*1 STATES v. WILSON UNITED et al. May 19, Argued 17, 1974 Decided No. 73-1162. December Court, which Stew- opinion J., Burger, C. delivered *2 Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, and art, White, Rehnquist, J., concurring opinion, which J., in Blackmun, a filed dissenting J., opinion, in Brennan, p. filed a joined, post-, 320. Douglas p. JJ., joined, post, Marshall, and which for the United P. Norton argued the cause Gerald Bork, Assist- General Solicitor brief On the were States. General Petersen, Solicitor Deputy Attorney General ant William L. Patton. Frey, and Wil- Ginsberg argued the cause respondent for Sheila Hellerstein William E. were With on the brief son. her Martin, Jr., Bamberger. John Phylis Skloot and Bryan. respondent a brief and for cause filed argued Burger opinion of delivered the Mr. Chief Justice the Court. to decide whether district granted
We certiorari summary contempt punishment under may impose court (a)1 Proc. 42 when a witness who has Fed. Rule Crim. Fifth refuses on Amendment been granted immunity, held that in testify. The Court grounds dispose cannot of the con judge such circumstances proceed (b),2 but under tempt summarily, must Rule (a) provides: 1 Rule Summary
“(a) Disposition. may punished summarily contempt criminal “A if constituting contempt that he or heard the conduct certifies saw it was committed in the actual court. The signed by the facts shall recite and shall be order record.” and entered of (b) provides: 2 Rule
“(b) Disposition Upon Hearing. Notice and provided contempt except as
“A criminal subdivision prosecuted on notice. The notice this rule shall be shall state the hearing, allowing a place reasonable time and time for the prepa- defense, and state the of the shall essential constituting ration facts which disposition calls for only after notice and hear ing, and “a preparation reasonable time defense.”
I Respondents Wilson and Bryan, with one along Robert Anderson, were charged separate with indictments separate bank Respondent robberies. Wilson, An- derson, charged were robbery armed of a bank Tuxedo, N. Y. Respondent Bryan, and Anderson, were charged with armed robbery of a bank in Ivy, Mount N. Y. Prior Anderson’s trial both pleaded guilty charges against them, but neither was immediately given a final Sentencing *3 sentence. of Wil- son was deferred, and, pending presentence report, Bryan given was provisional 25-year sentence, as required by 18 (b), (c). U. C. §§4208
At Anderson’s trial for the robberies, respondents two were prosecution. summoned as for witnesses When questioned, however, each refused to testify, contending that his answers might incriminate him. The judge then them granted immunity, 18 U. 6002-6003,3 S. C. §§ contempt charged criminal and describe it as notice such. The given by orally judge shall in open be in the court or, application defendant on attorney or of United States attorney an appointed by by purpose, the court for that an order show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant entitled to a is jury any Congress provides. case in which act of so He provided is entitled admission to bail as rules. If these contempt charged disrespect judge, involves to or criticism of a disqualified presiding hearing from that the trial except finding Upon defendant’s consent. a verdict or guilt fixing punishment.” the court shall enter an order Appeals respondents In the Court of im- contended that munity granted scope of was not coextensive with the the Fifth against Kastigar privilege Amendment v. United self-incrimination. States, The U. S. Court of ruled fashion, respondents proper had claim in a not raised the Goldberg v. United 2d and, relying F. (CA2 1973), ordered them to answer forthwith. He long they informed them that as did not lie under they prosecuted by oath could not be any reason of testi mony, they but if continued to refuse to answer he hold contempt. would them in Respondents neverthe persisted less their and the refusals, judge summarily in contempt. held them Counsel for Wilson, who acted respondents, for both for argued sentences; lenient how ever, objection trial counsel made no summary contempt citation,4 nature nor any was claim made that more time was prepare needed to a defense to the contempt citation.
Both were then sentenced to six months’ any consecutive to imprisonment, imposed sentences the bank robberies. made it clear that he would consider reducing the contempt sentences, or eliminating them if respondents completely, decided to testify. pointed When counsel presentence out that a study being prepared was on Bryan responded: the judge “I am going impose the maximum .. . with the delib- erate intention of revising sentence to might what appropriate in light of very study that is going to be App. made.”
