Piron v. General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc.
3:19-cv-00709
E.D. Va.Feb 7, 2022Background
- GDIT acquired CSRA and absorbed ~1,500 employees working on an OPM background-investigations contract; a Program Management Office (PMO) in Falls Church, VA, directed a largely remote "mobile workforce."
- Between July and September 2019 GDIT issued multiple waves of terminations; Plaintiffs allege a WARN Act violation for failure to give 60 days' notice to affected employees at a "single site of employment."
- Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of OPM-contract employees terminated July–December 2019 (≈800–1,200 members); GDIT opposed only on predominance grounds.
- The central legal dispute was whether, under the DOL regulation known as Subpart 6 and the Fourth Circuit's Meson decision, class members could treat the Falls Church PMO as their WARN "single site of employment" (i.e., whether they were "mobile workers" covered by Subpart 6).
- The court found Rule 23(a) factors satisfied (numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy) and, despite reserving merits, concluded common questions (including single-site status and failure to give WARN notice) predominate, and certified the class.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Predominance under Rule 23(b)(3): whether class-wide proof can resolve WARN liability | Falls Church PMO was the common single site; uniform policies, travel records, reporting lines and CMS/Workday data permit class-wide proof under Subpart 6 | Meson/Regulations require a fact‑specific, individualized inquiry; many employees had fixed home offices so Subpart 6 cannot be applied class‑wide | Court: common questions predominate; class-wide evidence suffices at certification stage; predominance satisfied |
| Applicability of Meson/Subpart 6 (whether class members are "truly mobile") | Putative class were mobile/outstationed: primary duties required travel and work outside regular sites; Meson contemplates truly mobile workers like these | Meson limits Subpart 6 to workers without any fixed workplace; many members had home-based fixed workplaces, so Meson counsels individualized determinations | Court: Meson does not preclude certification here; facts differ from Meson and the single-site question should be decided on the merits, not by denying certification |
| Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)) | Individual WARN claims are small; class action is the only feasible, efficient remedy | GDIT did not meaningfully contest superiority | Court: class action is superior given small individual damages, existing discovery and judicial economy |
| Ascertainability & Rule 23(a) elements (numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy) | Class members readily identifiable from HR/Workday/PMO records; named plaintiffs and counsel are adequate and typical | GDIT raised no dispute on these factors | Court: ascertainability and all Rule 23(a) requirements satisfied |
Key Cases Cited
- Meson v. Gatz Tech. Servs. Corp., 507 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpreting DOL Subpart 6 as applicable to "truly mobile" workers without a regular fixed workplace)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (rigorous Rule 23(a) analysis; commonality requirement)
- Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013) (limits on merits inquiries at certification stage)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2014) (ascertainability requirement for class membership)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (2016) (distinguishing common vs. individual questions and recognizing class‑wide proof of liability)