Piedmont Hospital, Inc. v. D. M.
335 Ga. App. 442
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- In May 2005 D.M. underwent an appendectomy at Piedmont; an employee was exposed to his blood and hospital policy prompted HIV testing. A rapid in‑house test was presumptively positive; confirmatory in‑house and outside lab tests in May 2005 showed HIV positive.
- Colquitt (surgeon) reported results to D.M.’s primary care physician but did not call D.M.; he planned to inform D.M. at a follow‑up appointment that D.M. never scheduled. D.M. learned of the 2005 positive results only in 2011 after new testing and obtaining his Piedmont records.
- D.M. sued in May 2013 (almost eight years after the 2005 tests) asserting professional negligence, negligence per se, ordinary negligence, and fraud; he later amended and withdrew some claims so only ordinary negligence and fraud remained on appeal.
- Piedmont and Colquitt moved for summary judgment arguing OCGA § 9‑3‑71(b) (five‑year statute of repose for medical malpractice) bars the claims because they are medical malpractice in substance.
- The trial court initially ruled the statute of repose applied only to the expressly pleaded professional negligence count (which it then struck as abandoned) and denied summary judgment as to remaining claims; that order was set aside and reentered, certified for immediate review, and brought to the Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals held D.M.’s claims—although labeled ordinary negligence and fraud—arose from the professional duty to inform a patient of medical test results and therefore are medical malpractice claims subject to the five‑year statute of repose; the court vacated and remanded for the trial court to consider equitable estoppel.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction/timeliness of interlocutory appeal after trial court reentry | D.M.: trial court’s reentry improperly extended time for interlocutory applications in violation of Court of Appeals Rule 30(g) | Piedmont/Colquitt: reentry was permissible; interlocutory order subject to revision and appellate rules are directory | Court: appellate jurisdiction proper; reentry permissible and applications timely (no jurisdictional defect) |
| Whether claims are medical malpractice (triggering § 9‑3‑71(b) repose) | D.M.: claims labeled ordinary negligence and fraud; not all duties here are professional malpractice | Piedmont/Colquitt: substance controls; failure to inform a patient of positive HIV is a breach of professional duty and classic medical malpractice | Court: substantive test controls; duty to inform arises from doctor‑patient relationship/statutes, so claims are medical malpractice and barred by five‑year repose (filed 2013 after 2005 events) |
| Whether labeling a claim "ordinary negligence" prevents repose defense | D.M.: characterization should control or at least allow ordinary negligence treatment | Piedmont/Colquitt: labels do not control; substance/test of whether claim arises from provision of medical services does | Court: labels do not control; court looks to substance—these claims implicate professional duty and thus malpractice law applies |
| Equitable estoppel to bar repose defense | D.M.: defendants’ alleged fraud/gross negligence in not informing him deterred him from timely filing; trial court must decide estoppel | Piedmont/Colquitt: urge appellate court to resolve estoppel against D.M. now | Court: remanded—trial court did not rule on estoppel; appellate court will not decide equitable‑estoppel issue in first instance and vacated summary judgment order for further consideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Canoeside Props., Inc. v. Livsey, 277 Ga. 425 (trial court may revise interlocutory summary judgment orders)
- Simmons v. Sonyika, 279 Ga. 378 (statute of repose is absolute and destroys the cause of action after the period)
- Schramm v. Lyon, 285 Ga. 72 (repose period begins when negligent act causing injury occurred)
- In re Carter, 288 Ga. App. 276 (duty to inform patient of condition arises from doctor‑patient relationship; failure to notify treated as classic medical malpractice)
- Carr v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 293 Ga. App. 80 (substance of claim—not label—controls whether malpractice applies)
- Deen v. Stevens, 287 Ga. 597 (discusses tension in case law between professional‑decision test and broad "arising out of" test for malpractice)
- Rosenberg v. Falling Water, Inc., 289 Ga. 57 (equitable estoppel can bar a defendant from asserting a statute of repose defense)