similar nor 887,112 at S.Ct. 505 U.S. (7th Foust, in court Karlin v. 188 F.3d therefore, follow- Casey, establishes Cir.1999), ma- upon the decision which the (1) we present case: ing guidelines for of its reliance. jority places most With the Indiana law based must evaluate approach I believe this confuses respect, which is operating, whom it is upon those fundamentally inquiries: different two bur- of women who will be say the set in a way concerns the which certain first presence” require- “in dened established, fact must be and the second (2) ment; no evidence before asks, if there were vary logically whether this fact will this re- tending court to show if, properly to case or once from- case notification spousal like the quirement, established, “legislative” it is nature “likely Casey, pre- is rule considered questioned over and that it cannot be such number of women significant vent a again. over ' abortion,” an 505 U.S. at obtaining Casey, preceding discussion as required then we would be S.Ct. clear, focused on the first makes facial chal- Indiana’s rule on this uphold there decided questions. Court those there is evidence that lenge; but since burden” of an “undue the existence much more as reliable —if not is least on the record had not been established Casey which the the evidence on so—than open, how- it. It left the door then before evaluating spousal relied
opinion ever, present more parties for later rules, at what we must look notification in the gaps that would cure the evidence shows, deferring to the dis- that evidence can be point that existed. This record fact, just findings historical trict court’s drug ap- to new analogy illustrated Casey. did in Supreme compa- as the pharmaceutical proval. Suppose Cf. 699,116 Ornelas, 1657. .1 Drug Admin- ny 517 U.S. the Food and approaches application approval for turn before the dis- istration with now to the evidence it Naturally, sub- drug, Alphа. of a new trict court. case, agency. mits information to the supporting compared with the record If, however, court, FDA deems informa- before the Karlin and it has made insufficient, assumptions reject it will about applica- inter-state differences unsupported (and, does not mean that the this record I compa- tion. This suspect, later, unsupportable). again, Once I ny re-apply cannot after conducts discuss the particular evidence in pres- studies or more clinical otherwise cures ent record later. important What is here is the deficiencies the earlier record. to recognize that highly this evidence is fully supported application, Based on pertinent A case. central reason Alpha FDA whether should will decide why treats this as a “failure approved as safe effective the des- proof’ case, does, to the extent it is that situation ignated exactly uses. Our it assumes that studies done Mississippi, have in same. We now this case the “re- Utah, Carolina, or North nothing application” finding whether a rule to do with Indiana. assumption This (here, requires two visits to the clinic mysterious. considering, What we are af- “presence” requirement) Indiana’s consti- *25 all, ter is a simple matter of human reac- there, tutes an undue burden. Are in tions sets of incentives or disincentives: words, other women for whom this rule will a particular measure be seen aas placing has the “effect of a substantial all; so, at disincentive will the obstacle path obstacle in the of ... seeking an inconvenience, be a mere or will it effec- abortion of a nonviable fetus”? 505 U.S. tively particular ban a option? In the field 877,112 at economics, we assume people will In order to answer that question, we in react similar predictable ways to presented must evaluate the evidence in (And incentives. sometimes it takes more so, particular doing this case. Before how- study to ascertain what the incen- ever, it is also useful to note where the are, tive effects a particular measure concept “legislative facts”—on which the if, understood, even once those effects are majority legitimately in applies relies— universal.) presumed to be Consistently case, and where it does Skipping not. with that well-accepted proposition, there question over the crucial way about the in every is reason here to assume that established, which facts must be the ma- Indiana women will react proven incen- jority in treats this case as one which the tives and disincentives in way the same factual record is identical to the record in women from other (e.g., states Mississippi) Karlin and then assumes that if there was have respond. been shown to The Law of nothing a unconstitutional about two-visit