*1 Donegal HANNABERRY HVAC Companies v. Insurance Mutual APPEAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JR.), (SNYDER, BOARD Snyder, Appeal Jr. of Charles Pennsylvania. Supreme Argued May 2002. 22, 2003.
Decided Oct. *2 Clawson, Norristown, Snyder, Kurt for Jr. Edward Charles Aronson, Hill, Camp Kupchinsky, John T. Irwin William AFL-CiO, PA appellant amicus curiae. Holzman, Harrisburg, Tarczy, A. Marie Car-
James Janet lisle, for W.C.A.B. Lenahan, Hannaberry HVAC, al.
Brian J. et C.J., CASTILLE, NIGRO, CAPPY, Before: and NEWMAN, EAKIN, SAYLOR JJ. OF THE COURT
OPINION CASTILLE. Justice whether, in granted
This review to determine amend- 309(d) (“Act”), Compensation Act ing Section the Workers’ see 582(d), that a the General intended P.S. worker, seriously permanently injured full-time whose preceded by part-time after-school penalized by having be employment, should part-time employment included the calculation of his aver- weekly Citing purpose humanitarian age wage. the overall here, presented of the Act and the unusual circumstances both (“WCJ”) Compensation Judge the Workers’ the Workers’ (“WCAB”) Board Compensation Appeal construed the amend- requiring part-time wages ed Act as not that the be included computation average wages. panel A the Com- reversed, Act holding permits monwealth Court that the no *3 and, part-time employment distinction full-time and between accordingly, appellant’s average weekly wage the calculation of quarters employment during must of which include earlier he reasons, part-time employee. following was a For the we reverse. appellant part-time
The industrious worked on a basis for Hannaberry (“employer”) high was a school HVAC while he 20, 1996, school, graduating high student. On after from June appellant accepted position employer. Appel- a full-time with greatly during part-time lant’s work schedule had varied his employment, paychecks generally increasing grad- with his Thus, in quarterly periods preceding uation neared. the three entry employment, average his full-time appellant’s into week- (for 20, ly wages period September were: the from $57.25 (December 20, 1995); 20, 1995 to December 1995 to $96.87 (March 20, 1996); March 1996 to June $110.56 1996). contrast, appellant’s average weekly wage In for the status, quarter period calendar after he assumed the full-time 20, 1996, September from June 1996 until increased more four-fold, than to $473.65. 20, 1996, September appellant
On a devastating suffered him, injury injuring spinal work when a forklift fell on his cord rendering him quadriplegic. Appellant was nineteen years any dispute concerning old. There has never been the severity injury, its permanence, work-relatedness and appellant’s entitlement to workers’ benefits. dispute The is limited to amount of the benefit.
Employer of compensation payable issued notice acknowl- edging appellant’s injury calculating average weekly his wage as with a corresponding compensation rate $207.03 Appellant petition filed a claim challenging employ- $186.33. computation average er’s weekly wage. During litigation, employer amended average weekly wage with corresponding compensation benefit $229.43 rate Employer based its calculation upon highest $206.49. quarters three previous year, two part-time which were employment. Appellant con- average weekly tended that his wage should be calculated solely upon based quarter coinciding with his full-time employment, which was also the most quarter. Appel- recent argued lant that including part-time his high employ- school calculating ment in average weekly wage artificially de- actually creased the he earned as a worker, which was enjoyed the status he injured, when and would consign him to a lifetime of compensation. insufficient agreed appellant WCJ with and calculated his average weekly $473.65, wage as with a corresponding compensation rate of The WCJ based average weekly wage $315.76. solely on quarter claimant’s last calendar of work. The WCJ *4 very noted that “the unusual circumstances” of the case made it a “difficult one.” recognized Act, The WCJ that the amended, does not explicitly distinguish part-time between employment in providing for the calculation of a average weekly wage. But, claimant’s concluded, the WCJ it would be “manifestly ignore unfair” to the “dramatic” distinc- tion part-time employment between as a full-time student and full-time adult in employment this context. In the WCJ’s his
view, due “reflect adult earn- appellant should the benefit 15. Op., his school activities.” ings after WCJ [and] WCAB, the which appealed and its insurer Employer Stressing “recognized humanitarian intent affirmed. the Act,” correctly had that the WCJ decided the the WCAB held and, adopted opinion. the WCJ’s accordingly, the matter Op., WCAB 1-3.
