Pike County v. Callaway-Ingram
292 Ga. 828
Ga.2013Background
- Callaway-Ingram was appointed Chief Magistrate of Pike County in May 2010 and began duties June 1, 2010.
- The prior chief magistrate had an annual salary of $63,139; Callaway-Ingram’s temporary arrangement reduced to $49,182 to wind down private practice.
- In June 2010 the County permanently reduced the chief magistrate’s salary from $63,139 to $49,182 over Callaway-Ingram’s objection.
- A year later the County budgeted $49,182 for her salary, again over Callaway-Ingram’s objection.
- Killingsworth had a full-time associate magistrate paid $56,826; for 2010-2011 the County adjusted to half-time at $23,108, later maintaining half-time status in 2011-2012.
- Callaway-Ingram sued for writ of mandamus, permanent injunction, back pay, and fees; the superior court granted summary judgment for Callaway-Ingram on all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did salary reduction violate term-of-office protection? | Callaway-Ingram was incumbent; reduction during unexpired term violated the constitution and OCGA 15-10-23. | Salary for the office is set by statute; reduction during term permissible when office vacant or terms allow. | County violated term protections; mandamus proper. |
| Did collateral estoppel/res judicata bar Callaway-Ingram’s associate magistrate claim? | Rakestraw settlement did not bind Callaway-Ingram as nonparty; relief still warranted. | Consent order collaterally estopped Callaway-Ingram from further challenges. | Neither estoppel nor res judicata barred her claim. |
| Was permanent injunctive relief appropriate to restrain future interference and mismanagement? | Evidence of ongoing budget cuts and staff withholding justified injunctive relief. | No proven injury or reasonable fear of future acts; injunction premature without notice of intent. | Injunction properly issued to prevent ongoing interference. |
| Was the injunction sufficiently specific under OCGA 9-11-65? | Order described rights and conduct to be restrained; enforceable as reasonably detailed. | Need more specificity to enforce; policy arguments favor later detailing. | Injunction sufficiently specific to be enforceable. |
| Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees? | Fees warranted since not all claims were resolved in County’s favor. | Fees inappropriate if County prevailed on some claims. | Attorney fees awarded consistent with case law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lee v. Peach County Bd. of Commrs., 269 Ga. 380 (1998) (incumbent status and term-of-office analysis)
- Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535 (1981) (equitable relief and injury anticipation doctrine)
- Morris v. Mullis, 264 Ga. App. 428 (2003) (reasonable fear of future acts in injunctions)
- Bearden v. Ga. Power Co., 262 Ga. App. 550 (2003) (injunctions need not be hyper-detailed)
- Jennings v. McIntosh County Bd. of Commrs., 276 Ga. 842 (2003) (attorney's fees when not all claims prevail)
- Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504 (1995) (statutory compliance and injunctive relief standards)
- Odom v. Odom, 291 Ga. 811 (2012) (identity of parties and causes of action in res judicata)
- Ellis v. Georgia Kraft Co., 219 Ga. 335 (1963) (injunction standards and future interference considerations)