The trial proceeded, Bryan’s but without testimony *4 the evidence against Anderson on Ivy the Mount rob- bery was such that at end of the the Government’s case respondents did not seek review of that conclusion. Thus no issue concerning scope immunity the of is before us. proceeding Earlier the requested counsel had a continuance to study compelled whether could testify be after a grant immunity. App. of 5. The trial did not allow a con- Id., tinuance. at 6. The of Appeals, however, Court considered that purposes appeal request for of objection the was sufficient to the summary contempt citation. The Government does not contest ruling so we do not address it. granted Anderson’s motion for acquittal. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Tuxedo rob- bery. aAt later trial Anderson was convicted of that robbery.
Respondents appealed their contempt convictions. The of Court rejected the claim that their Fifth rights Amendment would have been violated com testify them to pelling they after had been granted im munity, but accepted it their contention that of use summary contempt power was improper, and it re for manded proceedings (b). under Rule 42 F. 2d (CA2 1973). The court reasoned that . . . “[i]f had been given counsel ‘a reasonable time for prep defense,’ aration Fed. R. Crim P. Rule 42 she (h), have might presented marshalled and facts in mitigation Id., charge.” at 1234.5 In requiring (b) Rule 42 disposition the Court example, 5 For respondent court mentioned that ex Wilson’s perience suggested possibility psychiatric of a defense. With prepare, time Appeals said, Court of might counsel have "enlarged health, on the issue of perhaps mental [Wilson’s] relationship any psychological shown a between difficulties 2d, refusal to serve aas witness.” 488 F. at 1234r-1235. The record support Court, does not such a defense. On order District given psychiatric Wilson had been his examination determine trial. 18 U. C. He competency stand was found §4244. however, lawyer competent; argued at the Anderson trial his family may the examination revealed difficulties that have been a App. reason for his behavior. 12-13. The District antisocial agreed investigation psychiatric prob that further Wilson’s sentencing Id., might helpful purposes. lems be at 17. The either does show counsel or record not District Court psychiatric investigation might for a moment that further considered charge. psychiatric provide to the defense investi might gation appropriately whether was to determine Wilson more psychiatric probation with placed treatment rather than prison. in a confined *5 own previous itself bound its
Appeals considered
by this Court’s decision Harris v. United
decisions, previous
In a
the
In another case Court of interpreted had language our require Harris decision to disruptive . . . “[a]bsent which conduct, affronts dignity of the hearing pursuant court, (b) Rule 42 required explore possible exculpatory or mitigating circumstances.” Marra, United States v. 482 F. 2d (CA2 In 1973). of Appeals’ only view disorderly obstreperous interference with court proceed- provides ings an occasion for use of summary con- -. tempt power. at 1201-1202.
Because
importance
of this issue in the conduct
of criminal
trials, and
because
view
the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently conflicts
with that of the Court of Appeals for the
Circuit,
First
Baker
Eisenstadt,
F. 2d
cert.
denied,
U. S. 846 (1972),
granted
we
certiorari.
II Respondents’ to answer, refusals although not deliv- ered disrespectfully, plainly fall within express lan-
315 guage (a),6 of Rüle 42 contemptuous and constitute conduct. Rule 42 (a) was never to intended be limited to situations where a witness uses or language, scurrilous threatens or creates overt physical thereby disorder and disrupts a necessary trial. All that is that the certify he “saw or heard the conduct constitut ing contempt and that it was in committed presence actual of the Respondents court.” do not con test that these requirements are met here. Indeed, here each refusal was in the context of a en face-to-face counter between the judge respondents. Illinois See Allen, 397 337 (1970); States, U. Cooke S. v. United 267 (1925). U. S. 517
The
contemptuous
refusals were
judicial
of
authority
they
because
were intentional obstructions7 of court
6
power
Rule 42 applies
contempt
in
defined
18 U. C. 401.
S.
§
Conkey Co.,
See Bessette v.
324,
(1904) ;
W.
194 U.
B.
326-327
parte Robinson,
505,
(1874).
Ex
19
pro
Wall.
510
That statute
power
punish by
vides that a federal
court has
im
fine or
prisonment,
discretion,
at
contempt
authority
its
such
its
of
any person
its
or so near thereto as to
“[m]isbehavior
justice.”
predecessor
obstruct the
administration
The
stat
by
ute was enacted to limit the
power granted
Judiciary
broad
1789,
Nye
States,
Act of
45,
Stat. 73.
v. United
313 U. S.
indiscriminately
summary
Courts had
used the
power
punish persons
for acts that occurred far from the court’s
which,
truth,
view and
not be
could
considered direct affronts to
dignity,
justice.
its
phrase
and obstructions of
pres
Thus the
“in its
ence or so near
apply
thereto” was intended to
geographical
limita
power.
on the
actually
tion
at 50. Misbehavior
in the face of
punishable summarily,
the court remained
and this Court made it clear
contemptuous
“actually interrupting
actions
the court in the
business,” id.,
conduct of its
summarily punishable just
were
vicinity
quiet
as “misbehavior in the
of the
disrupting
court
and order.”. Ibid.
judge explained
protection
accorded
by
grant
immunity
they
and that if
continued in their refusals
contempt.
he
He
would hold them in
oppor-
also offered them an
literally disrupted
proceedings
progress
orderly
justice.
trial and
administration of
hence
(CA9 1955).