Demand is generalized based on assump- in can nothing rule Karlin there uncon- tions about human behavior and rationali- burdens, stitutional here. Burdens are no ty, and there is no reason to waste time matter what state a court considering. trying prove that people in one area are Furthermore, majority, reasons the that is exceptions to these rules. Supreme how the Supreme Court treated efforts to Court relied on the same idea in Stenberg: regulate procedure the late-term abortion faced with high uncertainty about which in Stenberg, issue and thus it must be procedures legal not, were and which were way all relating to treat facts coupled with penalties draconian for an abortion issue. guess, incorrect it was safe to assume that
With all due respect, majority doctors, has all everywhere, would err on the failed to take into significant account dif- side of caution and altogether refuse ferences in the record that compiled perform was in certain kinds late-term abor-
7H between of the differences significance should the Court Maybe tions. factors Indiana that these Mississippi and doctors exception for out carved best, incorporat- At studies might reveal. like attracting gamblers, famous places level of greater at a these variables ing for obvi- City; but Atlantic or Vegas Las are some indicate there detail not. it did reasons ous “pres- for whom Indiana that under acknowledges as there just a problem, rule is not ence” Demand, higher prices Law of Pennsylvania many women were de the number will decrease abortion spous- anticipate any problem not did (as recog manded, appears it also but majority does Surely the notification. al here. nize) question difficult is not the in Indiana every think that woman increase the observed whether It is instead states, clinic; all like close to lives two- “presence” caused price sig- rural significant areas Indiana one under a permissible rule is visit far from living people numbers of nificant Los City analysis. See burden undue facility. health services reproductive - Inc., Books, U.S. Alameda Angeles v. Indiana, (There clinics 1728, 1742, 152 L.Ed.2d -, Institute, Fact Sheet: Family see (reduction J., concurring) (Kennedy, Indiana, http://www.hoosier- Abortion step first merely the in demand covering family.org/FactSheetl3.html, regula- aof analysis permissibility miles, 36,000 see square territory of some that de- step is whether crucial tion: the Bureau, County State Census allowable through achieved crease *26 http://quickfacts.cen- at QuickFacts, action). precisely That is governmental That adds sus.gov/qfd/states/18000.html. Casey in identified that the Court issue average for clinic on the to one abortion up where a different point, empirical And, 3,300 miles. square every almost complete on a more possible result unlikely that quite it say, to is needless why me to It unclear best is record. perfect with distributed clinics are these majority on in the judges two to the extent regularity; geographical than the they know better think that panel major cit- around are concentrated clinics all the who heard judge, court district that other Indianapolis, that means like ies evidence, all weighed testimony and will live substan- Indiana in rural women whether question is to the answer what facili- away from nearest distances tial would of Indiana women number a critical majority most, the details At ty.) rule as presence” “in the experience that more Indiana suggest might demands it burden that significant such the burdens can withstand women exercising them from effectively prevent in counterparts their Indiana In- choice. constitutionally protected not, question But the Mississippi could. ex- court’s the district respecting stead as a women example, whether work, majority flaws finds tensive It is clinics. to abortion live closer group the court based on which evidence 60 miles living woman an Indiana whether instance, thinks, It findings. factual cannot in Indiana away from a dime in the record should the evidence (either psy- financially, socially, afford degree of factors like into account taken visits, will rе- two make chologically) to urbanization, average distance Mississippi woman way a spond same at 689. clinics, income levels. Ante in a clinic Mis- away from miles living 60 To did. constraints majority’s sissippi with similar leads to the simply But this the set it clear Casey made legal repeat, misunderstanding about second 41, 51-52, women must consider are those we who U.S. 89 L.Ed.2d (1986) (in law, by the and it context, are burdened found 1% 29 the First Amendment justify enough striking spousal down the requirement no that “a city, before enact- Maybe ordinance, rule. 10% of ing notification the wom- such an [ ] conduct new Mississippi problem en in have that produce studies or independent evidence “only” 3% of women Indiana do. already generated cities, No that by other so quite long matter. The district court was rea- as whatever city evidence the relies upon sonable to find that women Indiana are reasonably believed to be relevant people addresses.”). like all other and that their re- problem city sponses will be the same as those of wom- Ill