Upon appeal, panel a the further Commonwealth opinion. Hannaberry v. Work- published reversed a HVAC Jr.), (Snyder, ers’ Bd. Compensation Appeal (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). the Act panel The noted that amended between, addressed, nor made a distinction explicitly neither noted part-time panel and full-time The further formula, statutory required which three that the 1996 the averaged four be highest quarters employment of the last wages, a calculating represented a claimant’s deliberate legislation, from which calculat- change policy prior the had single quarter wages premised highest earnings the ed year. panel in the itself previous deemed hold, law, matter that appellant’s as a constrained year employment during preceding part-time his injury could not be excluded from the calculation of average weekly wages. conclusion, panel reaching opined legis-
In that the history 1996 amendments that the lative behind the revealed sought prevent individuals from receiv- General than would ing through they workers’ more they have earned had remained the workforce. This situa- previous computational tion could arise under the formula highest year could quarter during since claimant cite the quarter preceding injury, if that reflected even aberration- i.e., ally high wages: may the claimant have inflated earned bonus, overtime, assign- temporary due to a one-time (as higher wage position prevailing-wage ment to a on contract), In of its support etc. conclusion such was intent, quoted legislative panel following remarks during made debates: one senator
71 Now, get people they back to work when can you how do by doing nothing, going or back to work make week $527 I think and I think making and do not that is fair we $400? that, change going should to this bill try under we are that last four playing level field and use three quarters your average salary just instead of determine using many on that high peaked quarter, one times peak it they peak would use bonuses and vacation time higher. even HVAC, 653, 767 A.2d at
Hannaberry quoting Legisla- Senate Journal, (remarks 10, 1996, tive p. June 2156 Arm- Sen. strong). panel nothing
The
noted that
further
there
legislative history
suggest
that the General
had
part-time
employment paradigm
considered the
to full-time
presented
panel recognized
“inadequacy”
here.
1996
amendment to the Act as so construed
a case such as
this,
it
in “grossly
average weekly wage
results
unfair
panel
certain workers.”
In appeals, workers’ this Court will affirm the adjudication below unless we find that an error of law was committed, violated, rights that constitutional were that a practice procedure agency or of a was not Commonwealth or any necessary finding supported followed of fact is not 704; substantial evidence of record. 2 Mitchell Pa.C.S. (Steve’s v. Compensation Appeal Workers’ Bd. Prince of Steaks), Pa.380, (2003); 620, 815 A.2d 623-24 Reinforced (Astudillo), Earth Co. v. Bd. Compensation Appeal Workers’ (2002) Pa.464, Here, (plurality opinion). 810 A.2d undisputed party alleged the facts are and neither has agency practice procedure constitutional violation or that an was not followed. The sole is whether the Common- issue determining wealth Court committed error of law appellant’s the amended Act commands a conclusion that earnings part-time employee while a scholastic must be includ- average weekly wages purposes ed the calculation of his following permanent, him determining benefit due law, our question is a injury. Since this
disabling work University Duquesne v. plenary. Murphy See review (2001) (citation Ghost, 565 Pa. Holy *6 Bd. Appeal omitted); Compensation v. Thompson Workers’ (2001) 1146, (citing Co.), Pa.420, 1150 (USF 781 A.2d & G 566 Am-Can, Appeal Compensation v. Ltd. Workers’ Universal (2000)). 2 Pa.480, 331 n. (Minteer), 762 A.2d 563 Bd. escaping the that there is no begin by noting We Court deemed that the Commonwealth harshness of the result was, and had Appellant commanded here. statutorily to be employee when months, full-time a continuous been for three Act not injury. Had the devastating work suffered his he was a amended, during which he period month the three been for calcu provided the measure employee would have most just because it was the average wage, and not lating his was a full- during which he quarter, only quarter or the recent to the quarter favorable the most employee, time but because agree statutory measure. We provided the worker/claimant that obvi one and the Commonwealth parties with the 309(d) was to to Section purpose of the amendment ous artificially benefits receiving inflated a claimant from prevent calculating select, measuring point for as the by being able to was during pay which his quarter a work average wage, light, the amendment in a broader atypically high. Viewed wages calculation of to that the attempt thus an ensure was measure of what accurate and realistic would be more injured had he not been expected to earn employee could have was not which, turn, employee that the would ensure both But, not over-burdened. over-compensated employer and the of his work receiving at the time wages appellant was not wages Those did artificially inflated. injury were rather, were “spike” pay; these “peak” a one-time reflect time of earned at the wages appellant regularly that appel Moreover, enduring fact of injury. ignoring even that, if no injury, question there is permanent lant’s total off he will still be worse prevail appeal, on appellant were injured, since he will financially than if had not been he
73 actually was receive but two-thirds of the he consistently earning injured job. at on the the time he alone cannot
The mere harshness of the result below emphasize only it legal analysis. dictate the course of our We seriously recognition that because we take this Court’s settled premise basic matters is workmen’s “[o]ur Compensation Act in nature the Workmen’s is remedial worker, and, therefore, the Act intended benefit the liberally must be its humanitarian construed effectuate objectives.” Peterson v. Compensation Appeal Workmen’s (PRN Pa.279, Bd. A.2d Nursing Agency), (1991) cases). (collecting Accordingly, interpreta [b]orderline Compensation] tions Act are to be construed [Workers’ injured party’s favor. v. Harper & Collins Workmen’s (Brown), Pa.484, Compensation Bd. Appeal (1996), citing Turner v. Jones Laughlin Corp., & Steel *7 (1978). 479 Pa.
Appellant misap- contends the Commonwealth Court plied holding average weekly the amended statute wage upon wages, must be calculated his actual full-time upon wages by but with averaging those diluted them two quarters part-time wages work as an industrious he earned high Appellant’s argument school student. is not a mere equitable that, Appellant one. submits when the General 309(d), type amended Section it did not consider the calamity of circumstantial that befell him and did not intend by the result commanded the Commonwealth statuto- Court’s ry interpretation. apply To “rigid” the amendment adopted by Court, fashion appellant the Commonwealth ar- gues, remedial, conflicts with the humanitarian nature permit Assembly’s overall Act and would attempt the General particular problem “to rights address one to defeat the of a different, facing difficult, worker a much and much more problem entirely.” Appellant, Brief for 7.
Relying upon legislative history by cited the Common- Court, appellant emphasizes wealth further that his is not situation that motivated the 1996 Act. amendment intendment” of the 1996
Appellant argues that the “true an calculation of provide was to accurate amendment pay cycle. in a by “high points” occasional wages, unaffected that, seeking far from a windfall based Appellant notes merely to avoid artificially “peaked” pay period, he seeks some artificially including devalued having wages his full-time entirely type of an different by analogy to dicta in this Court’s Finally, appellant cites (Katz) v. Appeal Bd. Compensation decision Workmen’s Bulletin, (1982). Pa.219, A.2d In that Evening case, prior part version of that this Court considered employer pay compen- an liable to 309 which rendered Section who, wages employee at the time sation for earned engaged employment in concurrent with injury, had been required at that the multiple employers. The subsection issue injury knowledge of the concur- employer liable for the have wages in- employment before those additional could be rent average weekly wage.1 The in the calculation of the cluded Evening Bulletin a union who worked claimant in worker newspaper as a part-time on an as-needed basis substitute agent hiring and “stuffer.” union served as the “mailer” claimant worked. newspaper employers for both for whom the union/hiring agent’s knowledge of the This held that the employ- to the concurrent had to be attributed conclusion, In at this dis- arriving the Court er/defendant. law, obvious development noting of this area of cussed the (whose employers economic interest was tension between worker) they limiting exposure usually paid to the (whose being interest was in made employee and the economic *8 injury). dismissing for work In the whole the effects employer’s overpayment, concern with this Court noted following: obviously repulsive legislation, remedial in
It to that is is legislation relegating intent, construe such as to part-time wage basis, although his actual claimant to Assembly amended the Act to delete the 1. The General has since knowledge employment. requirement the concurrent See 77 P.S. 582(e). member of the labor earnings that of a full-time are Moreover, injustice of an will example isolated any force. It situation. by an view of the eradicated overall be composite, sector as a employer’s to consider the legitimate premiums to perspective used determine since that is the It is not fair to compensation coverage. for workmen’s workman whose individual perspective such a apply upon the family may dependent his be life and that of entire given in a case. award received Appellant upon relies (emphasis supplied).
