Pietrangelo v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP
2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 154
| D.C. | 2013Background
- Pietrangelo, a pro se attorney, sued WilmerHale in DC Superior Court over its pro bono DADT representation and related matters, asserting 23 counts of claims including malpractice and fiduciary breaches.
- The trial court dismissed 20 counts under Rule 12(b)(6); summary judgment then resolved one more count in WilmerHale's favor, and a jury trial later favored WilmerHale on the remaining two counts.
- Pietrangelo engaged in lengthy contemptuous conduct during the case, including denying authorship of an email and refusing to answer questions despite court orders.
- The trial judge sanctioned Pietrangelo by instructing the jury to draw adverse inferences about his testimony rather than dismissing the case, though she noted dismissal could be appropriate.
- On appeal, Pietrangelo challenged numerous rulings; the DC Court of Appeals affirmed, endorsing the trial court’s discretion and sanctioning power, while warning that contumacious conduct can justify dismissal.
- The decision affirms the dismissal of Counts 1-11, 15-19, and 21-23, the grant of summary judgment on Count 12, and the denial of further relief on Counts 13-14, with the court reiterating that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for serious judicial abuse.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pietrangelo’s contumacious conduct warranted dismissal as a sanction | Pietrangelo argues the court erred by sanctioning him rather than addressing merits. | WilmerHale contends contumacious behavior justifies dismissal under 41(b) and supports upholding sanctions. | Affirmed; sanction of dismissal warranted given contumacious conduct. |
| Whether Counts 1-11, 15-19, and 21-23 were properly dismissed for failure to state a claim | Pietrangelo contends the allegations, if proven, support claims. | WilmerHale argues the pleadings fail plausibly to show proximate causation, harm, or required elements. | Affirmed; court properly dismissed these counts for lack of plausible claims. |
| Whether the grant of summary judgment on Count 12 and the denial of summary judgment on Counts 13-14 were correct | Pietrangelo asserts errors in summary-judgment rulings affecting breach of the alleged agreement. | WilmerHale maintains there was no evidence supporting Count 12 and no motion for summary judgment on Counts 13-14. | Affirmed; Count 12 supported dismissal; Counts 13-14 lacked procedural basis for reversal. |
| Whether the trial judge properly managed discovery, witness conduct, and evidentiary rulings | Pietrangelo challenges various management decisions as prejudicial and improper. | WilmerHale defends the broad discretion of trial judges in discovery and trial management. | Affirmed; no abuse of discretion found in discovery, disqualification, narrative-testimony, redirect, or evidence rulings. |
| Whether the Count 23 choice-of-law ruling applying DC CPPA law was correct | Pietrangelo argues NY/MA consumer-protection claims should apply. | WilmerHale argues DC law governs under Restatement conflicts analysis due to most significant relationship and CPPA exclusion. | Affirmed; DC law applies; CPPA excludes lawyers, making DC law controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Synanon Found., Inc. v. Bernstein, 503 A.2d 1254 (D.C.1986) (dismissal as sanction for intolerable conduct allowed)
- District of Columbia v. Serafin, 617 A.2d 516 (D.C.1992) (extreme sanctions limited, but permissible in proper context)
- LaPrade v. Lehman, 490 A.2d 1151 (D.C.1985) (court may dismiss for failure to comply with orders)
- Wilson v. United States, 421 U.S. 309 (Supreme Court 1975) (contempt power to vindicate court authority)
- Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354 (D.C.1979) (trial court broad discretion in managing trials)
- Chase v. Gilbert, 499 A.2d 1203 (D.C.1985) (proximate causation; speculative outcomes insufficient)
- In re Curseen, 890 A.2d 191 (D.C.2006) (pleading standards; plausibility standard)
- Potomac Development Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531 (D.C.2011) (pleading plausibility standard)