F.
Re-
Yates v. United
2d
spondents’
silence,
grant
contumacious
after a valid
immunity
followed
explicit, unambiguous order
impeded the due
testify,
per-
course of Anderson’s trial
haps
so than
more
violent conduct
the courtroom.
disruptions
swiftly by bodily
can be
Violent
cured
remov-
ing
offender
courtroom,
by physical
from the
*7
restraints,
Allen,
v.
supra;
parte Terry,
Illinois
Ex
see
The face-to-face refusal to with the court’s order itself an constituted affront the court,8 to when that kind of disrupts refusal and frustrates an ongoing proceeding, here, as it did summary contempt must be to available vindicate authority of the court provide well as to the recalcitrant witness with some In testify. to Chiles, incentive re 22 Wall. 168 157, such Whether incentive is necessary in par- a tunity speak Groppi Leslie, in their own behalf. v. 496, 404 U. S. (1972). Moreover, judge 501 made it clear that he would con- reducing sider if respondents testify. sentences did App. 19-20, 21, 33. In view this their continued refusals to testify can only be termed intentional. 8 In dignity order to constitute affront to the of the court judge personally himself need not be judge insulted. Here the personally he not respondents’ was indicated affronted actions. angry He said: “I am at Mr. not Wilson because he refuses testify. up App. That him.” 14. He also said: “I don’t [Bryan] chip consider have his shoulder towards towards me.” at
317
wisely
is a
the Rule
leaves to the
ticular case
matter
trial
discretion
court.9
summary contempt
conclusion that
is available
Our
supported by
under the circumstances here is
fact
consistently
recognized
that Rule 42 has
been
no
existing
more than
of the law
when the
restatement
Illinois,
Rule
Bloom
adopted,
was
391 U. S.
209
v.
42
(1968);
Advisory
Notes of the
Committee on Rule
States,
p.
Cooke
App.
U. S. C.
v. United
(a),
4513;
(1925),10
testimony through imposition contempt. of civil only should resort to criminal determines, good sanctions he after reason, remedy that the civil inappropriate.” would be Here, course, weight that admonition carries little because at they.acted time contemptuously both were incarcerated *8 guilty pleas. due to their own Under the circumstances here the threat of immediate confinement for civil would have provided testify. Contrast, Anglin little incentive for them to Johnston, (CA7 1974), denied, 504 F. 2d 420 1165 962 cert. U. S. (1975). Nevertheless, respond the careful made it clear to they obeyed ents that if relented and order he would con his reducing sentences; sider explained their and he also that he would deciding consider other factors whether to reduce the sentences. Supra, at 312. 10 contemporaneous adoption Sources with the Rule uni- this formly substantially indicate a that subsection restatement of law, existing Law, Proceedings 6 N. Y. U. School of Institute —' (1946); Dessión, Federal Rules of Procedure 73 The New Criminal II, Federal 197, Rules of Criminal Procedure: 56 Yale J. 244 L. n. (1947); 268 Orfield, Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal 26 Neb. 570, Rev. 613 n. (1947), L. 189 and was not intended to alter the circumstances in which notice hearing required. and a are 318 parte Hudgings, Ex S.
(1919). See U. Walker, Brown v. (1919); (1896), 161 U. and parte Kearney, cases cf. Ex therein, cited Wheat. 38 In Savin, re (1822); U. S.