en elsewhere. Or could be that the Turning thinks now to the evidence demon- likely women Indiana are more strating that the Indiana “presence” rule persuaded by the “presence” require- burden, indeed constitutes an undue we ment than are women in Mississippi, so find detailed and meticulous findings from the decrease abortions due to the the district court support proposi- requirement could be attributed to the tion. This entirely evidence was compe- constitutionally permissible persuasive support tent the district court’s deci- however, sion; Again, force of the law. all Casey’s discussion of the spousal previous apply: question criticisms is notification rule makes it clear that evi- women in whether more Indiana are dence on undue burden does not have to persuaded than are women Mississippi heightened meet some standard of perfec- (bearing mind there was no evi- tion. To the contrary, the Court there dence before the district court indicating relied on “limited research that has been case). why that should be the It is instead conducted with respect issue [the hand, whether a sufficient number of Indiana there notifying one’s husband about abortion], akin to (something the 1% of Ca- although involving samples *27 sey) persuaded, not so yet and are representative,” too small to be 505 892, among those who will be forced forego 112 S.Ct. to support its conclu- right to choose. spousal sion about notification. majority rejects wholesale zero, the rele- haveWe more than and less than (and of Mississippi perfection, vance studies sever- when it comes to information studies) by implying al other that the dis- about the burden the Indiana statute clearly trict court erred in its places decision that on the women affected the two- Indiana women would react to burdensome visit majority, effect, rule. The in has not requirements two-visit in the way, only same perfection; demanded it also wants a reasons, and for the same Mississippi showing that some number of Indiana context, women did. But even in this significantly larger than the num- offers no reason at all to believe that accepted ber the Court in Casey are undu- idiosyncratic, Indiana women are so ly nor in burdened the law. Every time the my Supreme view could it. The plaintiffs Court has come back with more studies and (as consistently endorsed the use of studies more they information surely here, from other states or experi- areas-—shared done in comparison with the record exactly Karlin), ence is how the “laboratories” in they created in rais- See, ought several states to work. e.g., higher es the bar and tells them to come Theatres, Inc., Playtime Renton v. 475 back another day though this court —even
713 certiorari) tas, J., dissenting of one from denial of that “the biases held specifically has (same). re may avoided or in one case study Illinois next.” Mister v. in the
versed
study is a
The JAMA
time-series and
Co.,
1427, 1437,n.
832 F.2d
Cent.
analysis designed to
regression
assess the
Gulf R.R.
J.).
(7th Cir.1987) (Easterbrook,
3
law
Mississippi
effect of the
on the abor-
Mississippi
tion and birth rates of
resi-
evidence,
im-
case,
In
we have
this
first,
ways:
through
dents in two
a retro-
evidence
significant new
portantly we have
spective analysis of those rates before and
Karlin,
developed since
that has been
statute,
passage
after the
and sec-
ques-
the kinds of
precisely
which answers
ond,
comparison
through
between Mis-
plaintiffs
future
that Karlin directed
tions
states,
sissippi
Georgia
and two similar
on
The distinct court relied
to address.
Carolina,
and South
neither of which had a
“in the
conclude that the
evidence to
“presence” requirement
effect
part of the
law
presence”
were otherwise similar in
relevant time but
enough
an undue burden
impose
indeed
respects. Regression analy-
the relevant
that this
seeking abortions
Indiana women
important
ses are an
tool in much of social
enjoined.
had to be
of the statute
part
research,
science
as well as
law. See
consistently
en-
Supreme Court
279, 293-94,
McCleskey Kemp,
v.
