5 F.4th 1204
11th Cir.2021Background:
- Marin booked a rental car on Orbitz and clicked to accept Orbitz’s Terms of Use, which contain a mandatory arbitration provision defining “Claims” as disputes relating to five categories including “any services or products provided.”
- Orbitz’s Terms define capital-S “Services” as products and services provided by Orbitz (not third parties) and require claimants first to notify Orbitz and wait 60 days before filing suit.
- Marin rented from Sixt, executed a separate Sixt contract (with no arbitration clause), was later billed for alleged damage, and sued Sixt (not Orbitz) in federal court for breach and consumer‑protection claims on behalf of a putative class.
- Sixt moved to compel arbitration under Orbitz’s Terms of Use, arguing the clause binds claims against travel suppliers and covers “any services or products provided.”
- The district court denied the motion; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the phrase refers to Orbitz’s own offerings and that Marin’s suit did not fall within the arbitration clause or the FAA’s reach.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “any services or products provided” in the definition of “Claims” refers to Orbitz’s offerings only or to services/products provided by anyone | Marin: phrase refers to Orbitz’s own services/products; dispute with Sixt is outside clause | Sixt: phrase is broad and covers any services/products, so claims against travel suppliers like Sixt are arbitrable | The phrase refers to services/products provided by Orbitz only; Sixt’s rental‑car dispute is not a “Claim” under the Terms of Use |
| Whether the FAA’s pro‑arbitration canon (Moses H. Cone) controls scope in close cases — i.e., does Marin’s suit “aris[e] out of” his Orbitz contract so the canon applies | Marin: suit does not arise out of Orbitz contract and is too attenuated for the FAA presumption to apply | Sixt: any ambiguous scope should be resolved in favor of arbitration under Moses H. Cone | Moses H. Cone presumption does not apply because Marin’s dispute did not arise out of the Orbitz contract (so the FAA’s canon does not mandate arbitration) |
| Whether Marin’s claims “relat[e] in any way to” Orbitz Services such that they are arbitrable under Florida’s interpretation rules | Marin: mere booking via Orbitz is insufficient; suit lacks a significant relationship to Orbitz Services | Sixt: booking through Orbitz satisfies the “relat[e] in any way to” language and triggers arbitration | Court: under Florida law a “significant relationship” is required; Marin’s suit does not significantly depend on facts about Orbitz Services and thus is not arbitrable |
Key Cases Cited
- Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (establishes the pro‑arbitration canon often applied under the FAA)
- Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587 (Fla. 2013) (Florida rule: interpret arbitration provisions by parties’ intent and plain language)
- Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 657 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2011) (explains “arising out of” is broad but not all‑encompassing for arbitration scope)
- Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train, 690 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982) (dispute did not arise out of the referenced contract; limits FAA reach)
- Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 977 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2020) (concurrence emphasizing FAA’s “arising out of” nexus requirement)
- KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18 (2011) (reiterates FAA’s federal policy favoring arbitration)
- Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (FAA places arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts)