Phoenixville Hospital v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
623 Pa. 25
Pa.2013Background
- Shoap suffered a work-related left-shoulder injury, received temporary total disability benefits, and had multiple surgeries.
- Employer (Phoenixville Hospital) filed a Section 306(b) modification petition in 2007 alleging medical improvement and availability of suitable work, supported by a medical exam and two labor-market surveys from a vocational expert identifying five open jobs and calculating Shoap’s earning power at $347.41/week.
- Shoap applied to the five listed jobs, received no offers (one employer told her she was not qualified), and testified she did not follow up beyond initial applications; she and her experts contested that she could perform the jobs.
- The WCJ credited Employer’s medical and vocational experts but found Shoap credibly had made good-faith applications and had not received offers, and denied modification.
- WCAB affirmed the WCJ’s focus on whether the jobs were "open and available" to Shoap in reality; the Commonwealth Court reversed, holding Employer satisfied Section 306(b) because the jobs were open and available at the time of the labor-market survey regardless of Shoap’s unsuccessful applications.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review, rejected the Commonwealth Court’s narrow market-only view, held that Section 306(b) requires proof of meaningful, open opportunities and permits claimants to rebut market evidence (e.g., by showing a job was effectively unavailable when claimant had a reasonable opportunity to apply), and remanded for further fact development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Shoap) | Defendant's Argument (Phoenixville) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jobs identified in a labor-market survey are "available" for §306(b) purposes even if claimant applied and received no offer | §306(b) should be read to require employers to show jobs are open and available to the claimant; claimant’s unsuccessful, good-faith applications are probative of nonavailability | §306(b) bases earning power on jobs that "exist" in the market; employer’s expert showing positions were open at survey time suffices without regard to claimant’s application results | Majority: Employer must prove meaningful, open opportunities, but claimant may rebut with evidence (including her experience applying) that jobs were not actually available when she had a reasonable opportunity to apply; remand for fact development |
| Whether Kachinski requirements remain relevant after Act 57 amendments | Kachinski’s practical test (good-faith referral and claimant follow-through) still informs meaning of "exists" and ensures humane, sensible outcomes | Act 57 (amending §306(b)) displaced Kachinski’s strict referral/offer framework; legislature intended market-focused expert evidence to determine earning power | Majority: Act 57 changed the burden but did not render claimant evidence irrelevant; Kachinski is not adopted wholesale but remains a relevant background consideration when statute is ambiguous |
| Whether Commonwealth Court’s decision announced a new standard requiring remand for evidentiary development | Shoap argued remand was required because the Commonwealth Court changed the standard and she needed opportunity to develop evidence under the new rule | Employer argued no remand necessary because employer satisfied §306(b) under the existing record | Court: Remand required because Shoap was not afforded full opportunity to develop rebuttal evidence under the correct statutory interpretation |
| Proper interpretation of "exists" and "earning power" under §306(b) | "Exists" should mean jobs open and available to claimants, and claimant’s application results are relevant to test availability | "Exists" means jobs existing in the marketplace as shown by credible labor-market surveys; claimant’s anecdotal lack of offers is immaterial | Court: "Exists" means meaningful, open opportunities; expert labor-market evidence is central, but claimant can rebut by showing positions were not realistically available to her when she had a reasonable chance to apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Kachinski v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco Constr. Co.), 532 A.2d 374 (Pa. 1987) (established pre-Act 57 referral/offer/good-faith framework for modification)
- South Hills Health Sys. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kiefer), 806 A.2d 962 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (interpreted §306(b) as requiring jobs that "exist in reality" and be open and available)
- Riddle v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Allegheny City Electric, Inc.), 981 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 2009) (recognized Act 57 lowered Kachinski burden by permitting expert-driven earning-power evidence)
- Hannaberry HVAC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Snyder, Jr.), 834 A.2d 524 (Pa. 2003) (reminder that Workers’ Compensation Act is remedial and should be liberally construed)