982 F. Supp. 2d 104
D. Mass.2013Background
- Ping Zhao, a long‑time Bay Path College (BPC) math professor, alleges her supervisor Gina Semprebon coerced unwanted sexual contact and used her influence to affect Zhao’s employment, creating a hostile work environment and leading to adverse employment actions and termination.
- Zhao reported workplace problems (initially omitting sexual details out of fear); BPC’s HR investigated but, per the complaint, did not adequately pursue Zhao’s evidence and ultimately insisted Zhao continue reporting to Semprebon.
- A January 27, 2010 memorandum acknowledged “unwelcome” contact and altered some supervisory duties but left Semprebon as Zhao’s supervisor; thereafter Zhao alleges progressive interference with her duties, exclusions, schedule changes, suspension, and termination in November 2011.
- Zhao filed EEOC/MCAD charges in 2012, obtained right‑to‑sue, and sued BPC and Semprebon asserting Title IX, Title VII (against employer), M.G.L. c.151B, retaliation, breach of contract, tortious interference, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- Defendants moved to dismiss six of seven counts: chiefly (1) aiding and abetting liability under c.151B against Semprebon; and (2) common‑law claims (breach of contract against BPC; tortious interference and IIED against Semprebon) as barred by c.151B’s exclusivity.
- Magistrate Judge Neiman recommended denial of the partial motion; District Judge Ponsor adopted the report and recommendation and denied the motion, after Plaintiff amended to clarify Title VII/IX claims are only against BPC.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Semprebon can be liable under M.G.L. c.151B §4(5) for aiding and abetting | Zhao alleges Semprebon both directly committed discriminatory acts (sexual coercion/hostile work environment) and participated in BPC’s inadequate investigation, supporting a distinct aiding/abetting claim | Semprebon’s alleged conduct is not separate and distinct from the direct discrimination claims, so aiding/abetting fails | Denied dismissal — complaint plausibly alleges separate factual bases (investigation/participation) sufficient to proceed on aiding/abetting claim |
| Whether Title VII/IX claims can proceed against Semprebon individually | Zhao clarified her amended complaint limits Title VII and Title IX claims to BPC (employer) | Defendants argued those statutes do not allow individual liability | Not reached on merits; plaintiff conceded Title VII/IX are only against BPC |
| Whether breach of contract claim (Count 5) is barred by c.151B exclusivity | Zhao contends breach arises from contractual expectations (procedures, pay, access), not creation of a new tort based on discrimination | Defendants argue breach claim merely repackages discrimination/retaliation and is precluded by Charland | Denied dismissal — claim alleges pre‑existing common law contract rights (contractual expectations) independent of c.151B remedies |
| Whether tortious interference and IIED (Counts 6–7) are barred by c.151B exclusivity | Zhao asserts these common‑law torts predate c.151B and are not mere recasts of statutory discrimination claims | Defendants argue the claims duplicate statutory discrimination/retaliation and thus are barred under Charland/Green | Denied dismissal — court finds tortious interference and IIED sufficiently distinct and permissible under SJC precedent (Green, Comey) to survive motion |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading plausibility standard)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must be plausible)
- Lopez v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 696 (setting elements for aiding and abetting under c.151B)
- Charland v. Muzi Motors, Inc., 417 Mass. 580 (c.151B exclusivity principle)
- Green v. Wyman‑Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551 (common‑law torts like IIED not categorically barred by c.151B)