Ill of Appeals considered bound lan- itself guage Harris v. United 162 (1965), 382 U. S. 42 (a) to hold Rule inapplicable here. The facts crucial difference between however, is that cases, Harris did not deal testify with a refusal to which ob- structed an In ongoing Harris trial. a witness before a grand jury granted had been immunity, 18 U. S. C. § and ques- nevertheless refused to answer certain tions. The witness brought was then before District a Judge and asked the he questions again. same When still summarily refused to answer, the court held him contempt. summary We held in con- that case that tempt was inappropriate compel- because there no was ling reason for remedy. an immediate
A grand jury ordinarily many inquiries deals with cases time, easily at one and it can rather suspend action any one, and turn to proceedings another while under Rule 42 are (b) completed. noted in We Harris that “swiftness prerequisite justice Delay was not a .... necessary for hearing would not imperil grand jury proceedings.” 382 U. at 164. S., courts, Trial on the contrary, expected cannot be to dart from case to case on their any calendars a witness who granted time has been immunity decides not to In questions. trial, answer court, the parties, jurors witnesses, are assembled in the expectation it will proceed as scheduled. Here the District Judge pointed problem out this when *9 defense counsel continuance; asked for a “I he said: think delay we cannot I this trial. cannot I delay it. many have other matters that are equally important the people concerned in those which cases are followi ng.” Delay under Rule 42 (b) may be substantial, and all essential participants in the trial may no longer be readily available when a trial reconvenes. In Harris this Court recognized these problems in noting that sum punishment mary may be necessary where a “refusal ... an open, [is] serious threat to orderly procedure.” 8.,U. at 165. A refusal to testify during a trial may be such an open, serious threat, and here it plainly con stituted a literal “breakdown” prosecution’s case.
IV In an ongoing with the trial, judge, jurors, counsel, and witnesses all waiting, Rule 42 (a) provides an appro- priate remedial tool to discourage witnesses from contu- macious refusals comply with lawful orders essential to prevent a breakdown of the proceedings. Where time not of the essence, however, provisions of Rule 42 (b) may be more appropriate to deal with contemptu- ous conduct. We adhere to the principle only “ possible power ‘[t]he least adequate to the pro- end ” posed’ cases, should be used in contempt Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. Taylor Hayes, See U. S. 498 (1974). As with power, all the author- ity under Rule punish summarily can be abused; the courts of appeals, can however, deal with abuses of discretion without restricting the Rule contradiction of its express terms, and without unduly limiting the power of the trial swiftly act and firmly pre- vent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress of a criminal trial.
Reversed. 11App. 6.
320 whom Me. Justice Blackmun, with Justice
Me. Rehnquist concurring. joins, States, (1959), 41 359 U.
In Brown v. United S. grounds, Fifth Amendment petitioner refused, had on jury. by grand federal put to him questions answer Judge but, by District immunized He thereafter was re- in his jury room, persisted to the returning grand before again He was taken questions. fusal to answer grand jury’s ques- Judge, repeated the District who again He to answer. petitioner ordered the tions and Crim. pursuant court to Fed. Rule then, refused. The con- adjudged guilty him of criminal (a), Proc. judg- Court, by vote, This a 5-4 sustained tempt. summary pro- use of ment, expressly approved and ground did on the the refusal ceedings; it so “com- Judge contempt before the District was a answer presence court,” in the within the mitted actual meaning (a). S., of Rule 359 U. at 47-52. years United later, Less than seven in Harris v. (1965), Justices, U. two new Court, was with a identical in all confronted factual situation Harris, In respects however, to that in Brown. relevant Court, again by vote, 5-4 concluded the wit- questions ness’ refusal to answer the before the District Judge not a “committed the actual was presence of the court.” It reasoned: if contempt, was,
“The real such there con- was grand jury before the tempt refusal answer —the when the court. wit- Swearing to it directed repeating questions before the judge and ness testify was an effort to refusal ‘com- have mitted the actual of the court’ (a). It purposes of Rule served no other pur- the witness had been pose, for adamant and had known. The position appearance his made before not a Court was new and pro- the District different ceeding, unrelated ancillary to the other. It was to the grand jury hearing designed aid to it.” 382 S.,U. at 164-165.
The Court then expressly overruled Brown.
1 was not on the Court Brown when Harris were *11 decided. IHad I been, joined would have the Brown and the dissenters I Although join Harris. the Court’s opinion I today, write separately my to express conviction Harris, that at most, now stands for noth ing more than the proposition that a witness’ to refusal grand answer jury questions is not conduct the actual "in presence of the court,” even when the questions are re by stated the district judge and the persists witness his refusal to answer.1
Summary contempt, especially summary criminal con
tempt, as the
ante,
Court indicates,
is not
power
lightly to be exercised.2 Nevertheless, summary criminal
contempt
is a necessary
legitimate
and
part of a court’s
arsenal of weapons
prevent
to
obstruction, violent or
otherwise, of its proceedings.
