220 A.3d 951
D.C.2019Background
- On October 13, 2015, D.B. was burglarized and raped; the attacker took her cellphone, checks, and cash; appellant Antwon Pitt was later arrested with the cellphone in his pants and checks/fuzzy gloves in his backpack; DNA linked Pitt to the gloves.
- Pitt testified at trial, claiming he was an innocent bystander/a fence who received stolen property from his cousin Delonte and denied entering or raping D.B.; he also admitted prior convictions and said he was on probation.
- The government sought to impeach Pitt on cross-examination with evidence of an earlier, severed October 6, 2015 burglary (in which Pitt later pleaded guilty) in which a woman’s phone was taken from her bedroom while she slept; the items from Oct.6 were found alongside Oct.13 items in Pitt’s backpack.
- After a full-day in‑camera hearing, the trial court allowed limited admission of Oct.6 evidence for impeachment of Pitt’s credibility (to rebut the misleading impression created by his testimony), piece-by-piece and with limiting instructions to the jury.
- The jury was instructed Oct.6 evidence was admissible only for assessing Pitt’s credibility and not to infer guilt of the charged offenses; Pitt was convicted on all counts and later appealed the other-crimes ruling.
- Separately, during deliberations a juror note said one juror disputed that a rape occurred; Juror 5 later reported illness and asked to be excused; the court interviewed her, found she was unable to continue, replaced her with an alternate, and the reconstituted jury convicted Pitt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Pitt) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by permitting cross-examination and limited substantive evidence of the Oct.6 burglary to impeach Pitt’s testimony | Oct.6 burglary properly impeached a misleading narrative Pitt created (innocent bystander/fence); probative value outweighed prejudice; limiting instruction sufficed | Admission was impermissible propensity evidence; Oct.6 was too inflammatory and used to show disposition to burglarize/rape — not a proper non‑propensity purpose | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion — Oct.6 evidence admissible to impeach credibility of Pitt’s testimony and probative value outweighed prejudice when accompanied by limiting instructions |
| Whether the trial court abused discretion by excusing Juror 5 during deliberations | Court reasonably found Juror 5 physically unable to continue after interview and observation; inquiry focused on capacity, not deliberative views | Removal may have been pretextual to blunt a holdout who disputed that a rape occurred; excusal could violate unanimity/right to deliberation | Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion — juror excused for observable illness after careful inquiry and without intrusion into deliberations |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (cross-examination of a testifying defendant may be broad to elicit truth)
- Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (other-crimes evidence admissible only for enumerated non‑propensity purposes)
- Kinard v. United States, 635 A.2d 1297 (D.C. 1993) (permitting cross-examination to dispel a misleading innocent-presence defense)
- Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988) (limitations on other-crimes evidence; impeachment rules for defendants who claim innocent presence)
- Flores v. United States, 769 A.2d 126 (D.C. 2000) (prior drug use admissible to impeach testimony about unfamiliarity with drugs)
- Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C. 1996) (trial-court discretion in admitting other-crimes evidence and balancing probative value vs prejudice)
- Samuels v. United States, 605 A.2d 596 (D.C. 1992) (other-crimes evidence admissible to avoid a misleading impression created by defense testimony)
- Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414 (D.C. 1988) (discussing the propensity exclusion and balancing test)
- Gomez v. United States, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014) (evidence inadmissible if relevance to non‑propensity purpose depends only on a forbidden propensity inference)
- Raper v. United States, 676 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (permitting broad cross-examination of a testifying defendant)