481 U.S.
of evidence
type
the use of
dorsed
(1987) (dis-
before. See In re
Spill
Oil
by Amoco sissippi was an effect not of the persuasive
Cadiz,
(7th Cir.1992)
mitted my necessary to although not Finally, dis- court requirement). The “presence” *30 Casey said noting that it is well, analysis, I worth com- evidence as other cussed finding of an undue explain “[a] that burden is that does not why the state could simply not point have said that at for the conclusion that a state shorthand clinic, checking into previously regulation purpose has the or effect transmitted information must be reiterated placing path a substantial obstacle in person. change from an oral com seeking an of a woman abortion of a nonvi- munication to an “in presence” re 505 U.S. at able fetus” quirement was added a floor amend added). (emphasis con- Representatives ment the House of only part the “effect” siders that dis- was marked scant debate. After some junctive test, perhaps thinking that members of suggested the House that the “purpose” court’s dismissal half presence” “in the requirement was intend binding Supreme Karlin was on the Court. abortion, ed as obstacle to its chief believe, I am under no such illusion. I sponsor stated instead that the concern therefore, appropriate is to take a was that unless the given information was brief at the purpose look Indiana offered person, you “how do know this is the regulation, for this to see if it might either person you’re doctor or the supposed to be help to save statute or condemn it. talking to.... I would think you would want to talk personally to person who “[tjhere The district court found that is may performing that and know ... no evidence tending to show how the ‘in they person are the they indeed that [say the presence’ requirement actually fur- they] are.” A special concern with impos legitimate thers the state’s interests in doctors, tor generally practitioners or with in protecting potential maternal health or being they say they are over the this, life.” It said importantly, after the telephone is problem not a that is sрecific plaintiffs prima had made an extensive to abortion —or at least there were no such showing that the statute furthered facie findings other than a statement that this interest; legitimate neither in the sense of (of possibility talking impostor) to an “is production, burden of the court was con- very dangerous, especially you’re when cerned that nothing Indiana had offered to talking about the symptoms and conse (Indiana contrary. argues strenuously quences of an Literally abortion.” imposed the district court an imper- only other scrap of evidence from leg missible shift the ultimate burden of islature seems to reflect a fear proof, but it is clear from the opin- court’s would receive the they information while ion as a whole that it did no such thing; it were under operating sedation on an table. simply addressing evidentiary vac- But that cannot legislature be what feared, really uum on simple Indiana’s side the face of the reason evidence.) this concern already addressed in plaintiffs’ consent,” Indiana’s law of “informed which Indeed, my legislative search of the his given by persons cannot be already under tory of the Indiana statute reveals no rea See, e.g., anaesthesia. Culbertson v. Mer son whatsoever for imposing two-visit nitz, (Ind.1992) (en 602 N.E.2d requirement for the dissemination of the dorsing the American Medical Associa required information. if Acting as it were tion’s 1992 Code of Medical Ethics review, conducting rational basis ma consent, respect necessary rejecting jority speculates that legisla some Indiana invalid given consent “where patient tor might have thought absorption of incapable unconscious otherwise information effectively occurs more when consenting”). I would surprised so, in person. transmitted Maybe many but Indiana doctors were in the habit of *31 procedures medical for obtaining consent patients; drugged or unconscious li- of their medical risk loss
they they per- did, were they whether
cense surgery, knee
forming appendectomy, removal, an abor-
vasectomy, prostate con- consent of informed The law
tion. spectrum surgeries across the
sistent why given if no reason procedures: in the abor- is needed consent
heightened context, accepted this cannot then presence” “in the the reason for
requirement.
V reasons, I believe that these
For all Ca- seriously mis-applied the factual its own It has substituted
sey test. is in
assumptions evidence
record; focus on the women has failed to it prob- create that statute will whom Casey
lems; think that it seems emphasized not serious when
Court it, in the record before evidence lack of dic- Casey result
by implying dis- respectfully I result here.
tates
sent. Young, JONES, Virginia
Edith Eunice al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,
Clark, et COMPA- & SONS
R.R. DONNELLEY Corporation, De-
NY, a Delaware
fendant-Appellant.
No. 01-3271. Appeals,
United States
Seventh Circuit. 4, 2002.
Argued April Sept.
Decided
