258 F. Supp. 3d 929
S.D. Ind.2017Background
- Plaintiff Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky (PPINK) challenged SEA 404, an Indiana law (effective July 1, 2017) that: (1) adds a parental-notification requirement to the judicial-bypass process for unemancipated minors, (2) requires physicians to gather and certify identification/evidence of parentage and execute a sworn affidavit, and (3) forbids third parties from assisting minors to obtain out-of-state abortions without Indiana-required parental consent.
- PPINK operates Indiana clinics that provide abortions and judicial-bypass assistance; many minors obtain abortions via judicial bypass or with parental consent. PPINK also refers patients to out-of-state providers when appropriate.
- PPINK sought a pre-enforcement facial and as-applied challenge under the Fourteenth and First Amendments, and moved for a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of several SEA 404 provisions.
- The State defended on justiciability and factual-evidence grounds (arguing pre-enforcement relief was premature), invoked interests in family integrity/child welfare, and characterized the speech restriction as professional speech.
- The district court found PPINK likely to succeed on the merits as to: (a) the parental-notification bypass amendments (undue burden on mature minors), (b) the identification/affidavit requirements (void for vagueness), and (c) the speech prohibition as applied to PPINK (First Amendment strict-scrutiny failure), and granted a preliminary injunction limited to those applications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Does SEA 404’s parental-notification amendment (which conditions confidentiality on a "best interests" finding) impose an undue burden on unemancipated minors? | PPINK: Notification without a Bellotti-style bypass deters mature minors and places a substantial obstacle (risk of abuse, obstruction, coercion). | State: Challenge is pre-enforcement and speculative; effects should be assessed after implementation; notification statute need not include a consent-style bypass. | Court: Likely-success for PPINK. Notification-as-amended creates an undue burden for a sufficiently large fraction of mature minors and is facially invalid. |
| 2) Are the new identification and physician-affidavit requirements unconstitutionally vague? | PPINK: Terms like "some evidence" and "articulable basis" lack standards; criminal and licensing penalties mean vagueness will chill care. | State: Certain documents plainly qualify; providers can adopt safe-harbor practices. | Court: Likely-success for PPINK. Provisions are void for vagueness and threaten chilling enforcement/licensing discretion. |
| 3) Does the ban on "aiding" minors to obtain out-of-state abortions unconstitutionally restrict speech? | PPINK: Prohibition is a content-based restriction on truthful, non‑professional information and triggers strict scrutiny; State fails narrow-tailoring. | State: Regulation of professional speech and protecting parent–child relationship justify limits on counseling minors. | Court: Likely-success for PPINK as applied to PPINK’s dissemination to minors; the provision is a content-based speech restriction that cannot survive strict scrutiny in that application. |
| 4) Is preliminary injunctive relief justified (irreparable harm, balance of equities, bond)? | PPINK: Constitutional harms (speech and due process) are irreparable; no adequate remedy at law. | State: Disputes merits and harm; asserts public interest in enforcement. | Court: Granted preliminary injunction; constitutional violations constitute irreparable harm; no bond required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (constitutional privacy right to choose abortion)
- Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (undue-burden standard; spousal-notification analysis)
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (judicial-bypass requirements for minors)
- A Woman’s Choice — East Side Women’s Clinic v. Neuman, 305 F.3d 684 (7th Cir.) (pre-enforcement injunction and evidence of operational effects)
- Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.) (post‑Bellotti circuit discussion of notice vs. consent bypass requirements)
- Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (abortion-regulation undue-burden analysis)
- Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (void-for-vagueness discussion referenced by parties)