Background - Petitioner (Ms. Copeland) obtained a permanent injunction for protection against stalking against Respondent Terrance J. Pickett at a hearing where both parties were pro se. - Pickett appealed, arguing he was denied due process and that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a stalking injunction. - Relevant events: Pickett followed Copeland from a gas station on Thanksgiving 2016 while speaking to police (and there was an outstanding warrant for Copeland); he videotaped her arrest; Copeland alleged he drove past her house on multiple occasions but record showed at most a single pass. - The trial court found stalking and entered a permanent injunction; the appellate court reviewed legal sufficiency de novo and abuse of discretion for injunctions. - The court rejected Pickett’s due-process claim but held the evidence was not competent and substantial to prove stalking (i.e., a malicious course of repeated conduct causing substantial emotional distress). - Court reversed the final judgment and vacated the injunction; it also discussed First Amendment protection for recording police activity in public. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---| | Whether evidence was legally sufficient to support a stalking injunction | Copeland: single episode(s) (following, driving by, videotaping) constituted stalking (a course of conduct causing substantial emotional distress) | Pickett: events amounted to isolated or lawful acts (police contact, videotaping) and did not show repeated malicious conduct | Reversed — evidence was not competent/substantial to show the required malicious repeated course of conduct; injunction vacated | | Whether stalking injunction requires proof of two separate stalking incidents | Copeland (implicitly): prior caselaw requiring multiple incidents supports injunction | Pickett: argued statutory definitions require repeated acts but not two distinct stalking offenses; single stalking incident can suffice | Court held section 784.0485 requires proof of a single incident of stalking (stalking itself requires repeated acts), not two separate stalking offenses | | Whether trial court abused discretion in granting injunction | Copeland: trial court acted within discretion given its factual findings | Pickett: discretion was abused because findings were unsupported by competent substantial evidence | Court: no abuse of discretion review outcome needed because legal insufficiency required reversal; discretion question not sustained given lack of evidence | | Whether Pickett was deprived of due process at the hearing | Pickett: claimed due process violation at hearing | Copeland: hearing procedures were adequate; trial court questioned both parties | Court: rejected Pickett’s due-process claim — no deprivation found | ### Key Cases Cited Noe v. Noe, 217 So.3d 196 (Fla. 1st DCA) (injunctions reviewed for abuse of discretion) Wills v. Jones, 213 So.3d 982 (Fla. 1st DCA) (legal-sufficiency review of injunction evidence is de novo) Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA) (stalking requires repeated acts; repeated acts required for one act of stalking) Packal v. Johnson, 226 So.3d 337 (Fla. 5th DCA) (reversed stalking injunction for insufficient proof of repeat harassment) Touhey v. Seda, 133 So.3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA) (insufficient record to show maliciousness or substantial emotional distress) Leach v. Kersey, 162 So.3d 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA) (messages and contacts did not constitute harassment serving no legitimate purpose) * Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir.) (First Amendment protects recording police performing public duties)