445 A.2d at support in of his claim emphasized language 309(d) is con- construction of Section Courts Commonwealth intent of the Act. trary to the overall straightfor- argument is short Employer’s responsive notes, panel as the Commonwealth Employer ward. 309(d) be- explicitly differentiate did, that section Although profess- and full-time part-time tween injury appellant crippling, permanent ing sympathy employ, employer argues in Section its suffered while 309(d)’s part-time employment respecting periods silence except not to indicating legislative judgment must be read Em- average wage. calculation of from inclusion them attempt appellant’s what it characterizes as ployer opposes formula.” private his “his own calculate benefits based very purpose submits that the of the amendment Employer practice allowing a Claimant choose was to “remove the average weekly earning quarter” calculating his highest formula, that, adopting wage. Employer further notes hoping “to curtail businesses and General ... leaving favor of other industry from the Commonwealth Laws.”2 Compensation with Workers’ states more favorable has also filed a Pennsylvania Amicus AFL-CIO Curiae that, at brief, appellant’s position. argues Amicus supporting argue point, employer suggest that respect With to the does not 2. last case, particular if appellant forwarded in this the construction competitive put Pennsylvania at a disadvan- accepted, would businesses Indeed, party tage in other states. neither accounts to businesses question presented approach the sub the manner in which other states judice. *9 76 part-time respect
least with to the to full-time here, Act is paradigm presented the amended not “clear and, ambiguity” thus, from all principles free resort 1921(b). statutory required. § construction is 1See Pa.C.S. Amicus that this Court’s decision in Lane Enterprises, *10 is, able the Commonwealth interpretation Court’s amicus then quotes panel’s own observation: law, present
Under the
an individual who works full
time
only
prior
injury
thirteen weeks
would be
to a
entitled
higher average weekly wage
individual,
calculation than an
case,
like Claimant in this
part
who worked
for the
time
quarters
first
three
and full time for
quarter
the last
preceding
injury.
In this comparison, the individual who
only
quarter
worked
last
would
greater
be awarded
benefits than a claimant who worked for an
year
entire
prior to
injury, although
both claimants had received the
wage
quarter
identical
for the last
injury.
before the
Amicus, 14,
of
quoting
HVAC,
Brief
Hannaberry
The statutory of construction is to determine 1921(a) the intent of Assembly. the General 1 § Pa.C.S. (court’s objective sole in construing or interpreting a statute remains to “ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Com., Assembly”). See P.R. v. Dept. Public Welfare, of Office 123, Hearings Appeals, 569 Pa. 478, 801 A.2d 482 (2002). When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, they presumed are to be the best indication of Pennsylvania intent. Financial Responsibility Assigned 424, Claims Plan English, v. 541 Pa.
(1995). However, if “the words of the statute are not explicit” issue, point on at “the intention of Assembly the General may be considering, among ascertained other matters:”
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) object The to be attained.
