2019 CO 72
Colo.2019Background
- Leo Phillips was stopped for driving with a suspended license; he was placed in the back of a patrol car, questioned without Miranda warnings, and later transported to the station where he received Miranda warnings and made additional statements.
- A search of Phillips’s car (after an alleged consent given while he was in the patrol car) produced a handgun under the driver’s seat.
- Pretrial, Phillips moved to suppress (1) statements made in the police car, (2) statements made at the police station, and (3) the handgun. The court suppressed the police-car statements but admitted the station statements and the gun.
- On appeal Phillips pressed new legal theories for suppression he had not advanced below: that the station statements were tainted fruit of the illegal police-car interrogation (a Seibert/Elstad two-step challenge), and that consent to search the car was tainted by the Miranda violation.
- The court of appeals held Phillips waived these unpreserved arguments; the Colorado Supreme Court agreed they were unpreserved but held they were forfeited (not waived) under People v. Rediger and therefore reviewable only for plain error.
- Applying plain-error review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed: admission of the station statements was not error under the two-step/Elstad framework, and the record was too undeveloped to show plain error as to voluntariness of consent for the gun search.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Phillips preserved appellate challenges to admission of station statements and the gun | Phillips argued the station statements were tainted fruit of the police-car Miranda violation and consent to search was tainted by that violation | Trial-court motions argued narrower grounds; appellate arguments were new and unraised below | Phillips failed to preserve both claims; they were forfeited (not waived) and reviewed for plain error |
| Whether unpreserved suppression claims were waived or forfeited | Forfeiture: failure to raise claims was neglect, entitling appellate plain-error review | Waiver: intentional relinquishment should bar review | Court followed Rediger: no record evidence of intentional relinquishment, so forfeiture rather than waiver |
| Whether station statements should have been suppressed as product of a deliberate two-step interrogation | Two-step (Seibert) argument: initial unwarned questioning tainted later Miranda-waived statements | Prosecution: no deliberate two-step; Elstad governs and post-warning waiver and voluntariness suffice | No plain error: court concluded police did not deliberately employ two-step tactics and Elstad requirements were met |
| Whether admission of the gun was plain error because consent was tainted by unlawful custodial interrogation | Consent was involuntary because given during unwarned custodial interrogation | Record insufficiently developed to show voluntariness was overborne; factual disputes exist | Not plain error on the record presented; factual development needed to show taint |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (establishes Miranda-warning requirements for custodial interrogation)
- Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (U.S. 2004) (two-step interrogation analysis; Kennedy concurrence adopted by Colorado)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1985) (post-warning statements admissible if subsequent waiver is knowing and voluntary)
- People v. Rediger, 416 P.3d 893 (Colo. 2018) (distinguishes waiver from forfeiture; mere failure to object is forfeiture absent record of intentional relinquishment)
- United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1993) (articulates legal distinction between waiver and forfeiture)
- People v. Verigan, 420 P.3d 247 (Colo. 2018) (applies Seibert/Elstad framework for two-step interrogation in Colorado)
- Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2007) (prior Colorado case discussing waiver by counsel’s procedural default)
