Phillip Andrew Campbell v. the State of Texas, 625 S.W.3d 675

Phillip Andrew Campbell choked Jade during consensual rough sex/erotic asphyxiation; she died and autopsy showed injuries beyond simple asphyxia.
Campbell was charged with murder (result-of-conduct offense) and convicted by a jury.
The murder jury charge included an erroneous, un-tailored definition of "intentionally" that described intent as to the nature of conduct (e.g., intending to choke) rather than intent as to the result (causing death).
Campbell objected at trial, arguing the definition should be limited to intent as to the result; the State conceded on appeal that the definition was erroneous under Price v. State.
The sole remaining appellate question addressed by the dissent is whether the charge error caused "some" (i.e., actual) harm under Almanza, warranting reversal; the majority affirmed the conviction, but the dissent would reverse and remand for a new trial.

Issue	Campbell's Argument	State's Argument	Held (Dissent)
Whether the jury charge erred by defining "intentionally" with respect to nature of conduct instead of result	The definition was erroneous and not tailored to the result element of murder	Error existed but any harm was not shown or was harmless	Charge was erroneous and prejudicial because it allowed conviction for conduct (intent to choke) that is not necessarily intent to kill
Whether the charge error caused "some" (actual) harm under Almanza	Error deprived Campbell of his only viable defense (lack of intent to cause death); harm is actual	Harm is theoretical or harmless given the evidence of intent	Error caused actual harm because it made a murder finding inevitable by permitting conviction on a non-result intent
Whether evidence showing Campbell intended to choke supports affirmance despite charge error	Even if appellant intended to choke, that does not equate to intent to kill; charge error prevented jury from distinguishing	The evidence of multiple manners/means supporting intent to kill undermines harm claim	The erroneous definition allowed a conviction on a theory not charged; that uncertainty requires reversal rather than relying on sufficiency analysis
Who bears burden to show harm on Almanza review	No party bears the burden; appellate court must independently assess harm	Same (court evaluates record)	Court must independently determine harm; here the record demonstrates actual harm and reversal is required

Price v. State, 457 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (trial court must limit culpable‑mental‑state language to the applicable conduct element)
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (harmless‑error framework for jury‑charge error; assess "some" vs. "egregious" harm)
Jordan v. State, 593 S.W.3d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) ("some harm" requires actual, not theoretical, prejudice; evaluate whole record)
Cornet v. State, 417 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (error reversal required if calculated to injure defendant's rights)
Schroeder v. State, 123 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (murder is a result‑of‑conduct offense)
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000) (civil jury‑charge error analysis illustrating prejudice when verdict could rest on improper theory)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standards for sufficiency of the evidence)
Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (no party bears burden in Almanza harm analysis)