(5) law, any, other including former if statutes The subjects. same or similar
(6) interpretation. consequences particular of a The (7) history. contemporaneous legislative (8) interpretations of such and administrative Legislative statute. 1921(c). P.R., Moreover, Act also supra. §
1 Pa.C.S. See presume Assembly that the did requires that we General or 1 Pa.C.S. is absurd unreasonable. intend result 1922(1) (fundamental in- “ascertaining presumption Assembly in of a statute” the enactment tention the General that is does not intend result “the General unreasonable”); absurd, Housing impossible execution Com’n, Pa. v. County Chester Civil Service Authority (1999) (“The statutory principle first A.2d *11 legislative interpret will not enact- construction is courts imputes absurdity in ments a manner which the Blom, enactment.”); 609, Pa. A.2d accord Bowser v. (2002). of proper appeal that a We are satisfied resolution that, in those requires statutory light construction and of construction, Commonwealth Court’s inter- principles of the cannot To the pretation of the statute stand. understand 309(d) only view in context. ambiguity, one need Section 306(a) following provides of the Act framework Section the disability, a disability payments: “For total calculating total sixty-six per wages centum of the and two-thirds in the injured beginning as defined section 309 after employe disability, payable duration of day seventh of total the 511(1). Act, the disability....” total P.S. Section 309 of (Act 57), by of P.L. 350 as amended the Act June “wages,” provides computation pertinent for the of in then part, follows: used, ‘wages’ in this article the term it shall be
Wherever average weekly wages to mean the of the em- construed as follows: ploye, ascertained (a) injury wages by If at of are fixed the the time the the week, average weekly amount so fixed shall be the the wage;
(b) If injury wages by at the time of the the are fixed the month, average weekly wage monthly wage the shall be the by fifty-two; so multiplied by fixed twelve and divided (c) by If at injury wages the time of the the are fixed the year, average weekly wage yearly wage the shall be the so by fifty-two; fixed divided
(d) If injury wages by any at the time of the are fixed the (b) (a), (c), manner not in average enumerated clause the weekly wage by dividing by shall be calculated thirteen the total wages employ employer earned the the each highest the periods three the last four consecutive fifty-two immediately thirteen calendar weeks in the weeks preceding injury by averaging the the total amounts during periods. earned these three (d.l) If employe the employed by employ- has not been the er for at least three consecutive of thirteen calendar fifty-two immediately weeks preceding weeks injury, average weekly wage shall be calculated dividing by total employ thirteen the earned employer for any completed period of thirteen calendar weeks immediately preceding injury averaging during the total amounts periods. earned such (d.2) If employe complete period has than a worked less weekly thirteen calendar weeks and not have fixed wages, average weekly wage hourly wage shall be the multiplied rate by the number of employe hours the *12 expected per to work employment. week under the terms of (e) (d.l) Except provided (d.2), occupa- clause or tions which exclusively are seasonal and therefore cannot be throughout year, average carried on weekly wage shall be taken to be of wages one-fiftieth the total which the employe has earned from all occupations during the twelve immediately calendar months preceding injury, unless it during year, by be shown that such of exceptional reason causes, such computation method of not fairly ascertain period case the in which earnings employe, of the for the give a basis so far as shall be extended
calculation weekly earnings. average of his fair ascertainment § 582. 77 P.S. ad- many subsections (d), thus, one of is but
Subsection commonly relationships employment of dressing types various attempts to address The statute working world. found in the relationships general those manner fairly comprehensive in a fixed, in which upon the manner based (as with season- and, to a certain extent employment length of aas The Section of employees), type al calculation an accurate designed to ensure obviously is whole differing end, provided has wages. To this to differ- unique factors to account for of calculation methods employees respect arrangements. With ent computa- salary, the monthly, yearly weekly, paid a fixed types employees, other fairly straightforward. With tion is flexibility needed however, allows for the the statute notes, Thus, in the case as amicus accurate assessment. projection based workers, permits the statute recently hired “expected” to employee was of hours the upon the number 582(d.2). respect to seasonal Similarly, with work. P.S. for- general from a permits deviation employees, the statute if, “by year in a reason wages given focusing mula on the “does causes,” computation that method exceptional “in which case the earnings, fairly” employees ascertain give so far as to be extended for calculation shall period weekly earn- average of his fair basis for the ascertainment ings.” (d) language of subsection from the equally apparent
It is work (as (d.l), a similar which addresses as subsection well circumstance) employee’s that a “fair ascertainment” “averaging” formula is the intendment. in an generally result provisions should adopted these weekly wages average of the actual accurate assessment basis. hourly on an paid who are appellant, such as employees, amendment is corroborat- accuracy is the aim of the That such (d) old— with the of new subsection by comparison both ed *13 permitted employee rely upon the old subsection the to the highest quarter, calendar if it an even were aberration —and legislative history the upon by relied the Commonwealth Court, ie., Armstrong, the remarks of that suggesting Senator it necessary playing by eliminating to “level the field” the injured prior ability rely exclusively upon worker’s to an artificially peaked quarter wages. By of making average weekly wage employees dependent upon averaging these an employment, thirteen-week obvi- the amendment ously to to a was intended lead calculation which would more accurately hourly wages. reflect the worker’s true case, however,
This gap reveals scheme greater accuracy and movement toward calculation average weekly wage. As was the in Lane Enterprises, case 309(d) simply Section address the circumstance that i.e., dispute crux of judice, sub the situation where (or here, injured progressed literally gradu- worker had as ated) part-time, from after-class to student full- employer time work. We do not share the confidence Assembly the Commonwealth Court that the General must have to intended silence have the actual of the injured employee in that all circumstance —unlike other statutory workers under the overall scheme—underestimat- ed. fact that Assembly anticipate the General did not precise scenario is no to reason assume that it intended totally result at logical odds with the otherwise and consistent slant of legislation and its purpose. humanitarian We think it that would do extreme to violence Section 309 and the overall Act to assume sub silentio intended single employees to out appellant’s such circumstances as special, punitive treatment based an unrealistic as- wages. sessment of part-time
Since Section does not address the here, paradigm presented and a reading of the as requiring statute dilution of the contrary benefit would be Act, the overall humanitarian purpose of the resort principles statutory appropriate. construction is Those principles that appellant’s part-time wages dictate not be him a result of due to to dilute the benefit
permitted time, became, and had been some he injury suffered after “occasion employee. Consideration a full-time *14 amendment, under “the circumstances necessity” for remedy, enacted,” sought it to the mischief it was which law, 1 Pa.C.S. attain, the former and object sought it appellant’s 1921(c)(1) (5), calculating in favor of weigh all — quarter his weekly wage based average legislation, in as noted change effected less, in more, accuracy not above, ensuring at was aimed sought to mischief average weekly wage. The computation of history, id. (as revealed, part, by legislative in be remedied 1921(c)(7)) i.e., artificially exclusively upon relying workers — in workers’ thereby receiving and more pay peaked in the work they than would have received circumstances. by appellant’s implicated not at all force—is in and the WCAB by the the WCJ As reflected decisions with judice, sub interpretation is also consistent our the case Id. interpretation of the amendment. administrative 1921(c)(8). consequences interpretation of our Finally, the purpose of Section 309—to general overall (cid:127)will further the contrary average weekly wage accurately calculate —while lead, recog- as the Commonwealth Court interpretation would 1921(c)(6). weekly wage.” See id. nized, “grossly to a unfair Enterprises, in Lane con- Furthermore, we are no less than and leads to an absurd contrary interpretation that a vinced presume not the General result we will result —a unreasonable 1922(1). Id. Assembly to have intended. law, the former holding today, we do resurrect
By our quarter employ- to the that the most favorable specified which average weekly wage. New-subsection measure of ee be the (d) paradigms for law for those work governing remains the intended, work averaging designated of the it was which Nor, contrary employer’s argu- periods is the formula. ment, private “own formula” approving appellant’s are we merely hold that calculating average weekly wage. We (d) calculation in a circum- not control the subsection stance, one, grossly it would lead to a as this where such average of a worker’s week- demonstrably inaccurate measure circumstance, not bottom, this case involves a ly wage. At Assem- complicated age, in where the General uncommon factual scenario. contemplate a certain bly specifically did not we But, guidance. without For the reasons we are not left above, discerning difficulty no specified we have have accurate measurement overall intent ensure intent, turn, question present- interpretive resolves the Accordingly, reverse the Commonwealth ed herein. we Court’s order and reinstate the order WCJ.