It is not seriously disputed
that a refusal to testify is punishable as a criminal con
tempt. So long as this Court holds,
it has,
1 The Solicitor General has invited the Court'
in this case to
overrule Harris. Brief
for United States 24. Since the
refusal
testify,
here,
involved
during
occurred
of
course
a trial
rather
grand
than before a
jury,
agree
I
with the Court’s tacit conclusion
question
to save the
overruling
Harris day.
another
2Although the use of
contempt,
civil
as opposed to the more
drastic
contempt,
usually
criminal
is
preferred
to be
remedy,
aas
I
am
requirement
aware of no
the less
drastic sanction
be
must
employed in all
Indeed, despite
cases.
fact
already
were
incarcerated
for substantive
offenses,
criminal
ap
it
pears
to be clear that
service of their sentences could have been
interrupted
compel
them to
intervening
serve an
sentence for
g.,
contempt.
e.
See,
Liddy,
United States v.
App.
166 U. S.
D. C.
289, 510 F.
(1974),
2d 669
denied,
cert.
420 U.
(1975);
S. 980
Anglin
Johnston,
(CA7
las proce one case is in this for decision question nonviolently contempt criminal dure: punish trial at a criminal testify refusing to respectfully Fed. pursuant judge trial summarily able must (a), Proc. Crim. Rule pursuant notice contempt prosecute prepara for the time a reasonable allowing 42(b), Rule District judge in A trial defense?1 tion (a) provides: Rule Summary Disposition. “(a) summarily if the punished may be contempt “A criminal *12 constituting the conduct or heard he saw certifies the court. of presence actual in the committed it was and by the signed be shall and the facts recite contempt shall of order of record.” judge and entered (b) provides: Rule Hearing. and Notice Upon
“(b) Disposition
(a) of
in subdivision
except
provided
contempt
“A criminal
state
shall
The notice
notice.
on
prosecuted
be
shall
this rule
prepa-
for
time
allowing reasonable
hearing,
a
of
place
and
time
constituting
facts
the essential
state
defense,
shall
of
ration
The notice
it as such.
charged and describe
contempt
the criminal
of
open court
judge in
by
orally
given
shall
attorney or
States
United
or,
application
on
the defendant
by an
purpose,
by
the court
attorney appointed
of an
is entitled
The defendant
of arrest.
order
or an
cause
to show
order
pro-
Congress so
act
any
in which
case
jury in
a trial
these rules.
provided
bail as
admission
entitled
He is
vides.
a or criticism
disrespect charged involves
If the
or hear-
trial
presiding at
from
disqualified
judge is
judge, that
finding
Upon
verdict
consent.
the defendant’s
except
ing
punishment.”
fixing the
an order
enter
shall
court
guilt the
Court for the Southern
District
New York summarily
punished respondents under
subdivision
of Rule for refusing to testify at a trial. The
Court
for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the
ground that Harris v. United States,
robbery of two banks, one in Tuxedo, N. Y., and the other in Mount N. Ivy, Y. Before the trial respondent Wilson pleaded guilty to participation in the Tuxedo bank robbery and respondent Bryan pleaded guilty to participation in the Mount Ivy bank robbery. Neither respondent had been finally sentenced on his plea, howe ver,2 and each refused to testify against Anderson on self-incrimination grounds, persisted in that refusal even though the trial judge granted him immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002-6003.3 The trial thereupon 2 The trial presided who at Anderson’s trial had deferred sentencing respondent Wilson. Another judge, who had been assigned respondent Bryan’s indictment, imposed had provisional 25-year pending sentence an evaluation under 18 U. S. (b). C. 4208 § After trial, Anderson’s Wilson was committed as a young adult offender for an indeterminate pursuant term *13 to 18 U. S. C. § (b), Bryan’s while sentence was reduced years. to 10 3 When privilege the was invoiced, Wilson’s counsel present was and, in the Bryan’s absence of counsel, attempted with the court’s approval represent to both witnesses.
Sections provide: 6002-6003 Immunity
“§ generally. “Whenever a refuses, witness on the basis of privilege his against sen contempt and criminal each in adjudged summarily served to be imprisonment six months’ to tenced each conviction,4 robbery the on sentence consecutively to his pro- in a information testify provide other self-incrimination, or to ancillary to— ceeding before or States, jury grand United “(1) “ or a court States, or agency (2) the United of two the joint of Congress, a committee “(3) of House either House, either of aor subcommittee Houses, a committee or to the proceeding communicates over the person presiding “and the may refuse not part, the witness under this an order issued witness against self- privilege his the basis of comply the order with to compelled information testimony other or incrimination; but no indirectly derived directly (or any information or. under the order against the information) may used be testimony or other from such giv- perjury, for prosecution case, except a any criminal witness comply the order. failing with statement, ing or otherwise a false jury grand proceedings. 6003. Court “§ “ may called be been or any who has individual In the case or any proceeding before testify provide information or other jury of the grand aor States ancillary United a court of judicial dis- court for district States the United United issue, in accord- may be held shall is or proceeding trict in which request section, upon (b) of this subsection ance with requiring such district, an order attorney such States United which he information testimony provide other give or individual to against privilege self- of his provide on the basis give or refuses to provided in section effective incrimination, to become such order part. 6002 of this approval attorney may, “(b) A United States designated any General, Attorney or Deputy General, Attorney (a) of General, request under subsection an order Attorney Assistant judgment— in his when section this may such from individual testimony other information “(1) or interest; and public necessary testify likely to refuse or has refused “(2) individual such against privilege his basis on the information provide other self-incrimination.” stayed pending provisional were contempt sentences contention rejected Government’s The Court appeal. *14 The Court today declines the Government’s invitation to overrule Harris v. United States, supra, and in that circumstance Harris clearly compels affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Harris interpreted subdivision (a) of Rule 42 as having a narrowly limited scope and expressly excluded its application to a non violent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination.5 The Court emphasized that- the witnesses had not adequately objected to the use of summary contempt procedures: “[U]nder circumstances, the request by counsel for Wilson
for more time to research the fifth amendment issue constituted
objection.
sufficient
And we refuse to penalize appellant Bryan
for his
failure make timely objection to the
(a)
Rule 42
proceed-
ing, since his own counsel
present.
was not
Although counsel for
Wilson did her best
protect
Bryan, the court having sanctioned
her
efforts
this regard, only a defendant’s
lawyer
own
could be
fully aware of the considerations which might be raised in his behalf
to mitigate a charge of contempt or the sentence thereunder, and of
likely
usefulness of a hearing for development of these considera-
tions.”
The interpre- Court stated its rationale for narrow (a) tation of subdivision as follows: light “We reach that conclusion in of ‘the concern long by Congress demonstrated both Court this possible over the of the contempt power’ abuse . .. and in light wording of the of the Rule. Summary contempt is for in pres- the ‘actual ‘misbehavior’... ence speedy punishment of the court.’ Then may necessary be in order to achieve ‘summary vindica- ” tion dignity Id., of the court’s authority.’ at 164.
The Court continued:
“Summary procedure, to use the words of Chief Taft, designed Justice was to fill ‘the need im- penal mediate vindication dignity of the proper precautions (e. g., sealing record) be taken to insure that Judge Cooper privy would not be to the statements made under grant immunity. were, however, required Both obey the man- date of 18 U. S. C. may ‘the witness not §6002 refuse to comply with the order on the privilege basis of against his self- 2d, incrimination ....’” 488 F. at 1233. 6 Harris given overruled the broader reach subdivision Brown v. United U. S. This was believed necessary objective to achieve the of its framers that the subdivision “ ” ‘substantially existing a restatement of law.’ S., 382 U. at 165 n. 3.
court...We start from premise long ago stated Dunn, Anderson v. Wheat. of the power limits punish for contempt are ‘[t]he possible least power adequate to the end proposed.’ In the case, instant the dignity of the court was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; no insolent tactics had be stopped.
here committed was far outside category the narrow envisioned Rule 42 (a).” at 165. Only last Term, the again emphasized that sum- “ mary punishment for contempt ‘always and rightly, ” regarded with disfavor’ light of the “heightened *16 potential for posed by abuse the contempt Taylor power,” Hayes, v. 418 488, 498, U. S. 500 (1974), and is “ resorted only necessary when penal ‘immediate ” of vindication the dignity of the court.’ at 498 n.
I
no escape from
application
see
the
of Harris to this
case based on the difference that respondents
wit
were
nesses
an ongoing
at
trial while the witness in Harris was
a grand jury witness, brought before
asked
and
the same
he
questions
had not answered
grand
before the
jury. The
argues
Court
that while
delay
necessi
tated
Rule 42 (b) procedures would be unlikely seri
ously to disrupt grand jury proceedings it would have
disruptive
substantial
in
effects
a
I
trial.
doubt
that
compliance with
procedures
Rule 42 (b)
necessarily would
have
disruptive
substantial
effects
any
trial7 but in
Marra,
In United States v.
(CA2