Pizarro Ortiz v. State
225 So. 3d 309
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2017Background
- In 1981 sixteen-year-old Luis Orlando Pizarro-Ortiz was charged with first‑degree murder, armed robbery, and armed burglary; he pled to second‑degree murder (with a dangerous weapon) and armed robbery (with a deadly weapon). The burglary count was dismissed.
- In 1982 the trial court imposed concurrent life sentences on each count.
- On October 15, 2015 Pizarro‑Ortiz filed a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(2) motion seeking vacatur of his life sentences under Miller, Graham, and Falcon and requesting an individualized resentencing under Florida’s juvenile sentencing reforms.
- The State argued the life sentence for second‑degree murder was discretionary and relied on Atwell (4th DCA) to contend parole eligibility precluded Miller/Graham relief.
- The trial court denied relief in 2016; Pizarro‑Ortiz appealed.
- The Third District, relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s Atwell decision and the court’s own Miller v. State, concluded Pizarro‑Ortiz is entitled to judicial review and resentencing under Florida statutes implementing juvenile‑sentencing procedures; the court reversed and remanded for resentencing under sections 775.082(1)(b)(1), 921.1401, and 921.1402 (2016).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juvenile life sentences must be vacated or reconsidered under Miller/Graham/Falcon | Pizarro‑Ortiz: life sentences for offenses committed at 16 violate Miller/Graham and Falcon; he is entitled to individualized resentencing | State: life for second‑degree murder was discretionary; parole eligibility (per Atwell 2013) means Miller/Graham do not apply | Court: Vacated and remanded — juvenile defendants are entitled to individualized review and resentencing consistent with Miller/Graham/Falcon and Florida precedent |
| Whether parole eligibility bars Miller relief | Pizarro‑Ortiz: parole eligibility does not cure the Miller violation; he still needs individualized sentencing/review | State: parole eligibility makes sentence constitutional (relying on Atwell 2013) | Court: Florida Supreme Court’s Atwell and related decisions require individualized consideration; parole eligibility alone does not negate relief |
| Whether resentencing should follow Florida juvenile‑sentencing statutes (post‑2014) | Pizarro‑Ortiz: entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014‑220 and statutory procedures including findings about role in killing | State: opposed to vacatur based on prior sentencing scheme | Court: Remanded for resentencing consistent with sections 775.082(1)(b)(1), 921.1401, 921.1402 (2016) and applicable precedents |
| Whether factual determination (killed/intended to kill/actual killer) is required to set minimum under new statutes | Pizarro‑Ortiz: asks for determination because it affects minimum punishment under chapter 2014‑220 | State: did not concede necessity of that specific inquiry in lieu of its constitutional arguments | Court: Directions to resentence include applying statutory framework that contemplates role determination where relevant (remanded for appropriate resentencing) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory juvenile life without parole unconstitutional)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile life without parole for nonhomicide offenses unconstitutional)
- Falcon v. State, 162 So. 3d 954 (Fla. 2015) (application of Miller in Florida juvenile sentencing context)
- Atwell v. State, 197 So. 3d 1040 (Fla. 2016) (Florida Supreme Court: parole process and requirement of individualized consideration for juveniles)
- Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459 (Fla. 2016) (discretionary life without parole for juvenile violates Miller)
- Miller v. State, 208 So. 3d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (Third DCA applying Miller in Florida and directing resentencing)