Reversed. participate ZAPPALA did not
Former Chief Justice of this case. decision dissenting opinion
Justice EAKIN files a which Chief joins. Justice CAPPY *15 dissenting.
Justice EAKIN 309(d) § I is respectfully dissent from the conclusion that ambiguous, requiring engage statutory interpretation us to to fashion a desired result for unfortunate cases such as not, appellant’s. provides simple Like it or statute explicit formula for calculation of wages, and there is no exception scenario; present oversight an which leads equivalent to a harsh is not of ambiguity. result See (Pa. DPW, 635, Dept. Scanlon v. 739 A.2d 638 Aging, Cmwlth.1999) (statute ambiguous language is or if its unclear subject is to two or more interpretations). reasonable
In general, Compensation Act not the Workers’ distin- guish part-time and 77 employment. between See 309(d) § 22 (defining “employe”). P.S. Section likewise does distinction; wage purposes, not make this calculation (d) length subsection focuses on the and the amount of compensation. “Employe” “wages,” as used 309(d), § subject interpre- are not to two or more reasonable 1921(b) (“When tations. 1 the words of a See Pa.C.S. ambiguity, statute are clear and from all of it is free letter not disregarded pretext pursuing to be under the its
84 Com’n., v.
spirit.”); Energy Pipeline Pennsylvania Utility Co. 641, (1995) 252, (plain 541 Pa. 644 words of statute disregarded language cannot is free and clear from be where 340, v. 397 Pa. ambiguity); MacDougall MacDougall all (1959) (statute’s plain A.2d words cannot be disre- accomplishing good purpose, particu- garded pretext under larly language ambiguity). is free and clear from all where undisputed appellant, although working part-
It is a student time, employed by Hannaberry was and received HVAC language for this Under the of the clear statute, consecutive, appellant employed for at least four quarters year preceding injury, in the and his 13-week calculation. part-time wages wage are to be included one, equitable part-time employee not an for a The result is during quarter status last who assumes full-time before injury prior part-time than if had no receives less there been wages. all Legislature’s anticipate potential employ- failure ambiguity; simply not amount it
ment situations does application statutory means there are situations of the where may yield signals formula not This fact the result intended. However, adjusting for revision of the definite need statute.1 incongruity Legislature, task for the not this Court. Co., Pa. Metropolitan See Frost v. Ins. A.2d Life (1940) (hardship equity of case cannot override statute, court, plain legislature, words of must correct evil). any unfortunate, result in this case is I am
While the reluctant statutory formula, exceptions application to carve out *16 ambiguity Arguments unjust absent the statute. revision, acknowledged quot- 1. The Commonwealth Court the need for (R. Lancaster; ing Armstrong a comment made Senator Gibson E. York) during legislative concerning the debate 1996 amendments: perfect. cannot write bill that is I do not think we have ever [Y]ou perfect. written a bill here that Some areas of this bill will do, probably adjusted, they you if need to be I am here to tell I anyone adjust quickly possible. will work with them as Jr.), (Pa. Hannaberty (Snyder, HVAC v. WCAB 653-54 Journal, Cmwlth.2001) 10, 1996, (quoting Legislative p. Senate June 2157). uncontemplated of a do not amount results scheme ambiguity, ambiguity should not courts manufacture said, disagreeable hope avoid a That I echo result. appeal present “that Commonwealth Court this would situa- tion that would compel just adjustment such the General HVAC, Assembly.” Hannaberry at 654. joins dissenting opinion.
Chief Justice CAPPY
v. ZONING HEARING BOARD OF MIDDLETOWN
TOWNSHIP, Appellee. Cummings,
Dale and Connie Intervenors.
Supreme Pennsylvania. May
Submitted 2002.
Decided
2003.
Oct.
notes
(Patton),
Inc. v.
Compensation Appeal
Workers’
Bd.
Pa.426,
(1994),